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ABSTRACT
The Republican party organized its first presidential 
campaign in 1856. The party was composed of men from a 
wide variety of political backgrounds, primarily from free 
soil and anti-slavery groups. The rhetoric of this first 
Republican campaign represented the efforts of these 
individual speakers to reconcile their free soil arguments 
with the official party platform. Although the party was 
loosely organized and poorly funded, many respected 
orators participated in the campaign.
As background for the rhetorical analysis, the major 
political and historical events of the decade are 
identified in the first two chapters. Bleeding Kansas, 
abolitionism, and the reorganization of the major 
political parties are examined for their contribution to 
the rhetorical exigence of the political situation.
The analytical portion of the study first identifies 
the method by which the party was organized in the period 
between 1854 and 1856. Then, the primary arguments 
employed by the Republican speakers are analyzed in three 
separate chapters for their logical, ethical, and 
emotional forms of proof. Individual speeches are
v
analyzed for the major form of artistic proof employed by 
the speaker. Some speakers argued for adoption of the 
Republican platform on logical grounds and other men 
employed emotional appeals with great skill. Personal 
credibility, mainly the eye-witness to the violence in 
Kansas, was an important artistic proof in the 1856 
campaign.
John C. Frfemont, the Republican presidential candidate, 
did not speak publicly during the campaign. Instead, the 
party was represented by surrogate speakers. Among these 
speakers were former Barnburner Democrats, Liberty party 
members, Conscience Whigs, and political abolitionists.
The rhetorical constraints posed by such a wide variety of 
political coalitions justifies this type of individual 
speech analysis.
The study concludes with a discussion of the 
effectiveness of the rhetoric of the presidential campaign 
of 1856. Suggestions for further study are also included.
Introduction
Statement of the Problem
The success of the Republican campaign of 1856 is 
difficult to measure against other national campaigns of 
the era. The immediate political challenge to the 
Republican organization, James Buchanan and the Democratic 
party campaign effort, was relatively well organized 
throughout the nation and had access to substantial 
campaign funds. The Republicans were campaigning out of 
their own pockets while devising strategy on a day-by-day 
basis. Yet, the Republicans accrued nearly one-third of 
the popular vote while actively campaigning in only one 
portion of the country. Not only is that measure of 
success remarkable, but it is equally significant that a 
national party should emerge out of the diversity of 
coalitions which struggled to control the fledgling party.
In general, American third parties have not fared well 
in the political arena. In the campaign of 1856, the 
Republicans faced the additional challenge of creating a 
party out of such diverse elements as former Whigs and 
abolitionists. How were the Republicans able to marshall 
the support necessary to create a new party that enjoyed
1
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such rapid success? The procedure was complex, and many 
forces contributed to the shaping of the new party. 
However, one element was the campaign oratory. This study 
is a rhetorical criticism of the Republican campaign­
speaking. Specifically, the study examines the choice of 
issues used by the speakers, and the manner in which they 
sought to adapt those issues to audiences. The 
investigation concludes with an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of those speeches.
Methodology
The present study is offered, not as a history of the 
speaking in the first Republican campaign, but rather as a 
rhetorical criticism of the speeches. As criticism, the 
present investigation attempts to draw some conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the campaign oratory. The 
methodology chosen for this study combines features from 
Lloyd Bitzer's rhetorical situation* and a neo- 
Aristotelian approach.2 The approach is based on the 
concept that speeches create meaning as a result of a 
rhetorical transaction between the audience and the text. 
Consequently, the critic must first of all place the 
speeches in an historical context in order to understand 
the circumstances that produced the speeches (the 
rhetorical exigence, in Bitzer's terminology), the
characteristics of the audience that might affect their 
reaction to the speeches, and the constraints that the 
context imposed on what the speakers could or could not do 
in the speeches. It is not the intent of the study to 
write a history of the period, which has been competently 
provided by numerous historians, but rather to use those 
histories to reconstruct the features of the historical 
context necessary to understand the rhetorical situation 
that produced the speeches.
However, a weakness of the rhetorical situation 
methodology is that it does not lend itself well to a 
criticism of the speech texts. Therefore, in the analysis 
of the speeches themselves, the study relies on a 
modification of the neo-Aristotelian approach. 
Specifically, the analysis will examine the major premises 
from which the speakers developed their ideas, and the 
artistic proofs used to support those ideas. The artistic 
proofs consist of logical support for ideas, including 
reasoning and evidence, as well as appeals to the emotions 
of listeners and appeals based on the credibility of the 
speaker. The organization of the speeches will be 
examined also. However, delivery will be discussed only 
in general terms, since first-hand accounts of the 
speakers' delivery on specific occasions are usually not 
available. Finally, the speeches will be evaluated 
against the background provided by the rhetorical
4
situation in order to reach some judgments about the 
effectiveness of the speeches.
Data
The primary data for this study were individual speech 
texts. Those speeches were published in the New York 
daily newspapers during the campaign period. These texts 
were transcribed by trained reporters during the speech 
act; so the possibility of textual error exists. However, 
since the major speaking events were attended by many 
members of the press, there are usually two or more 
reports of any large gathering. Textual authenticity can 
be checked by reading the various accounts of each major 
speech. None of the newspapers examined carried 
challenges or corrections to any of the speech texts 
included in the study. Therefore, the texts seem to be 
reliable.
In addition to the speech texts, data included the 
biographies of the leading political figures of the era. 
Many of these biographies included information about the 
subject's speech training and physical delivery in 
addition to information on speaking events.
Finally, standard histories of the period provided the 
background data for reconstructing the rhetorical 
situation in which the campaign took place. Some of these
wr
works dealt in general with the pre-Civil War period in 
the North and the western frontier, while others addressed 
topics necessary to an understanding of the rhetorical 
context of the speeches.
Organization of the Study
The first three chapters describe the rhetorical 
situation. Chapter 1 traces the history of the active 
political parties from 1840 through 1854. The breakdown 
of the Whig party, the constantly shifting abolitionist 
loyalties, the power struggles in the Democratic party, 
and the rise of the Know-Nothings are briefly examined as 
a part of the exigence which gave rise to the Republican 
party. Chapter 2 examines the issues of the 1856 
campaign: the violence in Kansas and Nebraska, the 
emerging sectionalism, and the abolitionist tendencies of 
the radical Republicans. Chapter 3 analyzes the 
organizational structure of the party as it relates to the 
rhetorical strategies and constraints of the first 
Republican campaign. In this third chapter, the 
"enactment" or structural formation of the organization is 
analyzed for its contribution to an understanding of 
communication among campaign participants, a situation 
that created rhetorical constraints for the speakers.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 analyze the speech texts. In 
order, they examine the three forms of artistic proof: 
ethos, logos and pathos. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
credibility of the speakers and its effect on the campaign 
rhetoric. Chapter 5 describes the logical proof in terms 
of the evidence and reasoning processes used by the 
speakers to support their claims. Chapter 6 looks at the 
emotional appeals generated by the speakers.
Chapter 7 summarizes the findings and draws conclusions 
about the rhetorical effectiveness of the speeches and the 
significance of the campaign oratory in terms of the 
future development of the Republican party.
Previous and Contributory Studies
No previous political or historical studies 
specifically examine the rhetorical strategies of the 1856 
Republican campaign. However, several studies contributed 
significantly to the description of the rhetorical 
situation, enough as to warrant special mention.
Eric Foner, author of Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: 
The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil 
War,3 provided the basic framework for discussion of the 
rhetorical situation which produced the speeches. 
Especially with regard to the concept of the "free soil" 
ideal, Foner clarified several lines of reasoning which
orators used throughout the campaign. Allan Nevins' two- 
volume work, The Ordeal of the Union, was also 
particularly valuable.^
Literary biographies of the leading Republican figures 
of the nineteenth century provide some intellectual 
insight into the motivation behind their political 
affiliation. Those works were useful in this study as a 
means of identifying common themes developed by the 
speakers.
Justification for the Study
Very little rhetorical research appears to have been 
done in the historical period immediately predating the 
American Civil War. Although a wealth of academic inquiry 
has been published concerning the inflammatory rhetoric of 
the armed conflict, little has been documented with regard 
to the emergent political themes in the decade predating 
the outbreak of war.
Individual biographies of outspoken politicians, both 
North and South, dominate the literature. The southern 
"fire eaters" and the northern abolitionist protesters 
have been examined exhaustively. Yet, the political 
activism of the mid-1850's provided the catalytic force 
which arrayed the country against itself. How was it 
done?
A study of the rhetoric of the first Republican 
campaign is a logical starting place for analysis. The 
national party did not exist prior to 1856, yet it ran a 
successful contest against a larger, wealthier, better 
organized political entity. Party spokesmen were 
responsible for uniting the North and West against the 
powerful Democratic party, against the entire South, and 
against the nativist American party. With limited funding 
and reliance on public speaking and the newspapers to 
reach the masses, the Republicans successfully united 
nearly one-third of the nation in a brief four-month 
period during which an explosive internal crisis removed 
many of their most brilliant speakers to Washington, D.C., 
to deliberate in a special session.
An examination of the speeches of the 1856 campaign may 
provide a useful supplement to the political and 
historical analyses of the Pre-Civil War era. It may be 
that the rhetoric of the first Republicans contains a key 
to understanding the sectional re-alignment of politics 
prior to the conflict. However, the particular aim of 
this study is to determine the rhetorical strategies 
employed by an emergent political party in its efforts to 
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Chapter 1 
Anti-Slavery Politics - 1840-1854
1854 was a year characterized by physical violence.
From the floor of the Senate to the plains of Kansas, 
bloodshed often resulted as politicians clashed. This 
escalating violence provided an "imperative stimulus," or 
exigence, which, according to Lloyd Bitzer's situational 
method of rhetorical analysis, is a necessary component of 
any rhetorical situation.1 Situational exigence may be 
defined as the actual or potential urgency of some 
imperfection which may be modified only through discourse.
However, the Republican speakers faced serious 
rhetorical constraints. Four major constraints, or 
situational limitations on the speaker's ability to engage 
in successful discourse, are examined in the first four 
chapters of this study. In this first chapter, the major 
political coalitions of 1840-1854 are examined for their 
influence on the rhetoric of the Republican campaign.
The major campaign issue in 1856 was the repeal of the 
Missouri Compromise. Northerners were angry about the 
extension of slavery into the new territories of Kansas 
and Nebraska. Southerners were defensive about the 
northern resistance to the use of slaves in the prime, 
western farming regions. These sectional attitudes
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further divided the political parties during the years 
between 1840 and the Civil War, but each party drew new 
strength from its sectional realignment.
The major parties were split by powerful factions and 
coalitions throughout the twenty years that preceded the 
Civil War. The Whig party was essentially powerless by 
1852. Third parties regularly formed and disbanded with 
each presidential election from 1840 through 1852. Many 
of the new parties represented abolitionist or free soil 
interests. The Democrats faced serious internal sectional 
conflicts between 1852 and 1856.
The Democrats were split by the (radical) Barnburner 
faction in 1844, the Southern Rights Party (under John C. 
Calhoun) in 1846, and the Free Soilers in 1848. The 
Conscience Whigs emerged as a faction within the Whig 
party in 1845. Even the Liberty party, formed in 1840 to 
promote abolition and free soil territories, was split in 
1844 by Salmon P. Chase and his coalitionists.
However, throughout this era of political realignment, 
the radical factions remained within their parties. Party 
loyalty superseded sectional identification until the 
1850s. Radical Whig and Democratic party members did not 
form new parties. Instead, they attempted to purge 
perceived ideological inconsistencies within their 
respective parties. The factions reflected a desire to 
return to earlier, more basic political issues, to
12
redefine the ideological differences which characterized 
the formative era of each party. Coalitions did not form 
across party lines until after 1850. When the Compromise 
of 1850 made the extension of slavery a regional rather 
than a party issue, concerned men of all parties began to 
plan for a national, anti-slavery coalition.
This chapter reviews three political developments 
during the twenty years which preceded the presidential 
campaign of 1856. First, the abolitionist societies of 
1839-1850 are analyzed for their contribution to the 
political status of the anti-slavery movement. This 
examination demonstrates the predisposition of the New 
England and Western Reserve regions to support anti­
slavery activities, a major factor in the success of the 
Republican campaign of 1856. The movement for the 
abolition of slavery reached its apex as an anti-slavery 
political movement in 1856, when the Republican party 
drafted a radical, anti-expansionist platform at .its 
inaugural convention.
Second, this chapter reviews the political events 
surrounding President John Tyler's bid for the annexation 
of Texas as a slave state and its impact on the Democratic 
and Whig parties. Although a member of neither major 
political party, Tyler initiated a political issue which 
resulted in the sectional realignment of American politics
13
and the loss of all support in his renomination bid in 
1844.
Third, this chapter reviews the changes within each 
political party that resulted from the internal divisions 
over the expansion issue. These structural realignments 
occurred in every party, directly relating to the 
formation of the Republican party in 1854. The major 
coalitions that became the nucleus of the Republican 
organization are analyzed for their rhetorical strategies 
and fantasy themes that carried over into the 1856 
campaign. The variety of political experience its charter 
members brought to the Republican party was broad, but the 
variety also provided the vitality and met the exigence of 
the inflammatory political situation.
American Antislavery Societies
American antislavery and manumission societies predated 
the Revolution and remained active throughout the 
eighteenth century.2 The Pennsylvania Abolition Society, 
for example, was founded by Benjamin Franklin in 1 7 0 9^ and 
Philadelphia retained its pre-eminence as a center for 
abolitionist activities throughout the Civil War era.
The New York City Manumission Society was formed in 
1785,4 ana New England fostered abolitionists among many 
of the leading political families. The most persistent
14
abolitionists were the Quakers, whose active involvement 
in behalf of enslaved Africans began in the late 
seventeenth century. However, the founding of the 
American Anti-Slavery Society in December of 1833 marked 
the true organizational thrust of the movement.5 The 
Society was founded in Boston, Massachusetts, by William 
Lloyd Garrison. It was a strange ideological mixture, 
being anti-political and anti-ecclesiastical. Garrison 
would brook no compromise.
Garrison demanded immediate emancipation. His views 
were widely known outside of abolition circles, since he 
was a prolific writer and a well-traveled speaker.® He 
elicited extreme reactions from his audiences - he was 
hailed either as a messiah of emancipation or a raving 
zealot. By 1835, his influence was most prevalent in those 
churches where individual ministers enjoyed the freedom to 
rail against the moral evils of slavery by using 
Garrison's arguments.7 However, many of the organized 
religions did not support formally any type of abolition. 
The mob violence that often greeted Garrison and other 
abolitionist speakers was condemned by religious leaders. 
David Christy, author of Pulpit Politics, recorded the 
deliberations of the national Baptist, Methodist, 
Presbyterian, and Catholic councils, which discussed 
abolition during the pre-Civil War era.® Religious 
leaders preferred to advocate a non-violent end to
15
bondage, leaving the means of effecting manumission to the 
politicians.
For a variety of reasons, political leaders shied away 
from supporting Garrison's program of immediate abolition. 
The breakdown of law and order that accompanied 
abolitionist gatherings was one reason, but the influence 
of the southern politicians in Congress was probably the 
most important reason. Pressure from commercial interests, 
especially those northern concerns carrying substantial 
southern industrial accounts, contributed to the political 
expediency of re-establishing law and order rather than 
pressing for an end to slavery.® Garrison's radical 
tactics were an impediment to accomplishing a political 
solution to the slavery issue during the 1830s.
By the end of the decade, Garrison had embraced women's 
suffrage and a form of "Christian anarchy," ideas so 
extreme that conservative abolitionists were alienated 
from his o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e  schism between Garrison and 
the conservatives resulted in the breakdown of the 
American Anti-Slavery Society in 1840.
In 1839, a religious abolitionist group was organized 
by Lewis Tappan.*1 This American and Foreign Anti- 
Slavery Society first met in New York City, sharing 
pulpits with sympathetic ministers throughout the city. 
Tappan's group suggested that slavery must be abolished 
through legal means, that is, the slave states
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themselves, had to remove slavery from their own 
constitutions. This voluntary constitutional abolition of 
slavery would be morally preferable to having such 
legislation forced upon them by Congress.*2 Members of 
the group encouraged the slave states to pursue 
educational programs designed to prepare the slaves for 
their lives of freedom. Geography doomed Tappan's group 
to failure. Their rhetoric was successful in recruiting 
sympathetic northern churchgoers to the abolitionist 
ideals, but the pulpits of southern churches were closed 
to society members. The society was preaching to the 
converted, not to those who needed conversion.13
Tappan's strategy was to apply internal pressure on the 
major organized religions, especially the Presbyterians, 
the Methodists, and the Baptists. However, these groups 
were no more receptive to Tappan's abolitionists than were 
the political party leaders to Garrison's followers. 
Tappan's program was too radical to interest the large, 
conservative organizations— especially those with large 
southern memberships. Influential southern church members 
would hardly support a policy of abolition even if 
endorsed by its denominational leadership, making church- 
sanctioned abolition an inexpedient national policy. 
Without the support of the major churches, the society 
remained little more than a loose network of local groups. 
Members had control over some newspapers, providing a
17
propaganda outlet. However, the society was essentially a 
nondenominational religious group that was unattractive to 
both organized religion and the major political parties.
The transition from pulpit to politics began in 1840.*4 
Popular interest in the abolition of slavery became a 
potent political force, especially in New England where 
the fugitive slave laws were ignored or brashly, openly 
broken whenever possible. Campaigning politicians could 
no longer ignore the issue in the northeastern United 
States, since their constituents demanded that action be 
taken against the new, stronger fugitive slave laws. 
Political abolition failed as a moral issue, but abolition 
as a popular sovereignty issue had political significance.
Some abolitionists had been elected to local and state 
offices in the northeast.15 These men began to question 
publicly the constitutionality of the laws surrounding the 
practice of slavery, particularly the fugitive slave laws 
and the gag rule that bound Congress.
As an example, John Quincy Adams spent years fighting 
against the First Amendment violations that resulted from 
Congressional legislation favorable to the slavery 
interests. Adams was the popularly acknowledged spokesman 
of the anti-slavery politicians who served in the House 
during the 1830s and 1840s.*6 Adams was neither an 
abolitionist nor the catalyst for the politicalization of 
abolition. In fact, he published an "indictment" against
the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1839.1^ His 
indictment was inspired by the internal conflict that 
characterized the society and undermined its credibility 
with the people it sought to persuade at a time when Adams 
was trying to secure the congressional right of petition 
for abolitionists.
Adams was not interested in the abolitionists per se.
He was a strict constitutionalist who was horrified at the 
Pinckney resolutions that were in effect in Congress.
These resolutions were a series of increasingly severe 
restrictions on the introduction of anti-slavery petitions 
to Congress. The resolutions demanded, in essence, that 
all anti-slavery petitions introduced to the House be 
automatically tabled without being read, printed or 
referenced in any fashion.18
Adams protested that the "gag rule" not only violated 
the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, but 
that it set a dangerous precedent. If the "gag rule" 
could be enforced, then the precedent existed to introduce 
and enforce other rules which violated Constitutional 
guarantees. His popular image as the anti-slavery 
spokesman resulted from his courage in testing the 
strength of the resolutions. On January 9, 1837, Adams 
attempted to read a petition protesting slavery in the 
District of Columbia into the daily proceedings of the 
House. His fellow representatives shouted him down,
19
refusing to allow him to read the petition. On January 18, 
only nine days after his abortive attempt to petition an 
end to slavery in the District, the gag rule was renewed 
by a large majority.!9
The Pinckney resolutions and their support by the 
southern members of Congress and some northern 
conservatives helped to focus northern attention on the 
"unified" southern voting block that had evolved in 
Congress. This first experience with sectionalism would 
become very important in the 1850s.
Annexation of Texas
Anti-slavery legislation was not a major political 
issue in the early 1840s, in spite of John Quincy Adams' 
dramatic attempts to break the gag rule. However, John 
Tyler's proposal to annex Texas as a slave state prodded 
politicians to weigh the ramifications of slavery as a 
party issue in 1844.
John Tyler succeeded to the presidency in 1841 upon the 
death of Benjamin Harrison. Although he was elected as a 
member of the Whig party, Tyler disengaged himself from 
the Whigs early in his administration by vetoing a number 
of economic bills that were critical to the Whig program
20
begun by Harrison.20 ^s a result of his unpopular action, 
Tyler was formally "read out" of the Whig party and the 
entire cabinet resigned.21
Tyler promptly presented the names of his new cabinet 
officers to the Senate for confirmation. The new 
President was already meeting regularly with his new 
cabinet in September of 1841.22 a result, Abel P. 
Upsher, who replaced Daniel Webster as Secretary of State, 
was instructed to b'jgin immediate negotiations for the 
annexation of Texas.
Tyler's reasons for immediate annexation seemed clear 
to experienced politicians like Adams. Adams revealed in 
his correspondence that he expected most of Tyler'a 
presidential actions to be directed at securing re- 
election in 1844. Tyler, a president without a party, 
needed an issue with which to secure a nomination from a 
sympathetic political organization. Adams recorded with 
great interest the furor created over the annexation issue 
and the subsequent activities of Tyler in his quest for 
the 1844 nomination.23
The annexation proposal reached the Senate in the 
spring of 1844. Essentially, the measure was supported by 
the Democrats, a party in need of an issue to spur 
reorganization and re-vitalization. The more conservative 
Whigs, notoriously anti-expansionist, were firmly opposed 
to annexing Texas. Tyler forced the annexation issue onto
21
Congress as the national conventions readied to select 
candidates for the fall elections.
The Democrats split into two major factions, aligning 
sectionally on the annexation issue. Their compromise 
candidate was James K. Polk, who was subsequently elected 
to succeed Tyler. The Whigs were equally divided, and the 
moderate, Henry Clay, won the Whig nomination. The 
Liberty party fielded an abolitionist candidate, James G. 
Birney, who helped to split the popular vote. Political 
factions outlasted the 1844 election. Factions that grew 
out of the sectional annexation issue continued to agitate 
from within each party. The possibility of a political 
minority winning control of the government, an issue 
addressed by William H. Seward in later campaigns, was 
already evident in the 1844 campaign.
Political Coalitions from 1844-1848
The Republican party drew members from three major 
factions that were active throughout the 1840s and 1850s: 
the Liberty party, the Conscience Whigs, and the 
Democratic party.
The Liberty party held a national convention in June, 
1845.24 The convention was designed to bring together any 
individuals, regardless of party affiliation, who were 
interested in the abolition of slavery. The convention,
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which could be described as a large rally, was held in 
Columbus, Ohio, which was a fitting location. The 
American midwest prided itself on being a seat of anti- 
slavery, anti-expansion activism.25 Most of the emigrants 
to the frontier states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, 
Illinois, and Indiana were from the northeast. They 
brought with them their anti-slavery sentiments, which 
were enhanced by the abuses fostered by the corrupt 
legislative processes in Kansas. According to Theodore 
Clark Smith, author of The Liberty and Free Soil Parties, 
political anti-slavery agitation became an everyday issue 
on the frontier, a situation that explains the brief 
success of the Liberty party.
The proposed annexation of Texas spurred the formation 
of the Liberty p a r t y . 26 Western Whigs were disappointed 
in Tyler's presidency, and the idea of an anti-slavery 
party became viable. Men eager to stop the spread of 
slavery had been meeting to support candidates whose 
principles reflected the anti-slavery sentiments of the 
Western Reserve, regardless of party affiliation. Ohio 
was the first state to put forth a convention call in 
1840.27 Resolutions calling for candidates not affiliated 
with either of the established parties were passed.
Indiana followed with a state convention in December,
1840, which also called for the nomination of candidates 
who were independent of the Whig and Democratic parties.28
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State by state, the mid-west organized to support anti­
slavery candidates. A formal organization was not yet in 
place.
The Liberty party was dedicated to the abolition of 
slavery. As the political outgrowth of the American and 
Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, the party continued to rely 
upon evangelical oratory as a means of encouraging 
legislative action toward the eradication of slavery.39
On May 12, 1841, the first national Liberty party 
convention was held in New York City.30 a  slate of 
candidates for the presidential campaign of 1844 was 
chosen. James G. Birney of Michigan was nominated for 
President and Thomas Morris of Ohio was the Vice- 
Presidential nominee. Both men were active abolitionists 
and perennial political candidates from the Western 
Reserve. Morris dropped out of the contest in 1843 when he 
determined that the cross-section of new Liberty party 
members included a great many men of considerable national 
political experience. He withdrew from the race, claiming 
that a candidate of greater significance than himself 
should be encouraged to run. The East, however, 
remained the center of anti-slavery activity. Members of 
the Liberty party met in 1843 to plan the strategy for the 
upcoming national campaign. The meeting was held in 
Buffalo, New Y o r k . 31 a  platform was devised to reflect 
the anti-slavery views of the party, and Morris was
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successfully pressed to accept the vice-presidential 
nomination in spite of his reasons for withdrawal. The 
party entered into the contest of 1844 with enthusiasm.
The party strategists were enthusiastic, but neither 
cautious nor politically experienced. The Whigs 
approached the Liberty party with coalition offers which 
would have provided for a Texas compromise. The Whig 
candidate for President was Henry Clay, a man whose 
reputation sparked libelous editorials in the Liberty 
press and slanderous rhetoric from Liberty candidates.
The Whigs could effect no compromise with the Liberty 
party because of their nomination of C l a y . 32 Henry Clay, 
with his pro-slavery background, was an unacceptable 
candidate to the anti-slavery politicians. They referred 
to Clay as a "man-stealer," a gambler, and a duelist.
The Liberty Party's credibility with potential voters 
was sorely shaken when it was revealed that the Democratic 
party had been behind Birney’s nomination for a seat in 
the Michigan legislature.33 The Whigs immediately assumed 
that the Liberty party and the Democrats were working 
together to undermine Whig candidates. Birney had no 
explanation. He merely announced that his nomination and 
subsequent election to the state legislature was a mandate 
from the people of Michigan, not the result of political 
manipulation.34 The Liberty party presidential drive fell 
apart. Joshua Giddings and other influential anti-slavery
politicians questioned the loyalty and the motives of 
Birney and his supporters. The questions intrigued the 
press as well as the political community, causing the 
Liberty party to founder in its membership r e c r u i t m e n t .35
Polk won the 1844 election. The Liberty party helped 
to split the votes, giving Polk a plurality. The Whigs 
were unable to forgive the Liberty party for the defeat of 
their candidate, Henry Clay.
The major problem faced by the Liberty party in 1844 
was its lack of organization. The party was formed to 
support anti-slavery candidates. It had no specific 
internal structure nor did it have an organizational 
hierarchy. However, between the elections of 1844 and 
1848, Salmon P. Chase took charge of the party and gave it 
political direction.
By 1848, the Liberty party harbored three distinct 
factions: the Chase people, who were primarily ex-Whigs 
and politically experienced; the Birney supporters, who 
embraced a full reform platform including woman suffrage 
and prison reform; and the pure abolitionists.36
Although the antislavery Whigs and Democrats professed 
alarm at their party nominees in 1848, many were afraid to 
join the anti-slavery fight as members of the Liberty 
party, since the party was popularly linked to 
abolitionism and its attendant violence. However, Chase 
was committed to bringing Whigs and Democrats into the
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Liberty party through coalitions favorable to all free- 
soil interests. His opportunity arose when the Democratic 
platform of 1848 forced the antislavery Democrats to call 
a separate convention. These regional divisions were new 
to American politics of the mid-nineteenth century. Until 
the Texas annexation issue arose to align voters on a 
North-South basis, party loyalty had transcended 
g e o g r a p h y . 37 whigs voted as Whigs, regardless of their 
state of residence. Democrats also voted across regional 
lines.38 prior to the 1850s, few issues carried the 
sectional ramifications that characterized the political 
extension of slavery.
The Democrats had a history of disagreement over 
slavery. In 1844, the party split on the annexation 
issue, with the southern Democrats supporting the 
annexation of Texas while Van Buren's "Barnburner" faction 
remained adamantly opposed. Ideologically, the 
Barnburners felt that any form of bondage compromised the 
ability of both the slave and the slave owner to function 
as individuals. The independent individual was the basis 
of any republican system of government, according to the 
Democratic anti-slavery faction.39 The faction adopted 
their own version of collective responsibility, which was 
the necessity of a republican society to police the 
activities of its members to insure the greatest amount of 
freedom for each member. This necessity functioned as its
rationale for opposing the extension of slavery into the 
territories. Barnburners identified slavery with 
corruption, claiming that the wealthy, powerful members of 
the South held the balance of power in the party, 
corrupting the republican ideals upon which the party had 
been f o u n d e d . 40 The appellation, "Barnburners," arose 
from the violence of their convictions, inviting 
comparison with the crazed farmer who burned down his barn 
to rid the building of rats.41
These radical Democrats were not abolitionists. 
According to the definitions provided by Frederick Blue, 
"antislavery" identified any or all aspects of the 
political opposition to slavery (from non-expansion to 
immediate abolition) whereas "abolition" was the moral 
opposition to s l a v e r y . 42 The Barnburner Democrats, while 
loyal to the principles of their party in 1844, were also 
separated from the majority of party members by that 
loyalty. Van Buren and his faction felt that the southern 
Democrats were violating party loyalty and splitting the 
membership along sectional lines by their enthusiastic 
endorsement of the annexation of Texas.
Conversely, the southern Democrats were uneasy about 
the strong, vocal northeastern coalition, which was 
strongly entrenched in New York state machine politics.43 
This coalition had control of a powerful organization in 
New York and was a considerable threat to the survival of
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the party. The rift widened as the nominating conventions 
approached in the spring of 1844. Democrats were split on 
the spread of slavery and the party was forcing the issue 
with its platform of territorial expansion.
According to Mark Berger, the roots of national 
Democratic discord can be traced directly to New York 
State politics. From 1844 until the Compromise of 1850, 
the party split into smaller and smaller f a c t i o n s . V a n  
Buren's "Barnburners," the radical faction of the party, 
were arrayed against the "Hunkers," or the conservative 
element. Although the two factions were not new to the 
party, the anti-slavery agitation forced the party members 
to chose sides. Southern Democrats and the Hunkers were 
the ideological enemies of the Barnburners and the free 
soil adherents.
In 1849, the more moderate Hunkers, referred to as 
"Soft Shells" or "Softs," aligned with the Barnburner 
(radical) faction as anti-expansionists. "Hard Shells" or 
"Adamantines," who were northern Hunkers committed to the 
national expansionist program of the Democratic party, 
continued to support the southern Democrats.^5
The Whig party experienced a similar split in 1844. 
Charles Sumner was the spiritual leader of the anti­
expansionist Conscience Whigs. The Conscience Whigs 
represented another regional division, much like the 
Barnburners in the Democratic party. The Conscience Whigs
were a strong, northeastern faction that enjoyed the 
support of Joshua Giddings and the active Western Reserve 
movement against expansion.46
Abolitionist Joshua Reed Giddings of Ohio supplied the 
ideology for the Conscience Whig faction. Giddings 
resigned his Congressional seat in 1840 when fellow Whigs 
condemned him for violating the "gag rule" in order to 
introduce anti-slavery legislation.4? He was immediately 
elected to the same seat, where he represented the anti­
slavery radicals of Ohio - an election which resulted in 
landslide returns for Giddings.48
Giddings* political vision focused on the efforts of 
free men who would create an effective government by 
working together for the good of all men.4® His version 
of national collective responsibility was enthusiastically 
embraced by the Conscience Whigs.68 Giddings was able to 
justify internal improvements, a perennial plank in any 
Whig platform, by reasoning that highway and canal 
construction throughout the nation would assist the 
movement of progressive ideas as routes of travel 
i m p r o v e d . R e p u b l i c a n  rhetorical strategists would 
argue in 1856 that industrial and agricultural progress in 
the South, patterned on the northern industries, was the 
responsibility of the administration. And they argued that 
only a Republican administration could be entrusted to 
enforce the necessary measures to promote southern
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progress. The Conscience Whigs were prepared with a moral 
argument against slavery, too. They felt that the slave 
was trapped in a civil caste system which rendered him 
unable to assume responsibility for his actions. This 
violation of the Jeffersonian principles of republicanism 
was perceived as an affront to the northern anti­
expansionists of both major parties, since any 
governmental system which condoned slavery could be 
neither republican nor self-regulatory.52
The only major difference between the Democratic and 
Whig anti-expansionist factions was the insistence by the 
Whigs that slavery must be eradicated, not merely 
contained within its pre-existing boundaries. This 
position of the Conscience Whigs was politically 
expedient. The Conscience Whigs depended heavily on the 
abolition vote in 1844 when clashing with the Liberty 
party for the antislavery vote.
Prior to 1844, the Liberty party balked at forming 
coalitions with either the Conscience Whigs or the 
barnburner Democrats. From 1840 until early 1844, the 
Liberty leadership actively disdained a national 
organization, relying instead upon a loosely-formed 
network of state groups. By mid-1844, Salmon P. Chase was 
guiding the party with greater political sophistication. 
Chase actively encouraged coalitions with sympathetic
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Whigs and Democrats in order to protest more effectively 
annexation and the extension of slavery.
Before Chase assumed leadership of the party, Liberty 
party members focused their activities on educating 
potential voters about the political and social problems 
posed by slavery. The speakers used an indirect, 
expository approach, voter education, as a means of 
persuading the audience to vote in favor of anti-slavery 
legislation. Their expository approach to political 
activism persuaded few independent voters to support the 
party in 1840. In 1845, Salmon Chase convinced the 
disorganized remnants of the Liberty party to sponsor a 
coalition convention in 1845 in order to unite all 
factions that supported antislavery legislation.
Political Coalitions 1848-1852
The Chase-sponsored convention in Columbus was intended 
to encourage Barnburners and Whigs to leave their 
respective parties and join with the antislavery 
c o a l i t i o n . 53 However, the Liberty party was too closely 
associated with abolition in 1845 for a successful 
coalition of the major parties to occur. It was not until 
June of 1848 that the Barnburner Democrats and the 
Conscience Whigs bolted their respective parties and held
separate conventions.54
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The Democratic platform for the 1848 presidential 
election incensed the New York Radicals.55 The 
Barnburners withdrew from the convention and met in Utica, 
New York, where they nominated Martin Van Buren for the 
Presidency.56 The gathering was attended by delegates 
from outside of New York who were equally unhappy with the 
official expansionist platform of the Democratic party and 
Lewis Cass, the Democratic nominee for President.57
Worcester, Massachusetts, was the site of the 
Conscience Whig convention. The Whigs nominated no 
candidate, but they organized a central committee to plan 
a new party. A formal protest against the candidacy of 
Zachary Taylor completed the official radical Whig 
business of 1848.
The organizational ambivalence of the Conscience Whigs 
ended in August of 1848. They met in convention with 
other free-soil advocates in Buffalo, New York, on August 
9, 1848.58 Earlier in the summer, Ohio, Indiana, 
Michigan, and Illinois held state conventions to elect 
delegates to the New York Free Soil convention. This 
convention was not sanctioned by the Liberty party. Since 
the free-soil factions of other established political 
parties were limited to securing non-extension of slavery 
rather than abolition, the Liberty party officially 
condemned the Buffalo convention. This posture was
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consistent with the party's history of discouraging 
coalitions and compromises.
Four major free-soil groups attended. An "unofficial" 
contingent of Liberty men arrived, nominally headed by 
John P. Hale of New Hampshire. The Conscience Whigs, 
including Joshua Giddings, Charles Sumner, and Charles 
Francis Adams (son of John Quincy Adams), hosted the 
gathering. The Democrats were of two sorts: the "Free 
Soil" contingent, which wanted to support the nomination 
of Cass but pressured him to support free soil principles 
and the Barnburners, who were the most fully organized and 
arrived with a presidential nominee in tow.59
A Barnburner-Liberty coalition resulted. The 
Barnburners provided the strong candidate, Van Buren, and 
the Liberty strategists provided the p l a t f o r m . T h e  
fifteen-item platform had eleven anti-slavery planks, 
three internal improvement planks, and a single economic 
plank. The party motto was "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free 
Labor, Free Men." Van Buren was unanimously nominated for 
the Presidency and Charles Francis Adams was pressed to 
accept the vice-presidential nomination.
Eastern Conscience Whigs were unhappy with Van Buren 
because he was a Democrat and the Free Soil Democrats were 
unhappy with Van Buren because he was not Cass, but the 
remaining body of delegates emerged from the convention as 
the Free Soil party.®1 The Liberty party was absorbed by
34
the new Free Soil party, many Conscience Whigs remained 
active with the Whig party, and the Free Soil Democrats 
disappeared as a faction under that name. The Free Soilers 
captured approximately ten percent of the popular vote in 
1848, in spite of their precipitous formation.62 
In his book, The Force of Fantasy: Restoring the 
American Dream, Ernest Bormann postulates that it was the 
free soil fantasy theme which united the various 
abolitionist factions.63 Northern voters, weary of anti­
slavery moralizing and frustrated by the lack of a 
political solution to slavery, were eager to embrace the 
free soil issue. Free soil politics were finite; specific 
legislation was needed and sides were clearly drawn. 
"Saving" the territories would be a symbolic blow to 
slavery and the perceived southern political domination. 
The free soil concept appealed to many of the Whigs and 
Democrats who were not abolitionists but were in need of a 
vital, new issue to sustain their interest in national 
politics. Many voters found the salvation theme equally 
appealing, especially as an alternative to the hackneyed 
economic issues that dominated earlier campaigns.64 
The 1848 canvass exposed some voting patterns that 
foreshadowed the organizational problems facing the major 
parties in 1852 and 1856. The Free-Soilers split the vote 
in New York and Pennsylvania, both critical Democratic 
strongholds that would later plague Republican
strategists. Zachary Taylor, the Whig nominee, swept the 
country, winning in every region except the West, but he 
won by a much smaller proportion of the popular vote than 
expected.®® Although Taylor's popular total included 
votes cast in the new states of Wisconsin and Iowa, the 
lower overall number of votes was an indication of the 
lack of enthusiasm evidenced by the voters of this 
particular election.®® The Whig vote all over New England 
declined significantly, with nearly 46,000 Whigs simply 
not voting at all.®7
The Democrats drew a similar apathetic voter response. 
The proportion of Democratic votes declined throughout New 
England, the mid-Atlantic, and the northeast.®8 Even in 
those southern states recording Democratic victories, the 
overall vote declined up to sixteen percent.®8 The 
decline in voter enthusiasm can be attributed to the lack 
of clear-cut issues represented by the major candidates. 
Cass was neither openly in favor of the Wilmot proviso, 
nor openly sympathetic to southern interests, so he lost 
considerable support in the North and the South. Taylor 
expressed sympathy with southern interests and was once a 
slave holder himself, yet he was perceived as the 
candidate of "lesser evil" by the non-slave holding 
voters.70
Both major parties were shaken by the decline of voter 
participation and the strength of the Free-Soil showing in
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1848. Yet, the Free-Soil party all but disbanded 
following the election. The various factions made 
attempts to re-unite with their respective parties, 
searching for ways to resolve harmoniously the worrisome 
sectional issues.71 The radical factions of the 
Democratic and Whig parties were intent on purifying their 
parties, not destroying them. Bormann refers to their re­
union attempts as a "restoration drama," noting that "the 
successful reform effort [requires] first a restoration of 
society to its original foundations." 7 2 The Conscience 
Whigs and the radical Democrats still identified with 
their respective societies, the Whig party and the 
Democratic party.
Political Parties to 1852
With the election of 1852, the Whig party 
disintegrated.7^ There were no significant issues to 
differentiate the major parties. Both the Whigs and the 
Democrats> favored acceptance of the Compromise of 1850, 
which would effectively eliminate slavery as a political 
issue. Some politicians spoke in favor of allowing each 
territory to decide the slavery question itself. The
most significant political change affecting the parties in 
1852 was the new provision for the direct popular election 
of local and state officials in many of those states
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undergoing constitutional r e f o r m . ^4 Patronage, or the 
appointment of public servants by elected officials, was 
in the process of being legislated out of existence at the 
state level. Local candidates focused popular resentment 
on national leaders, blaming the party leaders for the 
nation's ills. Local men tried to divorce themselves from 
the patronage, now an unpopular political association, by 
declaring their allegiance to home-town or state groups. 
This tactic further weakened support for the Whig and 
Democratic parties and paved the way for more independent 
political activity. Without patronage, political 
candidates would rely more heavily on emotional issues 
rather than the promise of direct reward in order to 
inflame the voting public to action at the polls. In 
general, the Democrats favored constitutional reform, a 
stance that strengthened their numbers.75 The Whigs 
resisted change, protesting many of the reforms. Their 
popular support declined significantly in reform states.
In spite of a search for fresh, vital issues in order 
to spark voter participation in the 1852 election, it was 
essentially a no-issue contest. The two major parties 
agreed on the Compromise and the territorial issue. The 
extension of slavery was not mentioned. The election was 
reduced to a popularity contest between Winfield Scott and 
Franklin Pierce.
38
Scott, the Whig nominee, was not popular with the 
southern Whigs. They protested his candidacy by either 
declining to vote or voting across party lines. 76 
Northern Whig strategists actively sought the new and 
numerous Catholic vote, alienating the anti-Catholic and 
nativist factions within the party. Since Scott had a 
public record as an anti-immigrationist, few votes were 
cast in his favor by the Catholic and immigrant voters.
Pierce was a compromise candidate from the North. His 
platform included acceptance of the Compromise. His 
campaign was conducted quietly.77 The free soil faction 
ran John P. Hale for the presidency, but support for 
Hale’s candidacy was lacking from important anti-slavery 
leaders such as Giddings, Adams, Sumner, and Chase.7®
Summary
By 1850, national politics had changed dramatically. 
Sectionalism fragmented the major national parties; 
ideological lines had been crossed; traditional issues 
were resolved or tacitly tabled; and public confidence in 
party leadership had eroded.
Even the economic issues that had sustained the Whigs 
throughout their brief history were resolved. The gold 
rush and the flood of hard currency into the marketplace 
erased the urgent economic and tariff issues that had been
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the mainstay of Whig platforms. With the overwhelming 
defeat of Zachary Scott, and no issues to sustain it, the 
Whig party collapsed. Scott's candidacy had alienated the 
southern Whigs, the northern Conscience Whigs, and the 
immigrant vote.
Special interest splinter parties were active in 
splitting the vote and confusing loyalties. Among the 
most vocal were the prohibitionists and the anti- 
Catholics.79 The low popular vote recorded in 1852 
reflected the apathy and confusion within the general 
population. National issues and party loyalty were ebbing 
away.®0
The Democratic party was also in flux. Franklin Pierce 
attempted to appease all of the factions within his party 
by appointing key party members to important patronage 
positions throughout the country. His "conglomerate" 
Cabinet, for example, contained a former Whig, a 
Barnburner, a Southern Rights Democrat, and a Catholic. 
Pierce lacked a credible political program and he 
alienated his power base. The Democratic party needed a 
strong leader and a strong issue.
Senator Stephen A. Douglas supplied the issue which 
galvanized the Democrats into legislative action and 
spurred the formation of the Republican party. Douglas 
was the acknowledged author of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 
1854, which repealed the Missouri Compromise.
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Chapter 2 
Political Issues - 1854-1856
The events of the early 1850s produced further 
situational contraints on the Republican campaign rhetoric 
in 1856. According to Lloyd Bitzer, one facet of a 
rhetorical situation is the necessity to give meaning to a 
complex event, that is, the historical context of the 
situation determines the proper rhetorical response.
The variety of arguments employed by the Republican 
speakers in 1856 reflected the complexity of the 
situational constraints imposed by the political events 
which followed the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Therefore, this 
chapter examines the major social and political events of 
the 1850s as they related to the campaign rhetoric.
Social and Political Movements: 1854-1856
The repeal of the Missouri Compromise inflamed northern 
passions. The repeal dominated politics from 1854 through 
1856 as a popular issue. The possible extension of 
slavery into the territories finally united the free soil 
and abolitionist factions throughout the free states.
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The popular reaction to the Kansas-Nebraska Act helped 
to define the issues that would characterize the 1856 
presidential contest. First, the violent civil action in 
Kansas demonstrated the breakdown in law and order as the 
pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions clashed in armed 
contest. Second, a clear sectional alignment arose as a 
result of the repeal, destroying the remnants of party 
loyalty and promoting a regional identity in its place. 
Third, militant abolitionism all but disappeared when the 
slavery question shifted from outright abolition to its 
extension into the territories. With the legislative 
battle over its expansion into previously free territory, 
slavery became an inescapable political issue.
The shift to sectional loyalties as a result of the new 
political focus on the expansion of slavery sparked an 
array of intellectual and social responses. This shift 
in focus from the morality of slavery to the 
constitutionality of slavery legislation is examined in 
this chapter in terms of its effect on the formation of 
the Republican party and its ideology. Further, an 
examination of the background and the impact of the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 introduces the political 
ramifications of the sectional and anti-slavery (non­
expansionist) arguments so that their importance as 
rhetorical strategies during the 1856 campaign is clearly 
linked to one another.
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The Kansas-Nebraska Act
Senator Henry Clay's compromises were designed to re­
unite the Union in 1850. The proposed compromise package 
received the support of political moderates like Daniel 
Webster who were dedicated to saving the nation from 
sectional division.1 Since one of Clay's propositions 
strengthened the fugitive slave laws, northern radicals 
were angry with Webster for supporting the compromise 
measures. However, moderates throughout the nation seemed 
to be pleased with the Compromise of 1850 because it 
quietly tabled the slavery issue.
The compromise essentially left the Missouri Compromise 
intact, admitted California as a free state, allowed Utah 
and New Mexico to decide the fate of slavery within their 
own borders, abolished the slave trade in Washington,
D.C., and provided a stronger, more detailed fugitive 
slave law. All of these events contributed to a feeling 
of national well-being.
In addition to the passage of the compromise in 1850, 
the California gold rush was enriching the national 
treasury, the Mexican War had been won by the United 
States, and Stephen Douglas had publicly vowed to speak no 
further on the slavery question.2
Abolitionist agitation subsided in the four years after 
the passage of the compromise. However, the tranquillity 
that the moderates seemed to promise never materialized. 
The Nebraska territory was filling with settlers, and the 
railroads were agitating for a western route across the 
nation, so the need to form a territorial government 
became urgent. Stephen Douglas, who chaired the Senate 
Committee on Territories during the thirty-third Congress, 
solved the political problems of the territory with the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.3 By virtue of this one piece 
of legislation, Douglas was blamed for the repeal of the 
Missouri Compromise and the precipitation of a sectional 
crisis that intensified throughout the decade.^
The organization of a territorial government for 
Nebraska was a complex political task. The resident 
Indian tribes had to be relocated, the "sooners" (settlers 
who claimed huge tracts of land by merely occupying the 
acreage) would have to be given resident status, the 
railroad interests had to be considered, and the vocal, 
slave-holding border Missourians had to be appeased.
During the winter session of Congress, 1852-1853, a 
territorial organization bill passed the House.5 This 
bill excluded slavery from the Nebraska Territory 
according to the provisions of the Missouri Compromise. 
However, the Senate adjourned before the bill could be put 
to a vote.
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When Congress reconvened in December of 1853, there was 
a Democratic majority in both Houses of Congress.® The 
same organizational bill was re-introduced in the Senate 
and referred to the Committee on Territories, chaired by 
Stephen A. Douglas. The bill evolved through three stages 
while in the hands of the committee; first, the initial 
format that allowed the territory to decide whether or not 
to include slavery when composing its constitution; 
second, a revision that included a new, twenty-first 
section explicitly giving the territorial residents, not 
the Congress, the right to determine whether or not to 
allow slavery on their soil; and a third, and final, form 
of the bill that was the most specific regarding the 
disposition of slavery in the territories.? Senator 
Archibald Dixon, the successor to Henry Clay in the Whig 
hierarchy, composed an amendment to the bill that called 
for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the division 
of the Nebraska Territory into two parts. The territorial 
split was designed to appease angry, slave-holding 
Missourians who could assume that, with two new states 
being formed, one would be a slave state and the other a 
free state.®
Free Soil protest was violent after the measure had 
been read in the Senate on Monday, January 23, 1854. 
Fearing that the bill would be "railroaded" through the 
Senate without a debate, free soil leaders published
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virulent protests designed to encourage public outcry 
against the proposed repeal of the Missouri Compromise.
The northern states rose to the challenge. Rallies were 
organized to protest the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Sermons 
and editorials were published denouncing the repeal. 
Northern free soilers were urged to action against the 
"slavocracy."9
The South, however, was not as passionate about the 
proposed disposition of the territory as her northern 
neighbors. It was a matter of conflict between the border 
Missourians and the anti-expansionists of the North, 
according to editorials in the southern press.
The amended measure passed the Senate after a night­
long debate on March 4, 1854. Most Senators supported 
their party rather than their section of the country. The 
House presented a more sectional argument against the 
amended Senate bill. Northern Whigs and most northern 
Democrats defied the measure. Resolutions and petitions 
from angry northern constituents seemed to influence the 
Representatives to a greater degree than their colleagues 
in the Senate. The House debate grew so emotional that 
weapons were brandished on the floor.H
On May 22, 1854, the territorial bill passed the House, 
113-100, with the membership voting along clear sectional 
lines. The Kansas-Nebraska Bill thus voted into law was
the spark that ignited the violence that followed in the 
territories.
Two primary groups clashed in Kansas: the free soil 
emigrants and the pro-slavery border Missourians. An 
emigrant society, formed in the northeast specifically to 
populate Kansas with free soil adherents, became one focus 
of pro-slavery rhetoric. The society sent approximately 
thirty settlers from Massachusetts to establish a town at 
L a w r e n c e . A l t h o u g h  few in number, the emigrants were 
encouraged by the vast publicity their organization 
received in the northern press. Pro-slavery residents of 
Missouri encouraged this publicity, claiming that the 
entire northeast was invading the territory in order to 
establish an anti-slavery political base that would 
outvote the pro-slavery territorial residents. As the 
territorial population grew rapidly through the summer of 
1854, so did the fiery public sentiment over the impending 
establishment of a representative territorial government.
Andrew H. Reeder was appointed governor of the Kansas 
Territory in the fall of 1854.13 Although he had never 
before held a political office, he was given broad powers 
to organize the territory. He was faced with the squatter 
claims of the "sooners," the emigrating New England 
abolitionists, and the "border ruffians" of Missouri who 
were violently opposed to a free-soil state on their 
western border. As the territorial election of 1854
approached, tensions rose along with the numbers of armed 
Missourians flooding across the border to establish flimsy 
property rights that would enable them to vote as 
Kansans.H
Hundreds of Missouri residents voted illegally for the 
first Congressional delegate to represent Kansas. Similar 
voting abuses occurred in Nebraska as Iowa's residents 
flooded the Nebraska polls to help elect a pro-slavery 
Congressional delegate and a territorial legislature.
Kansas elected a legislature the following year, 
waiting until the 1855 census was completed in order to 
determine representation.15 t o avoid the illegal voting 
practices of the previous fall, election regulations were 
minutely designed, providing special election judges and 
constables sworn to uphold the law at the polls in 
addition to the more usual laws governing public behavior. 
However, thousands of armed Missourians again 
participated, electing a large majority of pro-slavery 
representatives to the territorial legislature.
Although Reeder was aware of the voting fraud, he was
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unsure of its extent. He was also powerless to stop the 
abuse, since the federal troops under the command of his 
territorial administration were generally sympathetic to 
the pro-slavery administration's views. Reeder officially 
sought the assistance of President Pierce. Pierce 
expressed concern over the situation, but he was unhappy
with Reeder's tactic of publicly denouncing the Kansas 
voting frauds at every whistle-stop between the Missouri 
border and Washington, D.C.l^ Reeder hoped that public 
outcry against the massive voting frauds would force 
federal assistance.
The Kansas legislature met in mid-summer and began to 
pass legislation clearly favorable to pro-slavery 
interests. The representatives even went so far as to 
adopt measures which condemned to hard labor any 
individual who claimed that slavery was not legal in the 
territory.18 The progress of the legislature was recorded 
by a variety of extra-territorial newspapers, and angry 
northern editorials helped to arouse sectional sentiment 
against the activities of the pro-slavery men.
Free soil Kansans met in convention on September 5, 
1855.18 They drew up a constitution calling for an end to 
slavery in the territory after July 4, 1857. When the 
constitution was circulated by ballot, it had nearly 
unanimous appeal.20 However, the vote also delineated 
battle lines between the adherents of slavery and the 
adherents of freedom. In December, the two forces, fully 
armed and prepared to battle, were stopped outside of 
Lawrence and dissuaded from engaging in combat by 
political leaders.2!
When the Thirty-Fourth Congress met at the end of 1855, 
representatives from a variety of anti-Nebraska, anti­
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slavery coalitions filled many of the seats. The 
Democrats had lost heavily in both state and local 
elections while the Whigs were essentially powerless. The 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and its attendant 
violence, had a direct bearing on the formation of 
coalition parties that sprang to life with a clear issue 
and a ready-made constituency. The coalitionists were 
able to focus their energy on a single issue - the spread 
of slavery into the territories - and relate that issue to 
the larger issues of abolition and Constitutional law. 
However, it was the sectional nature of the Kansas- 
Nebraska conflict that provoked the formation of the 
Republican party and its unique North-South patterns of 
rhetorical conflict.
Rise of Sectionalism
The political sectionalism revealed by the Kansas 
conflict took two forms: a covert form that grew out of 
the technological advances overtaking the North and the 
overt political alignments of the slavery against anti­
slavery regions.
In general, technological advances were beneficial to 
the North. By mid-century, steamboats and railroads 
linked large areas of the nation. The Hoe rotary press 
provided the means to mass-produce cheap newspapers which
were illustrated with photographs and lithographs.22 The 
residents of the rapidly growing urban centers were not 
only able to read of distant events within hours of their 
occurrence, but they could travel to those distant points 
with ever-increasing speed and ease.
These technological advances affected the North more 
fully than the slave states.23 internal improvements such 
as canals and railroads were more valuable to the 
industrial North, which could not rely upon the unimproved 
river systems that served the South. In addition, 
northern agriculture was diversified, aimed at regional 
markets, and depended upon reliable and swift 
transportation systems. The tariff, long an inflammatory 
sectional issue, was designed to protect northern products 
from foreign competition. According to W. J. Cash, the 
perpetuation of the old plantation system of self- 
sufficiency coupled with an unvarying daily and seasonal 
routine was the goal of the southern planter-aristocrat 
and those who aspired to his position within the regional 
social system.24 cash concluded that the southern 
plantation system did not lend itself to technological 
advances without major modifications. Change, whether 
social or political, was not compatible with the 
plantation system.
However, the South was culturally and economically 
dependent upon the North at the mid-century point.25
Educational opportunities in the South lagged behind those 
of the North. The North was rapidly industrializing and 
there was a constant supply of cheap, inunigrant labor in 
northern urban centers. The plantations needed new 
markets in order to perpetuate the system. Southern 
planters needed to expand westward as their soil wore out 
from intensive, single-crop farming. New land was 
available in the territories, land that they needed in 
order to increase production and supply new markets.
Politically, the North was gaining power in the House 
as the immigrant flood continued, for few immigrants 
settled in the slave states. Suffrage laws were eased in 
many northern cities to allow immigrants to vote prior to 
gaining full citizenship. The traditional southern 
control of the House was slipping away as the northern 
population continued to grow and push westward, leaving 
the slave-holding states to assume the minority position 
in national politics.
Southern leaders adopted a defensive posture. The 
southern commercial conventions of 1852 through 1859 
provide evidence of the sectional defensiveness pervading 
southern politics prior to the Civil War.26 speakers at 
these regional conventions dealt with issues such as the 
improvement of the southern economy or the growing threat 
of northern political power. Demands that the federal 
government force the North to adhere to the fugitive slave
laws and that the South unite to combat dependence on the 
North were recorded at various meetings.27 Prom 1853 
until the eve of the Civil War, delegates to these 
commercial conventions even promoted enthusiastic support 
for strictly southern educational and literary 
institutions that would limit the intellectual contact 
between the North and the South.28
C. Vann Woodward defined southern sectionalism through 
its defense of slavery. He claimed that "Loyalty to the 
South came to be defined in terras of conformity of thought 
regarding one of its institutions."2® He charged that 
southerners embraced their defense of slavery with the 
eagerness and single-mindedness of a cleric involved in 
the "repression of heresy." Woodward blamed the sectional 
realignment of Congress and the evolving struggle for 
political control on the slavery issue. The South was put 
on the political defensive and was unable to strategically 
recover before the issue became fatally divisive. 
Therefore, the rhetorical dilemma facing the South helped 
to define the Republican rhetorical strategies of 1856. 
According to Woodward, the South permitted the opposition 
to define the issue, and naturally the issue was not 
defined to the South's advantage. "Because the attack 
centered on slavery, the defense rallied around that
point."30
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As early as 1849, John C. Calhoun encouraged a southern 
caucus to prepare a formal defense of southern rights in 
Congress.31 immediately prior to the Compromise of 1850, 
Calhoun began agitating for a southern rights party to 
organize in protest against Joshua Giddings' constant 
petitions, which urged the abolition of the slave trade in 
Washington, D.C.32 The address which Calhoun prepared for 
delivery in Congress was far too radical to suit even his 
southern rights supporters. Although never actually 
delivered in Congress, the address was widely circulated 
throughout the South as a bill of grievances against the 
northern abolitionists. Calhoun's defense of slavery, 
both morally and constitutionally, provided the nucleus of 
defensive thought that united the South as a political
unit.33
Political sectionalism intensified during 1849.
Southern Democrats and Whigs united against the plan to 
admit California and New Mexico as free states.34 
Northern free soil Democrats and Free Soil party members 
formed coalitions in various states, while the 
Massachusetts Democratic Convention proposed a platform 
specifically opposed to slavery and its spread into the 
territories.
Even the opening of Congress was delayed by the 
sectional squabbling. The major parties had split 
sectionally and had spawned so many factions that it took
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nearly four weeks to elect a s p e a k e r . 35 The moderates 
were appeased during the following year with Clay's 
compromises, which allowed the government to function in 
spite of sectional differences. Southern politicians were 
pleased with a stronger fugitive slave law. While 
northern radicals were driven to a greater fury because of 
the fugitive clause, they were not in a sufficiently 
strong position to change government policy in 1850.
The publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin in 1852 gave new 
impetus to the radical northern abolitionists.36 once 
again, rallies and editorials inflamed the passions 
against the evil "slavocracy" in the South. The 
activities of the Underground Railroad increased and this 
open defiance of the Fugitive Slave Laws infuriated 
southerners.
The Compromise of 1850, which had quieted the moderate 
members of the major parties, was destroyed with the 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Rampant sectionalism 
guided political activity from 1854 through the Civil War. 
Sectionalism was fostered by those northern politicians 
who genuinely feared the power of southern slave owners to 
undermine the republican principles of government, 
especially the concept of majority r u l e . 37 The three- 
fifths representation accorded each slave had given 
southern representatives a powerful edge in Congress for 
many years. The spread of slavery into the territories
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virtually guaranteed the continuation of a southern 
political stranglehold in Congress, according to the 
radical abolitionist press. The Kansas-Nebraska Bill was 
perceived as the beginning of northern political 
enslavement by the southern wslavocracy" according to the 
radical abolitionists.
Abolitionism
By 1855, the radical abolitionists had a legitimate 
political issue. Sectional differences polarized around 
the slavery issue. In particular, the disposition of 
fugitive slaves widened the ideological gulf between the 
North and the South. Developing from this sectional view 
of the fugitive slave legislation, two northern responses 
directly influenced the Republican party platform and the 
rhetoric of 1856. First, the response to the slave's 
condition of enforced servitude produced the need for 
arguments in the political sphere to deal with the moral 
issue. Second, the constitutional, or legal, aspects of 
the legislation providing for the institution of slavery 
and its perpetuation in the territories provided 
Republican party spokesmen with logical grounds to argue.
The moral arguments against slavery could be traced to 
the four truths of John Woolman.38 Woolman, a Quaker, 
held that all men were equal in the eyes of God, that
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Negroes were intellectually and morally responsible 
members of society, that the slave owners, not the slaves, 
should bear the expense of emancipation, and that slaves 
were entitled to "retributive justice."39 Benjamin Rush 
defined slavery as a sin, claiming that the moral 
faculties of the slave owner became debased and any vices 
in which the Negro indulged could be blamed on his 
involuntary servitude.40
Abolitionists condemned the institution for its 
immorality, unchristian character, and cruelty.
Politically active abolitionists attacked the planter 
aristocracy as being undemocratic, robbing the slave of 
his freedom, which the antislavery forces claimed was 
grounded in the Constitution. To the abolitionists, the 
slave was a person, not a piece of property, and he had 
the same rights under the Constitution as any other man. 
However, protests against the institution were politically 
ineffective because no one knew how to abolish the system 
without causing economic devastation in the South. There 
was no program for emancipation.
Instead, the militant abolitionists, including William 
Lloyd Garrison and Bostonian David Walker, called for 
immediate emancipation.41 Slavery, they contended in 
their editorial columns, was contrary to Christianity and 
the American way of life. Economic devastation or not, 
they demanded that the institution be abolished by any
possible means. These demands were perceived by the 
moderates as threats against law and order. The 
Compromise of 1850 realigned the relationship between the 
political moderates and the radical abolitionists. The 
moderates felt that the slavery issue had been legislated 
to rest, while the abolitionists were in the forefront of 
the protest against the stronger fugitive slave laws. In 
fact, the fugitive slave clause was one of the principle 
issues that polarized the adherents and opponents of 
slavery on constitutional, rather than moral, grounds.
Historically, the slavery issue centered around a 
definition: was the slave a person or was the slave 
property?4^ successful fugitive slave legislation 
depended upon the slave's being perceived as stolen 
property by the courts of the state in which he was 
apprehended. Interstate cooperation was critical for the 
enforcement of the fugitive statutes, since no extradition 
laws covered the slave.43
The first fugitive slave law was passed in 1793. The 
slave owner, or his agent, needed only to appear before a 
magistrate and prove ownership by whatever means might be 
satisfactory to that particular magistrate. Free blacks 
could be kidnapped and placed into bondage on the word of 
a slave owner or his attorney.44 The Compromise of 1850 
strengthened and further defined this law. Fines for 
obstructing the apprehension of a fugitive were raised and
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the commissioners appointed by the state circuit courts 
were to be paid $10 for each ruling favorable to the slave 
owner and only $5 for each ruling favorable to the 
fugitive. The fugitive was not allowed to testify in his 
own behalf nor was he allowed a jury trial. It was these 
abridgements of his constitutional rights that aroused the 
wrath of the North against the continuation and spread of 
slavery.
For example, the argument in favor of a slave's 
constitutional right to a jury trial was reasonably 
s t r o n g . s l a v e s ,  who were worth over $20, required a 
jury trial as stolen property. If deemed a person instead 
of property, the fugitive was being denied protection of 
life and liberty. Some northern states passed personal 
liberty laws which were designed to provide fugitives with 
a jury trial, witnesses to his identity, free counsel, and 
the mechanism to fine and imprison anyone who reduced a 
freeman to slavery.
Summary
The repeal of the Missouri Compromise was a major 
situational restraint that shaped the Republican rhetoric 
of 1856. Sectionalism was no longer a subtle distinction 
in 1855, but a viable political issue. "Bleeding Kansas" 
united the free-soil adherents ideologically, regardless
of previous party affiliation. The underground railroad 
and personal liberty laws operated in open defiance of the 
fugitive slave laws, Uncle Tom's Cabin brought a 
dramatization of slavery into northern homes, and the 
northern press continued to sensationalize rallies and 
mobs that gathered to protect unjustly accused fugitives 
in major urban centers.
Successful Republican candidates began to emerge from 
the state and local elections of 1854. The party gathered 
national political recognition from the support of men 
like William Seward, Charles Sumner, Thurlow Weed, Joshua 
Giddings, and Horace Greeley. These men formed the 
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Chapter 3
The Organization of the Republican Party
The Republican national party was organized quickly.
The presidential election was scheduled for the late fall 
of 1856, and the party formally organized less than six 
months before the election. The rapid formation of the 
national organization can be examined according to Lloyd 
Bitzer's concept of exigence as a motivating factor. The 
major controlling exigence was the need to form an 
organization that would effectively guide the Republican 
campaign efforts. The organization had to run 
efficiently, yet the major factions had to be given some 
measure of control and power.
The audience addressed by the Republican organizers was 
composed of anti-slavery coalition members and Republican 
sympathizers from the individual states. The change to be 
effected was the organization of a strong national party 
which would offer a direct challenge to the Democratic 
party. Finally, a presidential candidate whose political 
record could satisfy the major factions and represent 
Republican free soil interests would need to be recruited 
to the party.
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This third chapter examines the organizational 
structure of the Republican party as a means of 
identifying further situational constraints on the 1856 
campaign rhetoric.
The Republican party was organized with astonishing 
speed. From a loosely affiliated network of local free- 
soil "Nebraska" coalitions in 1854, a fully organized 
national party emerged to compete successfully in the 
presidential election of 1856.
The organization of the party cannot be examined 
internally from an effective interpersonal or small group 
perspective. These perspectives would be of great value 
in determining the particular campaign strategies employed 
by the party leaders. However, the secrecy which cloaked 
the early meetings of the party founders formed a 
precedent that guides the activities of the national 
Republican party today. A brief examination of the 
contemporary duties of the party organizers will help 
explain the significance of the organizational task 
accomplished by the men who planned the 1856 presidential 
campaign.
The contemporary Republican party is organized around 
an executive committee that coordinates a national 
convention every fourth year. This executive committee, 
referred to as the National Committee, began to function 
as a permanent entity in the twentieth century. Prior to
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its contemporary form, the committee met only to write a 
convention call in the months immediately prior to a 
national presidential election.
The contemporary National Committee runs the party. It 
is responsible for raising funds, providing information to 
state organizations, and defining policy.* The means by 
which policy is determined are secret. No records are 
made of official meetings; no by-laws have been recorded; 
no organizational chart has been developed; and public 
records are heavily edited. The party stands, unified, 
behind the platform and the policy as determined by the 
most powerful party activists.
The same procedure was followed in 1856. Although not 
formally organized into a national committee, several men 
of particular political or organizational stature - well 
known to one another - determined the policies of the new 
Republican party. The organization reflected the 
political needs of Whigs and Democrats, Free Soilers and 
compromisers, businessmen, laborers, and professionals of 
all classes in the free states.
The organizational methods employed by the early party 
leaders molded these disparate elements into a political 
entity. These organizational methods can be studied 
thematically. However, in order to identify the elements 
of the Republican ideology as it emerged from this initial 
campaign, it will be necessary to analyze the situation
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that spurred the organization of the Republican party in 
the spring of 1856.
The organization itself can be defined in terms of 
contemporary organizational theory to explain its internal 
structure and its success in surviving intact through the 
post-Civil War era. The emergent thematic unity of the 
platform and its attendant ideology will be analyzed 
according to the fantasy theme motif proposed by Ernest 
Bormann,
Organizational Environment - External Factors
According to Lewis Clephane, author of the pamphlet 
"Birth of the Republican Party," and the national 
secretary of the self-styled Republican Club of 
Washington, D.C., a local movement was organized in the 
Capitol to urge the adoption of an abolitionist platform 
by one of the major parties planning to campaign in the 
1856 contest.2 The Republicans had not organized at the 
time Clephane called for an abolitionist party, but many 
anti-slavery activists had formed local clubs that 
corresponded with one another. The clubs also sponsored 
speakers and other public events. The intention of 
Clephane, Daniel R. Goodloe, and H. S. Brown, the self- 
appointed organizing committee of the "Republican 
Association," was to force the rapid coalition of all
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anti-slavery groups under the aegis of a single, 
"republican" ideology.3
The Republican Association, as conceived by Clephane et 
al., was organized on June 15, 1855. It became the 
Republican party in January, 1856, when a national 
assembly met under that name and voted itself into 
existence.^ The various state party leaders, many of whom 
had run for local offices in the 1854 elections as 
"Republicans," assembled in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 
February 21, 1856.5 Their ranks were swollen by the 
presence of wavering Know-Nothings and abolitionist 
leaders. According to Horace Greeley's enthusiastic 
reporting from the pages of the New York Weekly Tribune, 
an executive committee was appointed as the first order of 
business in Pittsburgh, along with the following 
committees: Address and Resolutions, to prepare the 
official convention platform; Safety, to investigate the 
armed conflict in Kansas; Convention Credentials; and a 
committee for the Rules for the Government of the 
Convention.® The executive committee was charged by 
Francis P. Blair, Sr., president of the Pittsburgh 
convention, to "execute" a national nominating convention 
for mid-June of 1856.7
The organizational process was well under way by the 
spring of 1856, A clearly defined hierarchical structure 
of power and authority was created with the formation of
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the national committee and its specialized sub­
committees.® This structure closely resembled the 
national Whig organization, the model on which the 
Republican party appeared to be cast. The need for a 
strong, national organization was a recent political 
innovation, a factor resulting from legislation which 
defined a particular date for the polling of national 
election returns. Both of these organizational concepts, 
the clearly defined hierarchical structure and the 
environmentally-produced organization, are critical 
factors in the ability of an organization to function 
efficiently.®
The political environment shaped the national character 
of the party structure. Prior to the 1848 presidential 
campaign, the individual states held presidential 
elections on different dates. A small cadre of party 
spokesmen could travel through many states, delivering the 
same message to a wide variety of voters. Eight months of 
the year, there were elections in one state or another.
By Congressional action, however, a uniform, national 
election day was established in 1845, giving the Whigs and 
the Democrats, the two most powerful political parties of 
that decade, three years to re-organize and create 
national organizations which could coordinate a national 
presidential campaign.
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The local and state organizations remained important. 
Communication and fund-raising activities remained local 
responsibilities. The necessity that forced the parties 
to organize at the national level did not significantly 
reduce the power of the state organizations. For example, 
the incumbent Democratic leaders who wielded the greatest 
power in Congress were in control of tightly organized 
state machines. The more experienced Whigs, while not in 
control of the sophisticated "machines'' that characterized 
northeastern Democrats, were the dominant coalition within 
the new, Republican organization by virtue of their 
experience in state and national politics. Men like 
William Seward and Thurlow Weed delivered huge local 
blocks of votes into the new party by virtue of their 
influence at the state and local level.
The dominant coalition of ex-Whigs was responsible for 
the structural similarities between the new Republican 
party and the old Whig organization. The power and 
authority for structuring the new party were firmly in the 
hands of the experienced ex-Whigs rather than distributed 
throughout the factions of Free Soilers, Softs, 
abolitionists, or other groups whose experience in 
practical politics would not have been as near the source 
of national power. Seward, Weed, Clephane, Blair, and the 
rest of the dominant coalition were already ensconced in 
Washington, D.C. They brought a rich background of
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political experience to the Republican party.11 They were 
determined to nurture the organization, even if it meant 
sacrificing some individual goals in order to sustain the 
organization.
In his correspondence, Thurlow Weed alluded to the 
strategic planning element of the dominant (Whig) 
coalition. He felt that the Republicans had a very slim 
hope of success in the 1856 presidential contest. He 
found the Republicans poorly organized when compared to 
the Democratic party machine, especially in the southern 
states.12 He recognized that the Know-Nothings, thinly 
disguised as the American party to avoid comparison with 
their secret society Masonic party counterparts of twenty 
years past, would split the vote in several critical 
polling areas. Therefore, he proposed the following 
strategy: with Buchanan's election (the Democratic 
candidate for President in the 1856 election), the 
Republican candidate would be sacrificed. However, 
Buchanan's term of office could be expected to generate 
enough public errors that the Republicans would be 
guaranteed the presidency in 1860.
The element of strategic planning was evident from 
Weed's memoirs, which chronicled the activities of his 
close associates, many of whom had been members of the 
dominant Whig coalition. Strategic planning, as an 
organizational resource, provides a measure of flexibility
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within the organization, allowing for a shortened reaction 
time when organizational readjustment becomes necessary in 
a volatile political environment.*3
In addition to the strategic planning element as a 
sophisticated organizational resource used by party 
planners, the Republicans had access to communication 
resources already functioning within the political 
environment. The existence of these resources in the 
political environment was a critical factor in the speedy 
creation of the new party.
Republican candidates had access to a wide variety of 
sympathetic newspapers. They were able to draw support 
from the abolitionist press, the anti-Democratic press, 
independent newspapers willing to run Republican 
editorials for financial remuneration, and newspapers 
owned by the party itself. The major metropolitan 
newspapers had telegraph terminals in city news rooms for 
the rapid dissemination of campaign speeches, news of the 
latest, inflammatory border disputes, and demands for 
broadsides and pamphlets to counter opposition attacks
f
throughout the nation, throughout the campaign.
Members of Congress and church leaders communicated the 
Republican platform at those regular secular and religious 
gatherings designed as public speaking forums. In return, 
these same Republicans provided feed-back to the national 
party. Information about the Democratic and American
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party platforms were gathered from opposition speakers who 
shared the same speaking occasion, partisans hosting 
speakers on campaign tours, and copies of the local press 
forwarded from "stump" locations.
Thurlow Weed was the major figure in the organization 
and use of these information systems that were already in 
use as a part of the daily news gathering sources. He 
created at the national level a form of the party machine 
he had manufactured in New York state for the gathering 
and dissemination of information. With a central 
location for information processing and the field 
resources to gather and disburse that information, the 
power and authority of the national party could be 
effectively wielded.
In spite of the wide variety of political factions 
represented at the first Republican convention, the 
organizational process was swift and effective. Once a 
national coordinating committee had been established, the 
assorted free-soil interest groups were able to interact 
formally. Yet, the national coordinating committee would 
have been unable to form without the assorted free soil 
interest groups that it represented.
Conflict and uncertainty were reduced as the Free 
Soilers, Whigs, abolitionists, and Democrats united under 
an ideology broad enough to encompass a variety of 
separate ideologies that were dedicated to an equal
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variety of solutions for the slavery issue. The 
organization was able to focus its activities by 
organizing specific committees which included members from 
the various factions. The reduction of separate political 
units increased the immediate positive outcome of all 
activities, since the coordination of support for each 
activity was enhanced with the concentration of authority 
in a central committee.H Therefore, once the 
organization was formally defined, strategic planning was 
possible. Organizational objectives were formulated 
simultaneously with the party itself and all members could 
use the available communication resources.
The specific organizational structure, the internal 
hierarchy, was not made a matter of record nor did any of 
the members of the dominant coalition refer to the 
structure in extant letters or manuscripts. This 
reluctance to specify an internal hierarchy provided some 
measure of organizational flexibility. Present-day 
organizational theorists suggest that the absence of a 
hierarchy may indicate that the dominant coalition was so 
well acquainted and so politically experienced that 
specific roles and duties were not assigned. A rigid 
hierarchy might have blocked communication channels and 
slowed the reaction time of the organization. Yet, 
contemporary studies of the national committee are 
confounded by this historical lack of documentation. As
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Hugh Bone observed, "[I]n both parties the operation of 
the national committee is not generally prescribed but is 
left to custom and the discretion of the chairman and his 
staff."!5 According to this contemporary description of 
the committee structure, the internal communication flow 
appears to be blocked both vertically and horizontally.
The structure suggests that flexibility was more important 
than specific hierarchical distinctions, a structure that 
would have served the party well when it first organized 
in an era of limited communication technology and trusted 
associates.
Organizational Environment - Internal Factors
The politicians attending the first Republican
convention represented a wide variety of political
affiliations. The very diversity which characterized the
representatives should have been a barrier to internal
communication and compromise. Since the organization was 
*
swiftly and effectively created in spite of the potential 
for disagreement, a summary analysis of the theoretical 
basis for the success of the organization is necessary.
The diversity of experience and personality brought to 
the convention by the participants was itself the key to 
the swift formation of the party structure. The 
organization was the means of effecting coalitions of the
varying interests of the participants.1® The organization 
became a "marketplace" of influence without which the 
convention participants would not have been able to 
establish bonds, compromises, or common experiences in 
nearly so short a time. The common free-soil interests of 
the Republicans would have hardly been enough to provide 
the basis for effective, concerted action in the highly 
structured political environment. Instead, an internal 
structure of influence and control established the 
necessary hierarchy as well as the means to plan for 
effective, measurable political activities.
The men who gathered in Pittsburgh planned just such a 
coalition of influence as they developed a united stand 
against the spread of slavery.1? The marketplace concept 
allows the participating individuals to retain some 
measure of control in a compromise situation. The 
possession of resources determined the amount of control 
that any one participant might expect. For example, many 
of the participants were in control of viable state 
organizations, a necessary resource of the national party. 
Others held positions of power and influence in the 
national government or in the private sector. The common 
desire of these men to stop the spread of slavery, whether 
for political or economic gain, formed their official 
union. The amount of influence possessed by each
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participant determined the organizational hierarchy even 
before their initial meeting.
The success with which an organization mobilizes is a 
measure of the success with which the need for stability 
and unity of purpose is met.*9 Since the convention 
participants had a single, over-riding purpose in the 
desire to prevent the spread of slavery into the 
territories, a hierarchical organization met their needs 
as a means of facilitating the union of various factions 
into a cohesive political unit. The organizational 
structure, itself, provided the stability through which 
the activities of the groups could be measured and 
aligned.
Specifically, a political organization is merely the 
institutionalizing of control, both symbolically and 
realistically.20 ^he elected leadership within the party 
functions both as a symbol of control to members within 
the organization and as the mechanism for dealing with 
external demands. Therefore, the formation of the 
Republican party fulfilled the institutional needs of the 
various "Nebraska" groups whose unity of purpose had been 
confounded by the lack of centralization or organizational 
stability. With the formation of a stable central 
organization which directed the activities of its members, 
the course of action chosen by the party leaders could be 
launched.
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The particular political environment of 1856 dictated 
rapid action on the part of party organizers. Not only 
were events moving quickly in those geographic regions 
under dispute over the spread of slavery, but 
Congressional guidelines regarding presidential elections 
affected the nomination and campaign procedures of all 
organized parties, forcing the formation of national 
organizations.
Prior to 1848, each state held elections for national 
offices within a given calendar period, not on the same 
day. There was no need for a national organization. When 
the election procedure was changed by Congress to allow a 
single day, nationwide, for the election of national 
officers, it became necessary to organize quickly in order 
that the necessary channels of communication would be in 
place by the date of the election.21 Many of the men who 
were active in the structuring of the Whig national 
organization turned to the Republican party while their 
organizing experience was still fresh, providing for the 
enactment of an organizational structure similar to that 
of the defunct Whig party.
Therefore, the Republican party succeeded as an 
organization because it fit well into the pre-connected 
political environment. The organization was acceptable to 
the majority of individuals within the group. It has 
retained its bias in favor of northern business interests,
86
giving rise to continued criticism of its clearly 
sectional interests. Those interests arose from the 
strategic need to campaign sensibly in 1856, pouring all 
resources into the non-slave-holding areas for the most 
effective voter return, rather than making a weakened, 
geographically comprehensive effort to campaign throughout 
the entire nation.
Free Labor Ideology
The formal ideology of the early Republican party was
reflected in the introduction to its convention call of
1856. The convention planners invited
[Those] People of the United States, without 
regard to past political differences or 
divisions, who are opposed to the repeal of 
the Missouri Compromise, to the policy of the 
present Administration, to the extension of 
slavery into the territories, in favor of the 
admission of Kansas as a free State, and of 
restoring the action of the Federal 
Government to the principles of Washington 
and Jefferson . . .22
This invitation to convene encapsulated the popular
beliefs of a rhetorical movement that had been in place
for several decades. From the pulpits of New England to
the floor of the Congress, orators had thundered against
the spread of slavery in the United States. Concerned
politicians like John Quincy Adams and other
constitutionalists, men who were bitterly opposed to the
gag rule and the fugitive slave laws, gave the Republican
party a legal basis for its platform of anti-expansion. 
But, it can be argued that the Republican party was 
ideologically structured by the prevailing popular opinion 
against slavery and the extant rhetorical movement against 
the institution and its spread into the western 
territories. According to Leland Griffin, a rhetorical 
movement such as the popular movement against slavery may 
be classified either as an attempt to arouse public 
opinion in favor of an idea or an institution or an 
attempt to further the destruction of an institution.22 
Although the abolitionists favored the destruction of an 
institution (slavery), they demanded that the public 
accept the notion of universal freedom from bondage. 
Abolitionist speakers removed their demands from the 
destruction of an economic and social institution to the 
more philosophic plane of greater human good.
Griffin classifies rhetoricians as aggressors or 
defenders, according to their stand within the rhetorical 
movement. Many of the boundary-spanning journalists and 
abolitionist orators inherited by the Republican party 
were aggressively in favor of freedom from bondage. Some 
were so aggressive that they suffered physical harm for 
their zeal in speaking against the spread of slavery.2^
The political rhetors sought to focus public attention 
on the origins of sentiment against the spread of slavery. 
The repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the extension of
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slavery into previously "free" regions was the result of 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act, according to the Republican 
speakers.2 5 Congressional candidates added their voice to 
those of the clergy in the effort to stop the spread of 
slavery, making political issues out of the moral 
sentiment against human bondage.
Once the roots of the movement have been uncovered by 
public speakers, methods for propagation of information 
must be found.2® For the Republicans, avenues of 
propaganda were already in place, with Greeley's Tribune 
heading the list of partisan newspapers eager to press for 
the containment of slavery and an end to bloodshed in 
Kansas. In addition, many prominent abolitionist orators 
were serving as publically-elected officials and they used 
their public positions to speak against slavery with 
greater authority.
The Republicans, therefore, simply absorbed the 
movement against slavery. Orators such as the Reverend 
Henry Ward Beecher, who was widely known for his 
dedication to the abolition of slavery, joined the 
Republican cause immediately upon its organization. 
Beecher, in fact, took a leave of absence from his New 
York pulpit in order to campaign for the Republicans in 
1856.27
The rhetorical movement against the spread of slavery 
encompassed all regions of the United States during the
1850s, except for the South. By 1855, two phases of 
rhetorical development had been completed, according to 
Griffin's model. The period of inception, which stretched 
from the end of the slave trade to the Missouri 
Compromise, had been marked with occasional organizational 
success, mainly because of the Quakers and an increasing 
number of active abolitionists. The period of rhetorical 
crises, the second phase of development, occurred with the 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.
The final developmental period of the rhetorical 
movement, the period of consummation, occurred when the 
Republicans formally organized with a specific plan to 
bring the ideals of the movement to fruition. Although 
the Republican presidential candidate did not win the 
election in 1856, the party continued to grow in strength 
as a result of its absorption of the abolitionist and free 
soil movements. The movement prospered within the 
organization; the organization prospered under the 
leadership of the men who formed it; and the party was 
sustained through the rhetorical crises of a political 
campaign by the consistency of the movement that spawned 
the organization. This symbiotic political/ideological 
relationship succeeded, according to Griffin, ” . . .  in 
irrevocably disturbing that balance . . . between the 
groups which had existed in the mind of the collective 
audience."28 The movement for the non-expansion of
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slavery could never return to being either an abolitionist 
movement or a constitutional restoration movement. The 
balance between the individual moral and the political 
elements was destroyed in the public mind. The public had 
a new choice: it could align with the Democrats (the pro­
slavery identification group) or the Republicans (the new 
anti-slavery identification group).
The rhetorical analysis of the 1856 Republican campaign 
must rest on the particular strategies that created and 
nourished the party, uniting a variety of coalitions under 
a new ideology. As will be seen later in this study, the 
diversity of elements created important constraints on the 
rhetoric in support of the party's presidential candidate.
General Rhetorical Strategies
The rhetorical battles of 1856 were waged by surrogate 
speakers representing the Republican party, not the 
Republican candidate. Political communication theorists 
suggest that successful surrogate speakers normally should 
have a proven record of competence as public speakers, and 
they should have a clearly identifiable link to the 
candidate.29 This link was established in the 1856 
campaign by the implicit common political affiliation and 
the shared rhetorical vision of the party members. In
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addition to speaking experience and a link to the 
candidate, campaign speakers had to establish a link with 
the audience. Many of the surrogates stumped in their 
home states, from their familiar pulpits and in their own 
towns where sympathetic communication could easily occur. 
For lack of speaker-audience links, no Republicans 
campaigned in the South.
The particular rhetorical problems faced by the 
surrogate speakers included disavowing any direct 
association with the Whig party, avoiding the use of 
abolitionist rhetoric in place of anti-slavery arguments, 
raising grave suspicions against the Know-Nothings, and 
maintaining the fervor of the partisans already supporting 
the new party.
Campaign efforts were limited to New England and the 
mid-west. The far West was deemed pro-Fremont, freeing 
the strategists to concentrate on the disputed border 
areas.30
Two formal means of currying voters were employed: the 
political clubs and the stump speaker^. The clubs were 
formed locally and were the primary source of grass-roots 
funding, undertaking sanctioned local organizational and 
fund-raising events.31 stump speakers, sanctioned or not, 
provided the substance of the campaign. From the local 
scene, in which small-town magistrates and Fremont Club 
members would orchestrate torch-light processions and
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outdoor rallies for front-page press coverage, to the 
pulpits of metropolitan churches, men engaged in discourse 
about the political solution to slavery. The names of the 
particular presidential candidates were often absent from 
such discourse, even when it involved specific campaign 
issues.
The sectional arguments that formed the basis of the 
Republican campaign included the statistical comparison of 
slave versus free labor, protective tariffs that favored 
northern manufactured goods and were violently opposed by 
southerners, and the alleged southern political 
stranglehold on Congress. Free labor was the Republican 
ideological explanation for the rate of northern urban 
growth and its attendant enlightened culture. Northern 
industrial growth outstripped that of the South, claimed 
the Republicans, as a result of the immigrants who were 
filling the northern cities to compete in the free labor 
market, swelling the general population and nearly 
outstripping the demand for both skilled and unskilled 
l a b o r . 32 The Republicans argued that the comparative 
growth of northern and southern cities demonstrated the 
vitality of northern dedication to the free labor 
principle, since the sheer numbers of factories, goods 
produced, and people employed were significantly larger in 
the North. However, statistics were not enough to 
persuade voters that the new Republican party was
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dedicated to serving the interests of the free states. An 
ideological commitment to larger principles than factory 
ownership was necessary to allow for the successful 
emotional appeal of the party's platform.
Eric Foner located the roots of pre-Civil-War 
Republican ideology in the concept that labor is a noble 
and dignified pastime.33 Actually, the concept of labor 
was characterized by a complex moral, social, and economic 
system. According to Foner's analysis, to labor was a 
noble pastime. The nobility of labor stemmed from its 
role as a Christian endeavor, for the capital produced by 
labor created wealth that was perceived as one means of 
serving God. The Republicans argued that labor might only 
be construed as a Christian value, however, if the laborer 
were able to enjoy the fruits of his labor. Since slaves 
labored only to enrich their masters, both slave and 
master were debased and brutalized by the system. The 
slave could not enjoy any capital gain or material 
advancement as a result of laboring; therefore virtue 
could not arise from the act of laboring to increase one's 
capital. Further, the slave owner who prevented the slave 
from advancing materially or intellectually by the results 
of his labor was brutalized by the corrupt moral system 
that usurped both free will and free labor.
The Republicans neatly defined a laborer as anyone 
engaged in any useful activity.34 The woodcutter and the
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novelist alike were members of the laboring class, as were 
the fisherman and the professor. The measure that 
determined whether or not one was laboring freely was 
one's degree of financial independence. It was not 
necessary to amass great wealth to have achieved success 
in a free labor market. Merely to have economic choices 
or financial independence was enough to satisfy the 
Republican definition of "freedom." For this reason, 
Republican speakers with working-class roots usually had 
the greatest prior ethos. For example, Henry Wilson had 
once been an indentured servant and Nathaniel Banks had 
been a bobbin boy in a mill. Both men enjoyed enhanced 
prestige for having worked their way upward to an economic 
status of financial independence. They exemplified the 
Republican free labor ideal.
In theory, the financially independent woodcutter 
should have been able to enjoy the same social success as 
the novelist or professor. But the reality of northern 
social mobility was not as egalitarian as Republican 
idealists would portray it. However, there were two 
methods of defending the northern social attitude to the 
voters. Either the southern social caste system could be 
painted in the darkest possible terms to contrast 
unfavorably with northern society, or Republican orators 
could remind their audiences of the vast potential for 
economic and social opportunity that awaited the
enterprising entrepreneur, either in the industrial 
northeast or the western frontier.
The South suffered from a totally closed social system, 
according to the northern anti-slavery orators. That 
rigid class system was the major reason that the economic 
theories of the North could not take hold in the cotton 
regions. Since social mobility accompanied the 
accumulation of capital in any free-labor market, the 
South was doomed to practices that tied the entire 
population to a form of economic slavery and eventual 
extinction. Since slaves were unable to benefit directly 
from their own labor, all participants in the system, free 
and bound, were condemned to both social and economic 
stagnation.
The West figured prominently in the Republican 
ideology. The West was regarded as an economic extension 
of the industrial northeast. Those northern farmers and 
businessmen who wished greater opportunities than those 
available in the heavily populated New England region 
turned to the frontier areas as a means of establishing 
their financial independence. As immigration swelled the 
ranks of the unskilled and semi-skilled laborers to 
bursting, the excess population could move westward. 
Republican speakers portrayed westward migration as the 
only available means of protecting the eastern urban areas 
from the unemployed who would otherwise live on the
streets of the northern cities.35 The threat of slavery 
in the territories directly affected the free labor market 
because slave labor would choke off the need for free 
laborers in the West. Unemployment and urban poverty 
would then rise to dangerous, unprecedented levels, 
according to Republican speakers, since immigration 
continued to swell the northeastern population faster than 
jobs and housing could be made available. This threat of 
blocked emigration became a stock secondary argument in 
the Republican repertoire, second only to the arguments 
regarding the constitutionality of the pro-slavery 
representation in Kansas and the repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise.
Eric Foner referred to the election of 1856 as a 
constitutional referendum.36 The primary debate centered 
around the issue of the constitutionality of slavery. Was 
it protected under the Constitution, as the South 
believed, or was it a matter for the individual states to 
decide?
The more radical Republicans, William F. Seward and 
Charles Sumner among them, were dedicated to the 
eradication of slavery by any means. The 1856 Republican 
platform reflected the radical position on slavery, but 
the arguments favored by the Republican spokesmen on the 
stump did not effectively echo the degree of radicalism 
preferred by Chase, Giddings, and other politicians with
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abolitionist backgrounds. Therefore, the major themes 
espoused by Republican speakers dealt with the violence in 
Kansas as a symbolic expression of the pro-slavery 
mentality, the economic problems created by a slave 
society in a free-market world, and the political threat 
posed to the North by the united "Slave Power" in the 
South.
The Candidate as a Constraint
John C. Fremont was a popular, romanticized hero of the 
nineteenth century. He was the "Pathfinder," the daring 
explorer who bravely opened the West to overland travel 
and lived to write of his exploits. He was the son-in-law 
of Thomas Hart Benton, distinguished Senator from 
Missouri. With the companionship of his wife, Jesse, he 
outfoxed presidents and became the darling of the young 
literary set in both the United States and Europe. 
Continental salons idolized the young explorer.
Yet, Fremont was court-martialed during Polk’s 
administration, held responsible for the extreme suffering 
and negligent deaths of his fourth expedition, involved in 
disreputable land speculation in California, and scorned 
by his powerful father-in-law.
Fremont's career in politics was brief. He served only 
a few months in the U.S Senate before accepting the
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Republican presidential candidacy in 1856. How did a man 
of so little political experience come to represent a new 
party in an era of political crisis?
John C. Fremont entered politics as a Senator from 
California in 1849. The first session of the California 
Constitutional convention met on September 1, 1849. On 
Saturday, October 13, its work was finished. The borders 
of the new state were determined, state elections were 
scheduled so that a legislature could be seated on 
December 21, 1849, and copies of the proceedings were sent 
to Washington.
John C. Fremont and William M. Gwin were elected by the 
California legislature to represent the state in the U.S. 
Senate.37 They were a compromise slate, for Fremont was a 
Free Soil Democrat and Gwin represented a growing pro­
slavery faction. The pro-slavery faction in California 
was very powerful. Members were primarily wealthy mine 
owners who were in favor of working the mines with cheap 
slave labor rather than with wage-earning laborers.
Fremont and his family boarded a ship bound for 
Washington, D.C., less than one year after arriving in 
California. Fremont had taken no active part in the 
organization of the new state, was battling for title to 
his Mariposa lands, faced a Congressional investigation 
into the deaths of eleven men from his fourth expedition, 
and was preparing to work in Congress with the same men
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who had participated in his celebrated court-martial of 
one year past.
Fremont and Gwin waited in Washington for nine months
before California was finally admitted to statehood. The
admission of the territory was angrily contested in
Congress, since the southern Senators wanted that portion
of the territory lying south of 36® 30' to be open to
slavery but the residents of the territory had approved a
free soil constitution.3® The California Bill was passed
on August 13, 1850, by a vote of 34-18 in the Senate. The
following day, a long, formal protest against Fremont and
the anti-slavery status of the new state was read into the
Senate record, signed by Senators from Virginia, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and
Florida. They were outraged at the new political
imbalance between the slave-holding and free states,
protesting that
an odious discrimination is made 
against the property of the fifteen 
slaveholding States of the Union, who 
are thus deprived of that position of 
equality which the Constitution so 
manifestly designs, and which 
constituted the only sure and stable 
foundation on which 
this Union can repose.
Fremont was never called to answer any charges or explain 
his position as a free soil advocate. However, some pro­
slavery Senators claimed that Fremont's uncompromising
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stance on slavery prolonged the debate that delayed the 
seating of the California Senators.
William M. Gwin and John C. Fremont entered the Senate 
chambers on September 9, 1850. Fremont's credentials were 
presented by Senator Barnwell of South Carolina, who noted 
that he was not in favor of seating the new Senator under 
the present c i r c u m s t a n c e s . J e f f e r s o n  Davis of 
Mississippi even raised a formal protest before Fremont 
was finally seated, that the election of the California 
Senator was unconstitutional.42
Within a period of only four working days, Fremont and 
Gwin caused seven bills to be read and referred to various 
committees. Speed was essential, since only three weeks 
of the legislative session remained after the two men were 
sworn into office.
The first session of the Thirty-First Congress closed 
on September 26, 1850. Fremont's most effective speech 
had been delivered the previous day when he pleaded for 
gold mine legislation. A great deal of business remained 
unfinished with regard to California, but Fremont's role 
was over. Because of a recurrence of Chagres (Panama) 
fever, he was unable to return to Washington to attend his 
second, and final, session of Congress in January, 1851.
At the time of his appointment to the U.S. Senate, Fremont 
drew the shortest of three straws that represented the
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three new Senatorial terms available to the two men. Of 
the three terms due to expire in 1851, 1853, and 1855, 
Fremont drew the term which ended in 1851, represented by 
the shortest of three straws. William Gwin drew the 
session which lasted through 1855 and was an active member 
of the pro-slavery faction throughout his term.
Fremont campaigned briefly for re-election as a Free 
Soil candidate. However, during his long absence in 
Washington, the pro-slavery wing of the California 
Democratic party had grown stronger. Since his health was 
weak and the election was held only two months after his 
return to California, he had little opportunity to 
campaign effectively. He was soundly defeated in 
February, 1851, but no candidate was elected in his 
stead.4 3
Europeans were interested in large-scale mining 
propositions in the American West, so Fremont took his 
family to Europe in 1852, traveling to amass financial 
backing for mining operations on his Mariposa grant. 
Fremont remained aloof from domestic events until he 
returned to the United States to find himself the 
presidential nominee of the Republican party.
Although experienced abolitionists, Free Soil 
Democrats, Whigs, and other politically active men flocked 
to the Republican cause, few among them were suitable for 
a national nomination. Sumner, recovering from the
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caning, was too volatile an abolitionist even if his
health had permitted him to campaign. Salmon F. Chase and
William H. Seward, although experienced politicians, were
equally radical in their demands that the fugitive slave
laws be repealed along with the right to sell slaves in
the District of Columbia.44
The Republicans needed a candidate with a firm,
moderate stand on slavery, high name recognition, and no
interest in politics.45 John Charles Fremont was deemed
the ideal candidate by an ad hoc group of party officials
and newspaper editors meeting in New York City four months
prior to the nominating convention.
As spring opened, the St. Louis 
Democrat, Worcester Spy, New York 
Evening7"Post, and other journals were 
all quietly pressing the explorer.46
However, the attributes that brought Fremont to the
attention of these powerful men were rhetorical
weaknesses. Fremont successfully engaged the public fancy
as a dashing young explorer. He had powerful friends and
relatives scattered in all regions of the nation. Yet, he
was never a candidate of any substance. His political
experience included less than three weeks of national
service in an appointed office, a powerful father-in-law
who refused to support his candidacy, and a record
of leadership which did not bear close scrutiny. Allan
Nevins, Fremont's biographer, noted that
It was true that his career was 
sprinkled with incidents indicating 
that he lacked practical judgement, 
was deplorably erratic in his 
estimates of men, acted impulsively 
and egotistically, and wanted both 
tact and the stauncher traits ofcharacter.47
Yet, the initial period of Fremont's candidacy was intense 
and successful. Without so much as a single recorded word 
on his part, Fremont was guaranteed the presidential 
nomination. John C. Fremont was a manufactured candidate 
who fitted the rhetorical needs of the Republican party in 
1856: he was glamorous, he was popular, and he was silent.
Since Fremont was a figurehead rather than a 
political leader, Charles Sumner emerged as the symbolic 
leader of the Republican campaign. Sumner was beaten into 
insensibility at his desk on the floor of the Senate 
chamber by Preston Brooks, a southerner. The symbolism of 
the action was rich. The august Senate chamber, where the 
founders of the nation had deliberated, was sullied by the 
blood of an anti-slavery martyr whose life was threatened 
by a weapon-wielding southerner. Sumner had seriously 
offended Brooks and the entire body of southern Senators 
by delivering a polemic entitled "The Crime Against 
K a n s a s . "48 Because of his rhetorical attack on the South, 
Sumner became the symbol of northern righteousness. Brooks 
came to symbolize the incarnate inhumanity of the southern 
slavocracy through his instinctive defensive action. 
Sumner's speech formed the basis of many emotional proofs
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against the extension of slavery, while the Republicans 
had a new focus for their emotional appeals which was 
neither economic nor moral. It was a sectional focus.
Summary
The excitement of a presidential canvass arises from 
the highly-charged emotional issues and a sense of 
supporting a righteous cause against an enormous wrong.
The constitutionality of slavery certainly provided a 
double-edged issue, but the economic and moral arguments 
employed by the Republicans needed an emotional focus 
which would enhance identification between the party and 
its cause without employing stock Whig or abolitionist 
arguments.
The Republicans were challenging Democratic party 
control and Whig influence in all sections of the North. 
Particular attention was given to the campaign strategies 
in Pennsylvania and New York, for these were the two 
pivotal urban regions that would determine the election. 
According to Trent and Friedenberg, there are seven 
strategies available to the political challenger in a 
contest. The Republicans employed five of the seven 
strategies, each designed to force a change in the status 
quo. The strategies used by the Republicans included 
attacking the record of their opponents (the Democrats);
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taking the offensive position on issues (slavery and its 
expansion); calling for a change (a Republican 
administration); emphasizing optimism for the future (a 
free labor society for the South and greater economic 
protection for the North); and speaking to traditional 
values rather than calling for value changes (the 
constitutionality of a free society rather than the 
unconstitutional "slavocracy").
By June, the Republican party was ready to launch a 
national campaign. The organizational phase was 
completed. A national committee was operational, a 
convention was called to nominate a presidential 
candidate, a platform was drawn around a clearly 
articulated ideology, and a broad base of popular support 
was secured by the state organizations. The Republican 
party was designed to formulate and direct those national 
activities that affected its candidates and its policies. 
The individual members were free to explain, elaborate and 
define those activities and policies according to the 
exingence of the situation.
However, it was the individual speaker who represented 
the party. It was the individual speaker who defined the 
needs of a particular audience with regard to the policies 
of the party. Therefore, the strategies of the 1856 
Republican campaign can be most effectively studied
through analyses of those speeches that were delivered 
during the course of the summer campaign.
The specific rhetorical strategies employed by the 
Republicans are examined in the next three chapters 
according to a neo-Aristotelian model of speech criticism 
suggested by Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. 
Braden in the second edition of Speech Criticism.
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Chapter 4
Ethos: Identification and Credibility
According to rhetorical theory, the credibility of a 
speaker develops from one of three major factors. First, 
the speaker may present himself as an "expert" during the 
course of the speech. If he conveys an impression of 
being well trained in the art of public speaking and 
persuasion, as well as thoroughly schooled in the subject 
of the speech, he will likely be perceived as trustworthy 
by the audience. If he is able to incorporate practical 
and theoretical experience into a speech act that 
encourages the audience to trust him as an "official" 
messenger, he will probably create a lasting impression 
that will serve to enhance his reputation either as an 
effective speaker or an expert in the particular issue 
under discussion. The resulting positive "terminal ethos" 
provides the "initial ethos" at his next public speaking 
appearance.
Second, he may be associated with a particular group or 
movement that endows the speaker with the enhanced 
credibility of the association or "prior ethos." The 
names of those speakers who represented the free soil 
coalitions, for example, were quite often substituted for
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the political party. "Garrisonians" for abolitionists was 
one synedoche in which the man was named in place of the 
entire movement.
Third, the speaker may be well-known as an "opinion 
leader” within a small but influential group. Local 
elected officials or respected citizens within a community 
often perform this leadership function. They may not be 
directly affiliated with the issue under discussion or 
they may not be qualified experts as speakers or analysts, 
but they enjoy the respect of the community. Reputations 
as men of public "good will" qualify them to speak on 
political topics.
Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo Braden 
confirm the classical notion that the speech can be only 
as credible as the speaker. Whether the speaker merely 
creates an impression of trustworthiness in the minds of 
his audience or whether he is trustworthy by virtue of his 
prior activities or reputation is an issue which has been 
debated for centuries. In Speech Criticism, the authors 
present a variety of classical studies that illustrate the 
importance of the speaker's personality and reputation in 
any persuasive endeavor.* In the present analysis, the 
elements which constitute the "ethos" of a speaker will be 
drawn from classical literature. The character of the 
speaker, his intelligence and his good will toward the
audience will be used as the primary elements of 
credibility.
The character of the speaker is measured by the 
audience. According to Speech Criticism, the speaker may 
associate himself with anything deemed "virtuous" by the 
audience.2 He may link his cause with praiseworthy 
accomplishments or link his opponents' cause with events 
that are scandalous or horrifying. The speaker must 
appear to be sincere. Otherwise, his character may not be 
perceived as trustworthy.
The second element of the ethical appeal is the measure 
of sagacity demonstrated by the speaker. This term refers 
to the "integrity and wisdom" demonstrated by the speaker 
during the course of the speech. It is a measure of his 
intellectual stock and rhetorical skill. The speaker who 
is tactful yet compelling, wise, informed, and tasteful 
demonstrates sagacity in public speaking. Clear logic and 
good, recent evidence contribute to the perceived 
intelligence of a speaker by enhancing the impression of 
wisdom.
Good will and emotional appeals are very closely 
linked. The speaker wants the audience to trust his 
motives in any persuasive endeavor but he must stir the 
audience to action. The audience must want to believe 
that the speaker is seeking to protect the common good and 
will protect them from whatever evil lurks within the
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opposition. The speaker must reveal himself as a 
"messenger of truth" in order to establish his good will 
toward the audience.3
The major Republican speakers of 1856 were a critical 
factor in the party's success. Their training and 
experience in practical politics served to enhance their 
image of character, intelligence and perceived good will 
throughout the campaign. The specific elements of the 
ethical appeals employed by the Republicans will be 
examined in this chapter.
Political parties that were organized during the 1850s 
in the critical frontier regions shared several 
characteristics, according to Theodore Clarke Smith. 
Organization was incomplete, the personalities of the 
politicians counted far more than principles or voting 
records, and "eloquence and combativeness for more than 
social culture and wealth.
The Republican party had no political history with 
which to define itself in 1856, The most effective means 
available to persuade voters to support the new party lay 
in the artistic proofs of ethos, pathos and logos as 
employed by the surrogate (non-candidate party 
representative) campaign speakers. The men who spoke in 
support of the Republican platform needed to embody the 
principles of the party by demonstrating the virtue of 
their cause through ethical and logical means.
Specifically, the platform called for a return to the 
ideals rooted in the Constitution, the abolition of 
slavery and polygamy in the territories, and the immediate 
admission of Kansas under a free soil constitution.^ 
Although one plank in the platform called for a full 
range of internal improvements, including railroad lines 
and harbor improvements, few of the campaign speeches 
address the need to provide such improvements. Instead of 
urging the voters to approve funds for better 
transportation, it was the task of the Republican speakers 
to establish the urgency of the Constitutional issues 
embodied in the platform and to persuade the voting public 
to support the party's presidential candidate. The 
personal recommendations of these campaign speakers 
constituted the sole basis of their credibility, since no 
recorded party activities could stand as inartistic proof 
in support of their ethos.®
The men who represented the new party enjoyed a great 
measure of prior ethos as trustworthy political 
,representatives or leading abolitionists. In this 
chapter, the ethical appeal of five major speakers is 
examined according to the neo-Aristotelian standards set 
forth by Thonssen, Baird, and Braden in Speech Criticism.? 
The issues of the campaign were clear and the arguments in 
favor of adopting the Republican platform were limited by 
the short history of the party. Therefore, the
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examination of the speakers in this chapter falls into one 
of three issue-related categories. The speakers were eye­
witnesses to the chaos in Kansas, leading anti-slavery 
politicians, or religious leaders whose ethical standards 
transcended political boundaries.
These speakers represented another situational 
constraint. The rhetors spoke directly to potential 
voters, attempting to produce action by giving meaning to 
the political situation. Party membership imposed 
situational constraints on the identity of each speaker. 
However, the orator had the freedom to manipulate the 
artistic proofs of each speech, allowing his personality 
to overcome the situational restraints of party 
membership.
Leading Republicans
A list of the major political and literary figures 
associated with the Republican cause during the 1856 
campaign includes many famous names. Thaddeus Stevens, 
William L. Dayton, Horace Greeley, Abraham Lincoln, John 
Greenleaf Whittier, Charles Sumner, Henry Ward Beecher, 
Salmon P. Chase, Francis Preston Blair, Schuyler Colfax, 
Washington Irving, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Wadsworth 
Longfellow, and William Cullen Bryant of the New York 
Evening Post were among the more prominent opinion leaders
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who flocked to the Republican party. However, not all of 
these men were seasoned politicians with the oratorical 
skills necessary to participate in a national campaign.
For example, William Dayton, the Republican vice- 
presidential nominee and a former Senator from New Jersey, 
proved an able campaigner but cost the party critical 
votes in Pennsylvania.®
Horace Greeley devoted the New York Tribune, both the 
daily and the weekly editions, to the Republican campaign, 
often travelling to report on significant speeches and 
rallies in person.® Members of sanctioned Republican 
clubs were treated to a special, reduced subscription rate 
to the weekly Tribune during the course of the campaign. 
But Greeley's effectiveness was limited by his temper 
which he vented both in person and through his editorials. 
His editorials were often libelous, giving rise to the 
quip that the weekly edition of the Tribune was purchased 
only by those readers who wished to disagree with its 
sentiments.I®
Schuyler Colfax was an example of an abolitionist 
politician who allied himself with the Republicans in 
spite of personal hardship. Colfax was a respected, self­
avowed abolitionist from Indiana. After running for re- 
election to the U.S. Senate in the fall of 1856, Colfax 
immediately went on the stump for the Republicans. He 
drew enthusiastic crowds throughout southwest Indiana in
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spite of a voice weakened from hours of outdoor oratory in 
his successful senatorial campaign. Senator Colfax noted 
that
. . .  in the woods, miles from the nearest 
village, there would be four thousand 
present, procession and banners, bands and 
glee clubs, ladies innumerable; spoke three 
hours and a half in open air, throat giving 
out; but the crowds can't get into the 
houses . . .11
Colfax described other crowds and other occasions in his
letters, all as enthusiastic and well-turned-out as the
crowd he described above, but he felt sure that Fremont
would not carry the state because of to the presence of a
strong Know Nothing contingent.
Salmon P. Chase was not a powerful speaker. In
addition to a minor speech impediment, Chase was
uncomfortable when speaking to the "common people." J.W.
Schukers, a biographer of Chase, compared the Senator
unfavorably with Stephen Douglas, claiming to have heard
them both speak a number of times.
. . .  he did not employ the language of the 
people . . .  he could not please the crowds 
either "on the stump" or at the bar or in the 
legislative hall.12
Audiences were prone to thin out quickly when Chase rose
to speak, an effect not favorable to his message.
However, his distinguished physical appearance and
borrowed credibility from a seat in the U.S. Senate lent
dignity to most formal speech
occasions.
120
Francis Preston Blair of Maryland was one of the more 
flamboyant and outspoken anti-slavery speakers of the 
campaign. He travelled throughout Missouri, railing 
against the spread of slavery into the territories. His 
life was threatened more than once. He seemed to be 
enormously gifted in generating hostility wherever he 
spoke. Professing a burning moral commitment to eradicate 
slavery, he was nevertheless a slave owner who undermined 
his credibility by refusing to emancipate his family's 
slaves.
A variety of rhetorical tactics was employed in an 
effort to unify the divergent political beliefs which 
distinguished the early party spokesmen. For example, 
Republican speakers alluded to themselves and their 
supporters as the defenders of liberty, rather than as 
Republicans or abolitionists. The slavery argument was 
limited to the proposed expansion of the institution into 
the territories and the events in Kansas. The Know 
Nothing threat was soft-pedaled in those areas where 
American party and Republican co-operation would best 
serve to defeat Democratic candidates for office.
Partisans were reminded that the South was an economic and 
intellectual wasteland, existing only to sap the North of 
its industrial and economic advantages.
John Charles Fremont was the popular symbol that united 
the diverse Republican speakers in the 1856 presidential
campaign. Fremont did not actively promote his own 
candidacy. He did not even attend the nomination 
convention in Philadelphia, so he was not present to 
accept formally his nomination on June 19, 1856.H  The 
major purpose served by this convention was to provide a 
forum for the moderate free-soil men. Fremont had already 
been "tapped" for the nomination by the dominant coalition 
of powerful ex-Whigs months before the convention, but a 
formal convention fulfilled a symbolic function that 
unified the free-soil coalitionists into a single 
political i d e n t i t y . T h e  convention hardly met the 
criteria for a deliberative body, since the platform and 
the presidential candidate had been approved before the 
opening speech in Philadelphia.
Fremont was nominated on the first ballot to the great 
enthusiasm of the participants. Six days later, a 
ratification meeting in New York City ended with a 
torchlight procession to the home of the "Pathfinder," a 
meeting that the nominee had declined to attend when 
invited by enthusiastic supporters. However the 
Republicans were not ill-served by their candidate's 
silence. With his lack of political experience, he would 
have been a liability if pitted against Democratic orators 
such as the embittered Stephen Douglas. Instead of 
campaigning, the Fremonts "received." The candidate 
greeted small delegations of admirers at his home, where
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his wife, Jesse Benton Fremont, served coffee. The
partisans seemed gratified by their gracious reception, as
confirmed by effusive descriptions appearing in the press.
In the midst of the group sat a small, 
intense, earnest, determined-looking man, who 
bore the trace of hardships and toil, yet his 
countenance beamed with such an expression of 
good-nature that it seemed to preserve a 
magnetic attraction for his guests . . .  My 
preconception of greatness was confounded - 
yet I could not help admiring the man more 
than ever . . . modesty; ability; integrity; 
were written as plainly as the alphabet upon 
the whole MAN.
Fremont's silence allowed the professional campaigners of 
the party to organize a battery of highly skilled orators, 
fueled by sympathetic and powerful newspapers. Their 
skill was such that Fremont's name became the symbol for 
every democratic ideal they might conjure, with the Free 
Soil party slogan expanded to include "Free Speech, Free 
Press, Free Men, Free Labor and Fremont" to become the 
Republican rallying c r y .
Speeches by William H. Seward and Henry Ward Beecher 
are representative of the tactical speaking employed by 
Republicans in 1856. > Their discourses dealt with a dual 
rhetorical vision posited by other leading Republicans. 
This vision provided for a nation which could either favor 
slavery and divide against itself and its founding 
principles or a nation which could abolish slavery and 
regain its integrity.
123
William H. Seward nursed a personal ambition to become 
the foremost speaker among the anti-slavery leaders, 
according to his biographer Frederick B a n c r o f t . H e  
enjoyed an undisputed reputation for "ringing oratory," 
and his participation in the 1856 campaign was critical to 
the success of the new party.
Henry Ward Beecher took a leave of absence from the 
pulpit to stump the northeast for the campaign.19 He 
compared slavery to a burning building and the political 
controversy raging around the issue to a quantity of 
explosives stored therein. He called for a daring but 
prudent man to rush between the fire and the 
explosives in order to separate them and preserve the 
surrounding institutions. Fremont, as the Republican 
candidate, was that unnamed, metaphorical man of daring 
and prudence. But even Beecher was hard pressed to answer 
the anti-Fremont accusations that streamed from the 
Democratic press. The primary attacks against Fremont 
included allegations that he was Catholic, that he was 
illegitimate, that he was an alcoholic, that he was 
negligent with regard to the fourth western expedition, 
that he was a slave-owner, and that he was engaged in land 
speculation in California. These Democratic attacks 
against Fremont's religion and parentage served indirectly 
to weaken his candidacy in those states that supported the 
nativist, Protestant sentiments shared by the Know
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Nothings and their candidate, Millard Fillmore. The rest 
of the allegations were less serious problems than the 
loss of the anti-Catholic vote in Democratic strongholds 
like Pennsylvania.
This chapter analyzes the ethical appeals in selected 
speeches of representative Republican surrogate speakers. 
Campaign speeches by Charles Robinson, Andrew H. Reeder, 
Salmon P. Chase, William H. Seward, and Cassius M. Clay 
are examined for their ethical appeals. Robinson and 
Reeder were eye-witnesses to the violence in Kansas, Chase 
and Seward were experienced free soil politicians, and 
Clay was an anti-slavery southerner.
Eye-Witnesses
Charles Robinson and Andrew Horatio Reeder served as 
governors of Kansas during the first turbulent months of 
territorial organization. Reeder was appointed governor 
of the Kansas territory by President Pierce and was 
outraged by the corrupt election practices that resulted 
in a pro-slavery legislature being seated in 1 8 5 4 . 2 0  
Having taken his outrage to the people by engaging in a 
public-speaking tour on his way to Washington, D.C., in 
the winter of 1855, he proved too great an embarrassment 
to the Pierce administration and was removed as governor 
in July of 1855.21
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Returning to Kansas, he was elected as the free soil 
(free state) candidate for Congress in October, 1855, by a 
narrow margin over the pro-slavery candidate. Reeder then 
spent nine months campaigning for recognition of his 
status as a legal territorial representative to Congress. 
His status as a Congressional delegate was eventually 
disallowed by the special committee formed to examine his 
credentials. He returned to Kansas once again, arriving 
in the spring of 1856, when he was indicted for treason by 
a pro-slavery grand jury. He fled the state in May, and 
openly traveled east from Illinois, speaking frequently to 
large, sympathetic audiences during his journey to 
Washington, D.C.
Charles Robinson was indicted for treason along with 
Andrew Reeder in May of 1856. Robinson was an active 
abolitionist and a practicing physician who served as the 
resident agent for the Emigrant Aid Society, the Boston, 
Massachusetts, settlement group. Robinson's reputation as 
a proponent of "fair play" and as a defender of the 
underdog grew from his defense of California squatters 
whose land was pre-empted by Sutter during the height of 
the California gold rush. He was seriously wounded in an 
armed confrontation between the squatters and Sutter's men 
in 1849, then tried for conspiracy and murder. Robinson 
was eventually acquitted of both charges. While on trial, 
he was elected as a free soil proponent to the California
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legislature, where he supported John C. Fremont's 
candidacy to the U.S. Senate.22
In Kansas, Robinson was active with free soil (free 
state) interests from 1854, when he arrived, until the 
successful admission of the state under a free soil 
constitution in 1861. During 1855-56, his home was sacked 
and burned by pro-slavery men and he was imprisoned. He 
was elected governor of Kansas under the free state Topeka 
constitution in 1855, but he did not take office until 
Kansas was admitted to the Union.23
During the campaign of 1856, Robinson traveled widely 
in the East, speaking in behalf of a free Kansas. He 
relied upon his personal experience and integrity as a 
free soil politician to generate good will toward the 
Republican platform.
Charles Robinson: Speech of October 22, 1856
Charles Robinson was the first free soil governor of 
Kansas. Before statehood was conferred on the Kansas 
territory, however, Robinson's election to the 
governorship by the extra-legal free state convention was 
an act of defiance which thrilled the anti-slavery 
sympathizers across the nation. Robinson traveled 
throughout the free states during the campaign of 1856, 
speaking in behalf of those free soil Kansans who had
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elected him to office. His address of October 22, 1856,
provides an example of the ethos which he brought to the
Republican campaign.
According to the account printed in the New York Daily
Times, Robinson was the first of several speakers to
address a noisy, partisan audience that had jammed the New
York Academy of Music to c a p a c i t y . 24 He opened his address
by immediately establishing his status as a representative
of the people of Kansas, enhancing his prior ethos.
. . .  in the present canvass there is a great 
issue before the people. And I wish briefly 
to speak in regard to that issue, for I feel 
personally interested in it. I feel that the
people that I in part represent here tonight,
are personally interested in that issue. The 
question with me is a personal one . . .25
The question was slavery. The issue was its extension
into the territories. Robinson knew the partisan nature
of his audience well. He did not provide any particulars
about the extension of slavery until the conclusion of his
speech. Instead, he spent the bulk of his address firmly
establishing his credibility as a witness to the political
problems in Kansas.
Robinson was an eyewitness to the Kansas atrocities.
However, rather than discuss the sweeping events occurring
on the frontier, events that were being chronicled with
relish by the newspapers as quickly as telegraphed
accounts were received from Kansas, Robinson chose to
illustrate the conflict with a series of homespun,
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specific examples. He reminded the audience of the unfair
laws passed against the anti-slavery residents of Kansas
by explaining that
The Missourians carried the election and they 
passed such laws as they chose - laws under 
which you can scarcely breathe. Why, a man 
cannot speak even to his wife in the night 
without being liable to break those l a w s . 26
To some extent, the audience would have been familiar with
the pro-slavery legislation of Kansas to some extent from
reading editorials and news announcements headlined
"Current Kansas Atrocities." By providing a folksy,
humorous illustration of the unconstitutional constraints
of the new laws, Robinson underlined the severity of the
new legal code while invoking the sympathy of his
audience. Robinson enhanced his credibility as an
eyewitness by providing a sense of perspective for the
particular problem - the abridgement of free speech in
Kansas.
His understated description of the sack of Lawrence 
illustrated the hopeless frustration of the anti-slavery 
men in the face of the pro-administration border ruffians. 
In Robinson's account of "battle," the pro-slavery, 
territorial militia marched to the outskirts of Lawrence, 
Kansas, an anti-slavery settlement. The ruffians were 
armed and angry, just spoiling for a confrontation with 
the free state men. A rabble of 2,000 to 3,000 
Missourians approached the city, claimed Robinson, only to
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be stopped from engaging in open battle after marching, 
fully armed, right up to the city limits. The new 
governor of the territory, an administration appointee and 
pro-slavery man, talked the rabble into leaving the city 
of Lawrence alone. However, as Robinson recounted the 
confrontation, it was obvious that anti-slavery law and 
order prevailed over the unprincipled actions of the pro­
slavery forces as they retreated from the field of 
"battle."
The governor goes down and gets them in 
consultation. They agreed very reluctantly 
that they would let Lawrence stand, and not 
attack at that time, and concluded they would 
go home. But, before they go home, they 
begin to steal horses again, right before the 
governor’s eyes.27
Robinson illustrated the extent of the political
corruption he had observed by describing how the
insurgents proceeded to burn a sawmill and several homes
while still in the governor's company. He drew no
conclusions for his audience. Instead, he enhanced his
ethos as a rational, intelligent observer by allowing his
audience to draw its own conclusions about the actions of
the pro-slavery administration in Kansas.
Robinson was an expert free soil witness to the
activities perpetrated by the pro-administration
territorial government. He was unquestionably loyal to the
anti-slavery, anti-administration coalition which sought
to contain slavery. He illustrated the political
situation and identified the major figures, but Robinson 
drew no conclusions for his audience. He left the 
audience to draw the necessary inductive generalizations 
from Robinson's specific examples of injustice to the 
conclusion that the Pierce administration was to blame for 
the chaos that plagued the entire territory. Robinson 
provided his audience with a vivid contrast. He balanced 
his anecdotes with skill. The irrational activities of 
the pro-slavery faction were effectively contrasted with 
the understated observations of the more peaceful anti­
slavery faction that Robinson represented.
For example, he captured the irony of the confrontation 
quoted above in the very next passage of his address. The 
citizens whose cattle had been stolen along with the 
horses appealed to the governor to help them recover their 
goods. Robinson related the following confrontation:
Well, the Governor says, I don't know, those 
men are gentlemen down there, I find that 
they are old political friends. I have known 
them before. I find them very honorable men 
and I don't know about stopping them; you 
ought to have driven your cattle away. Well, 
says a man, ought I to have driven away my 
sawmill that they burned?2®
Robinson's drawling narrative style was perfectly suited
to his reputation as a homespun, frontier man of action.
His rather plain style reenforced his credibility as an
intelligent, objective eyewitness. According to Thonsson,
Baird and Braden, the relationship between the speaker's
style and his credibility reveals the inner character of
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the speaker to his audience since "personal character is 
clearly revealed by the speaker's style of expression."29
Although his speech was relatively free of stylistic 
figures, Robinson incorporated a great deal of irony into 
his narrative. Both irony and sarcasm served to 
underscore his sympathy for the Kansans while he ridiculed 
the administration. The ironic twists within each 
descriptive passage focused the attention of the audience 
on the point Robinson wished to emphasize, illustrating 
his facility for persuasive exposition.
Robinson related dialogue as a witness to its 
occurrence.30 in addition to his presence at the 
confrontation between the governor's troops and the anti­
slavery settlers of Lawrence, Kansas, he was perceived as 
a reputable anti-slavery eyewitness because of his status 
as the victim of pro-administration persecution. He 
illustrated the lack of due process that faced the free 
soil settlers in a manner calculated to engage the good 
will of his audience.
Robinson relied upon this form of expository narrative 
throughout his address. His authority as a responsible 
eyewitness was enhanced, for he included no judgments 
against the territorial administration or the powers in 
Washington. In Speech Criticism, Thonssen, Baird and 
Braden contend that any distinctive speaking style is
" . . .  an indivisible element of the process of
persuasion and focuses attention on what language does,
rather than exclusively upon what it is."31 Robinson
probably hoped to enhance the identification process by
presenting familiar political relationships, that is,
patronage, re-set in a violent context. He painted a
familiar picture - an administrative appointee (the
governor) with corrupt associations (the pro-slavery men)
exposed by an "honest man" (the farmer with the burned
barn) who exposed the dishonest practices to the audience
via the narrative sequence.
Robinson further implied Republican support of the free
soil Kansans by burlesquing the illegal activities of the
pro-slavery Pierce administration. He related an incident
involving a roving "posse" of pro-slavery militia that had
appropriated several hundred head of horses.
The Marshal of the United States is guilty 
then of horse stealing Kansas by the whole 
sale. The President of the United States 
retains him in office to this hour, indorses
[sic] his conduct and he is himself a horsethief.32
The audience roared with applause and shouts at Robinson's 
observation. His narrative moved the audience to 
demonstrate a measure of their good will. He then shifted 
into an intense, first-person narrative of the particular 
atrocities in Kansas for which he blamed the President 
whom he had just characterized as a horse thief.
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Now I tell you that I might depict to you 
every outrage that has been committed there, 
if I had the power and you could not believe 
them. . . .  We can tell you of them but we 
cannot show you the dead body of Barboue, 
shot by an officer of the United States. We 
cannot show you the shrieking wife as she 
sees the dead b o d y . 33
Robinson's plain style was perfectly suited to this
climactic, intense exposition. His method of relating
grand tragedy in simple terms enhanced his image as a
credible eyewitness. He implied a sense of stark
helplessness consistent with a horror-benumbed eyewitness
account.
The image of Robinson presented by the speech text 
mirrored his prior ethos closely. The consistency between 
the type of action-loving man Robinson was perceived to be 
and the manner of active exposition that characterized his 
speech suggested that the speaker could be trusted by his 
listeners.
Robinson drew no explicit conclusions for his audience. 
He made no grand promises nor any dire threats about the 
national problems that could arise from the territorial 
unrest. Robinson used his narrative about the plight of 
Kansas to provide an inductive basis from which his 
audience could draw their own conclusions about the larger 
problems implied in Kansas. If Robinson assumed 
correctly, then the trustworthiness and credibility he 
established during the course of the speech should 
persuade the audience to support the free soil activists.
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If Robinson's integrity, good taste, trustworthiness, and 
expertness were successfully demonstrated throughout the 
speech by the consistent objectivity with which he 
reported the violent and illegal activities in the Kansas 
territory then, based upon his experience in Kansas, 
Charles Robinson can be considered an expert witness 
against the Democratic administration. Therefore, the 
audience should reason that all men who accepted 
Robinson's narrative as the truth should vote against the 
Democratic administration.
The conclusion of the speech was not reproduced by the 
New York Daily Times, but the columnist summarized 
Robinson's closing remarks. He apparently suggested to 
his audience that a vote for Fremont was a vote against 
the Democratic administration, which Robinson blamed for 
the problems in Kansas. Since the rally at which he spoke 
was sponsored by the Young Men's Republican General 
Committee of the City of New York, Robinson’s closing 
remarks were predictably partisan and a necessary part of 
the speech. His address expressed support for the 
Republican program with regard to its ability to redress 
the consitational infringements wrought on the citizens of 
Kansas by the pro-slavery, Democratic administration in 
Washington, D.C. However, Robinson's partisan remarks 
were scant. Robinson's speech was designed to support the 
anti-slavery stance of the Republican party, that is, the
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concept that the Kansas situation was a blatant Democratic 
attempt to force slavery on the territories.
Charles Robinson was not the first eyewitness to 
address a New York audience during the 1856 campaign. 
Andrew Reeder, the first governor of the Kansas territory, 
had spoken in New York City earlier in the campaign.
Reeder was an experienced anti-slavery politician as well 
as an eyewitness to the chaos in Kansas. He was not an 
active member of the Republican party, however. He was a 
free soil advocate with the ability to testify to the pro­
slavery abuses fostered on the Kansas settlers by the 
Democratic administration.
Andrew Reeder: Speech of 27 August 1856
Andrew Reeder spoke before an audience of approximately 
three thousand in the New York Tabernacle on Tuesday, 
August 27, 1856. He arrived late. He had cancelled a 
scheduled speech earlier in the summer at the same 
location long after the Tabernacle was filled with an 
eager audience. The packed house was noisy, hot, and 
unruly, according to the newspaper account. Reeder was 
anxiously awaited by the organizing committee, since they 
hoped that his arrival would calm the crowd.
Although delayed, Reeder arrived to speak that Tuesday
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evening. His appearance was met with cheers and sustained 
applause, according to the New York Daily T r i b u n e .34
Reeder had served a short, turbulent term as the first 
governor of Kansas, appointed by President Pierce. His 
reputation for first-hand knowledge of the political chaos 
in the territory produced for him a strong initial ethos 
when speaking to partisan groups during the 1856 canvass. 
In addition, Reeder's election to the U.S. Senate by the 
anti-slavery settlers in Kansas probably enhanced his 
ethos as a spokesman before anti-slavery audiences.
Reeder was sincerely outraged by the violence in the 
territory. His sincerity and integrity were evident as he 
attempted to engage the good will of his audience with the 
introduction to his speech. "I come before you upon a 
mission from the Free State men of Kansas to tell their 
tale of wrongs and to appeal to you for that aid."35 
However, his appeal was indirect, compared to the 
emotional appeals of Robinson's vivid narrative. Reeder 
attempted to engage the sympathy of his audience without 
describing particular activities or remedies. The good 
will he hoped to induce in his audience was heavily 
process-oriented. He appealed for their sympathy and 
their support. He thanked the audience for its show of 
sympathetic applause upon his entrance to the hall. He 
claimed that their eager applause demonstrated their 
acceptance of his presence as the official representative
137
of all "who are struggling for their dearest rights upon
the plains of far-off Kansas."
I come to you not as a politician to urge the 
claims of any candidate for office. I 
represent a party who has but one article in 
their creed - the making of a Free State in 
Kansas.
Reeder made use of his ethos as the ex-governor of the 
territory. He declined to solicit votes from his 
audience, claiming only to be a non-political 
representative of beleaguered, free soil Kansans. He 
attempted to enhance his integrity by promising "to give 
fellowship and sympathy and thanks to every man who is 
laboring on sincerely to make Kansas free according to the
test of his j u d g e m e n t . " 3 7
In contrast to the indirect, narrative nature of 
Robinson's appeals, Reeder hammered at his audience with 
his first person demands. He declined to associate 
himself formally with the Republican party, choosing to 
identify himself only as a free state representative. "I 
speak for free Kansas and that alone," he asserted in his 
introduction. Postulating that the "truths" he revealed 
during his speech might help one party or another, he 
insisted that he did not wish to be held accountable for 
supporting one political organization over another, even 
by implication.
As the introduction drew to a close, Reeder suggested
the depth of his single-minded commitment to a free Kansas 
by saying
I shall go as straight to ray object as my 
intellect will allow, and shall not deviate 
to the right or left for the sake of 
candidates or parties. If, however, the 
truths I shall tell, and the remedies I shall 
suggest, shall incidentally help any party, 
it is their due and I shall have nothing to 
take back. If on the other hand, they shall 
work injury to any, the responsibility is on 
them and not on me, and I shall not have a 
shadow of regret for my action, whatever I 
may have for theirs.38
Reeder left nothing to chance in his efforts to establish
his authority as a free state spokesman. If anything, his
emphasis upon his qualifications to represent the free
soil cause made his personal credibility the sole issue.
Reeder's insistence that the audience accept his
credentials as a man of integrity may have been
purposefully defensive. According to Winston Brembeck and
William Howell in their work, Persuasion: A Means of
Social Influence, the validity of a speaker's assertions
as perceived by an audience is a function of the
trustworthiness he is able to project during the speech
act.^9
Reeder had been appointed governor of the Kansas 
territory by President Pierce. The Pierce administration 
was perceived as strongly pro-slavery by the Republican 
party. In his speech, "The Crime Against Kansas," Sumner 
had accused Reeder of complicity with the Pierce 
administration, charging that Reeder was a "tool of
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Pierce" for not challenging all of the territorial 
election returns in 1854.^0 Sumner was a radical 
abolitionist with high political credibility in New York, 
so Reeder had to defend beyond doubt his trustworthiness 
as an anti-slavery spokesman.
Reeder developed a three-part ethical appeal in his own
defense. First, he established himself as a loyal free
state man by reminding his audience of his free soil 
activities and associations. Second, he illustrated his 
concern for the plight of Kansas and the constitutional 
rights of those citizens he had been appointed to
protect. Third, he appealed to the audience to concern
themselves with the welfare of Kansas as a means of 
protecting the welfare of the entire nation by presenting 
an inductive analysis of the slavery threat based upon his 
experience and observations.
Rather than demonstrating his trustworthiness, Reeder 
initially demanded that his audience accept his 
credentials as a man of integrity by asserting that his 
purpose was moral and that his intent was selfless. His 
introduction was designed to reinforce his strong partisan 
credibility, establish his credentials as a trustworthy 
source, and imply his support of the Republican party. He 
recited an emotional chronology of the wrongs inflicted on 
the population of Kansas by the pro-slavery faction that 
had pre-empted the legislative power in his territory.
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Reeder absolved himself of responsibility for carrying out 
the "oppressive" measures dictated by the Pierce 
administration by claiming that he suffered from equal 
oppression. Ke charged that a "scheme" existed to bring 
Kansas into the Union as a slave state, just as Sumner had 
claimed in his "Crime" speech. Reeder argued that he was 
obviously blameless for any part in the pro-slavery 
scheme, since he had left the territory in order to bring 
notice of the scheme to the nation via a series of public 
lectures. He attempted to regain his trustworthiness and 
integrity by "exposing" the scheme at the public forums 
provided by the election campaign.
Like Sumner, Reeder offered no evidence for asserting 
the existence of any scheme. He relied upon the audience 
to associate his virtuous intention to expose the pro­
slavery schemers with the commendable character he 
intended them to perceive. If the audience perceived him 
to be the honest, wise, and just man he claimed to be, 
then his assertions would probably be perceived as 
truthful as well.
r
Reeder's strongest source of credibility was his 
expertise as an eyewitness and as an administrative 
insider. His inductive analysis of the Kansas situation 
was the only indication that he wanted the audience to 
perform a specific service, to vote into office those 
national representatives who would stop slavery from
entering the territories. By skillfully scattering 
emotional and ethical appeals throughout the body of his 
speech, Reeder implied that the nation was in danger if 
the situation in Kansas, as he portrayed it, were not 
resolved in favor of the free state party. His revelation 
of the administration's scheme to bring Kansas into the 
Union as a slave state was accompanied by a promise to 
"endeavor to show you what the awful consequences of that 
consummation will be to the North."
Reeder described the coming territorial election as a 
travesty which would indirectly affect every member of his 
audience should they fail to support the free soil 
advocates in the fall election. Reeder postulated that 
the results of the October territorial elections would be 
manipulated by the same armed ruffians and corrupt 
election officials who had engineered the outcome of the 
pro-slavery victory of 1855. Unless his audience provided 
support for national free soil candidates, history would 
repeat itself. Should the successful pro-slavery 
legislature draft a slavery constitution for Kansas, 
argued Reeder, then the "contest is transferred from the 
plains of Kansas to the halls of Congress and it will 
there be battled by you."4*
Reeder reasoned that a policy of unrestricted slavery 
throughout the nation would result in a gross political 
imbalance in Congress. He reasoned that the election of a
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pro-slavery legislature in Kansas would result in the 
extension of slavery into all other territories, upsetting 
the power balance in Congress, for "Each state will send 
two Senators, the South will have the preponderance of 
power, and when do you suppose we will get it back?"
He indicted the Pierce administration for condoning the 
constitutional abuses occurring in Kansas. Reeder 
provided an historical example to illustrate the depth of 
corruption in Washington, strengthening his credibility as 
an intellectual analyst. He compared the treasonous 
activities of the Pierce administration to those committed 
during the reign of Charles I of England. He compared 
Jeffries, of the Bloody Assizes, to Lecompte of Kansas, 
earning a round of sympathetic "hisses" from the audience.
Reeder, himself, had been charged with treason for his 
anti-slavery activities in Kansas. He fled the territory 
during the early weeks of the Republican campaign, fearing 
for his life and the safety of his family. After his 
flight, he enjoyed great popularity as an anti-slavery 
s p e a k e r . ^ 2 Therefore, his counter-charge against the 
Democratic administration served both to reinforce his 
credibility as an anti-slavery eye-witness to the 
atrocities in Kansas as well as to substantiate the 
Republican argument against the constitutionality of the 
pro-slavery, Democratic policies in Kansas. Reeder
143
shifted the focus of the argument from a defense of his
innocence to a charge of collective guilt for an entire
administration. His audience responded with enthusiasm to
his counter-charge of treason against the administration
that condoned the violence in Kansas.
His final appeal served to complete the sense of
identity between the northern audience he addressed and
the free state men in Kansas.
The free laboring men [sic] of the North 
should know that the people of Kansas are 
fighting his battles and fighting to settle 
the question whether he shall have a right to 
go there and build a home for himself and hischildren.^3
Reeder concluded that the only means of protecting Kansas 
and the rest of the nation from the pro-slavery factions 
(and, by implication, the Democrats) was to vote against 
the policies of the current administration by voting 
against those candidates fielded by the party currently in 
power.
On September 19, in New Haven, Connecticut, Reeder 
delivered his second New England address of the campaign. 
He made no reference to his tenure as a representative of 
Kansas. He constructed this New Haven address with 
subtle, implicit political appeals in contrast to his New 
York address in which his purpose was explicitly stated.
His major concern in the second speech appears to have 
been the re-establishment of civil rights in Kansas. He 
urged that legal, constitutional measures be invoked so
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that due process might return to the courts of the 
territory. His references to the violent struggles in 
Kansas were refined. He referred indirectly to the 
violence, describing the bloodshed as "a struggle of a few
years."44
As in his New York speech, Reeder projected the impact 
of a pro-slavery Kansas constitution upon the rest of the 
nation, and specifically upon New England, detailing the 
effects of new slave states on western emigration and 
congressional balance-of-power.
Reeder continued with this theme of pro-Republican 
morality throughout his address. He relied upon sweeping 
generalizations to illustrate the morality of the anti­
slavery forces in Kansas. He likened the free soil 
population of Kansas to the serfs of Russia, for example, 
in their forced servitude to the pro-slavery legislature. 
To enhance identification with his implied constituency in 
Kansas, Reeder relied upon the use of collective pronouns 
throughout the address. As he indicted the pro-slavery 
politicians currently governing Kansas during the 
campaign, he asserted,
Having thus robbed us of all our political 
rights, shut us out from the ballot box, 
deprived us of access to all judicial 
remedies, stripped us of our leaders, 
destroyed our presses, the next step was to 
destroy all facilities for Northern 
emigration and isolate us from our friends in 
the States.45
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Reeder thus sought to establish himself as the 
authoritative link between the two scenes: the Kansas 
atrocities, which he had witnessed, and the prospective 
northern emigrants, some of whom were perhaps occupying 
seats in that very auditorium.
The New Haven address included many of the same 
arguments that comprised the earlier New York speech. 
Reeder barely alluded to the upcoming presidential 
election, the Republican party, or any of the candidates. 
He professed no partisanship except to a free Kansas.
Yet, the New York Daily Tribune subtitled his speech, 
"Reasons for Electing Fremont and Dayton." Reeder's 
speech was inherently pro-Republican. Its anti-slavery 
sentiments echoed an emergent Republican fantasy theme, an 
argument in favor of free labor throughout the nation. 
Therefore, Reeder's appearance in behalf of those free 
state Kansans who had been denied due process associated 
him with a worthwhile cause and was therefore probably 
persuasive. He demonstrated, through his eye-witness 
testimony, that the pro-slavery forces encouraged 
lawlessness. He attempted to increase a sense of 
identification between his northeastern, pro-Republican 
audience and his fellow free state Kansans. Therefore, by 
linking both his cause and himself to positions which his 
partisan audiences approved, he tapped a strong source of 
artistic proof in support of the Republican party.
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Anti-Slavery Politicians
Salmon P. Chase, William H. Seward, and Cassius M. Clay 
were well-known anti-slavery politicians. Chase was the 
recently-elected governor of Ohio and an acknowledged 
leading radical Republican during the 1856 campaign. He 
was able to generate sympathy for the Republican cause by 
using his own campaign and political record as evidence.
Chase was an outspoken foe of slavery. He had served 
in the U.S. Senate as a Free Soil party member from 1849- 
1855.46 He ran as the first Republican gubernatorial 
candidate in Ohio in 1855, defeating his Know-Nothing and 
Democratic opponents by enlarging upon the issues of 
sectionalism and the problem of slavery in the 
territories. He used his own victory, and the defeat of 
his opponents, as a focus for his pro-Republican oratory 
during the 1856 presidential canvass. Chase professed to 
be an example of the ideal Republican candidate, 
representing the economic and political stability of the 
Republican platform.47
William H. Seward had long been an active anti-slavery 
representative in Congress. His reputation as a 
Conscience Whig was well known throughout the free states. 
However, he was reluctant to apply his influence with the 
New York voters in favor of Fremont's candidacy. Seward,
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himself, had hoped to represent the new party as its first 
presidential candidate. He was humiliated by the party's 
decision to endorse Fremont for the position that Seward 
felt he had earned during his tenure as a party founder.48 
William Seward considered withdrawing from public life at 
the end of the summer in 1856, since he felt that his 
party had scrapped its principles by nominating an 
inexperienced, but publicly and politically useful, 
presidential candidate.
Seward labored in Congress throughout the summer of 
1856, during which a special session of Congress had been 
convened to deal with army appropriations. Congress did 
not adjourn until the end of August, and Seward was deeply 
involved in arguing for the admission of Kansas as a free 
state even during the special session. When the Congress 
finally adjourned, Seward announced plans to travel abroad 
during the fall, but he was persuaded to remain in the 
United States and lend his voice to the campaign.*9 
Thurlow Weed, among other leading Republicans, urged 
Seward to display better sportsmanship and to take an 
active part in the c a m p a i g n . 50 Seward agreed, but he 
limited his engagements to New York and Detroit.51 His 
address at Auburn, New York, which clearly demonstrated 
his lack of enthusiasm for the canvass, is examined in 
this chapter.
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Cassius Marcellus Clay was a southerner who had 
embraced the abolitionist cause. His support of the 
Republican platform was potentially valuable because he 
provided eyewitness testimony about the abuses of the 
slave system in the South. He was fiercely dedicated to 
the eradication of slavery and gifted with the eloquence 
to move his audience to action. Clay was Yale-educated 
but reckless and willful. His personal life was 
punctuated with duels, brawls, and at least one murder.52 
Therefore, Clay's primary value to the Republican campaign 
of 1856 lay in his ethical appeal as a southern 
abolitionist.
Salmon P. Chase: Address of July 1, 1856
Salmon P. Chase was serving as the governor of Ohio 
during the 1856 presidential contest. Chase had served in 
the U.S. Senate for six years, then won election in the 
1855 gubernatorial contest when his term in the Senate 
expired. He was a popular speaker at anti-slavery 
meetings, so his prior ethos was that of an active, 
politically seasoned, anti-expansionist Republican.
When speaking in behalf of the Republican party. Chase 
used his own political background as his strongest 
argument in favor of other Republican candidates. He 
limited his speaking engagements to Ohio, normally
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addressing partisan groups in or near Cincinnati. On July
1, 1856, Chase spoke briefly before an outdoor rally in
downtown Cincinnati, where his political record and
achievements were well known to his a u d i e n c e . 54
Chase announced that his topic would be freedom and
slavery as they affected the governing of the republic as
a whole. Since the responsibility of his office dictated
that Chase protect the welfare of his constituents, he
meant to continue speaking against slavery for the good of
his fellow Ohioans as well as for the good of the
Republicans. He reminded them of his long experience as
an abolitionist speaker and of his popular election as a
free soil adherent. Then, he reminded his audience that
he was addressing them unofficially - not as the governor
of Ohio, but as a concerned citizen of the nation. He
endeavored to establish his competence on two fronts, as
a duly elected public servant and as an acknowledged
spokesman for a national party. He included a touch of
humility, as further evidence of his selfless intent.
There are times and occasions when, before 
addressing a public and political meeting, a 
public servant might need to apologize for
his appearance in assemblies where the strict
line of official duties did not call him.
. . . I am here tonight to discuss the 
question that most nearly affects us ascitizens.55
Having defined his identity as a servant of the public, 
Chase claimed that it was his official duty as a "friend
150
to our form of government" to address the "imminent 
danger" facing the national government.
The body of his short address had three major parts.I
In the first portion, Chase illustrated the alleged 
shortcomings of the Democratic administration by 
presenting a selective chronology of those events that led 
from the repeal of the Missouri Compromise to the 
Democratic campaign of 1856. He spoke from personal 
experience as he developed the chronology. He had served 
in the Senate and participated in many of the decisions 
pivotal to the current campaign.
Pursuing a rhetorical strategy of enhancing his own 
character by attacking the behavior of an opponent, Chase 
charged the Democrats with political irresponsibility for 
nominating Pierce and promoting an oligarchy which had 
proven unpopular even within their own party. "I cannot 
think of any good thing done or proposed by this 
President, and therefore I will be silent."56 gy 
implication, Chase condemned the party which had nominated 
Pierce. However, his condemnation reflected his good 
taste by being discrete, indirect, and humorous. He 
suggested that the Democrats had failed their public trust 
to defend the principles of the Constitution and that 
Democratic leaders had acknowledged that failure by 
nominating someone other than the incumbent to run for the 
, presidency.
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Chase briefly developed the notion that Pierce and the 
Democrats were dedicated to promoting a slave-based 
political power. Rather than allude to the "plot" theory 
proposed by Reeder and Robinson, Chase derived his 
authority from his political experience in Washington,
D.C. Chase charged that Pierce had served the slave- 
power interests more fully than any previous President, 
doing exactly as he was directed by "the sole and trusted 
representatives of the slaveholding oligarchy." Chase 
avoided naming the opposition as the Democratic party. He 
alluded to the organization that fielded Pierce as its 
representative, but he avoided making direct accusations 
by naming the party. The partisan audience was left to 
draw its own connections between Pierce, slavery, and the 
party currently in power.
Chase illustrated the second half of his speech with 
what he claimed were successful Republican policies as 
implemented by himself as governor of Ohio. Chase claimed 
that "Manufacturers are stimulated, the price of property 
has advanced - everybody is employed - and the Union 
stands] Have I not a right to claim all this as a result 
of my election?"57 Chase used his political record and 
the ethos of his elected office to imply that effective 
Republican leadership in Ohio could provide a model for 
effective Republican leadership elsewhere in the nation.
. . . the opponents of our cause predicted
tr
. . . that if Salmon P. Chase was elected 
Governor, Cincinnati would sink; the Union 
would be dissolved; there would be no trade; 
commerce would make her farewell appearance 
on the northern shore of the Ohio . . .5®
He then testified to the various economic and political
successes that had been achieved in Ohio since his
election, arguing that if the opposing party had been in
error about the results of Ohio's election, then they
could make a similar error in predicting the outcome of
the national election. Having listed the positive results
of his short tenure in office, Chase linked his political
identity to the national Republican campaign effort by
preparing to "speak of the beneficent influence already
felt from this uprising of the people in behalf of the
Republican cause."
In this third portion of his speech, Chase attempted to
establish his political integrity. He recited a lengthy
chronology of the evils inflicted upon the American
society by the party currently controlling the government.
He continued to allude to the guilty Democrats without
naming the party, demonstrating his verbal moderation in
the face of violent issues.
I care nothing about names of party; it is 
the principles to be asserted and maintained; 
all that we want to know is, whether men who 
are presented to us for our suffrages will 
use their positions in the right way. I 
don't know that it is worth while to talk 
about Buchanan or any of the candidates.^9
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Chase lodged a direct attack on the Democratic party as he 
concluded his speech. Having reminded his audience of the 
outrages in Kansas, he remarked that "The candidates of 
the so-called Democratic party represent the wrongs we 
have referred to, and in this light only have we to regard 
that party." Just as he would have his audience judge the 
Republican party on the record he represented, Chase 
demanded that his audience then judge the Democrats on the 
evidence he presented in his address. Chase offered his 
own political record to support the Republican standards 
of constitutionality and fairness. He detailed the legal 
abuses in Kansas as the Democratic record.
Chase had hoped to represent the Republicans as their 
presidential candidate in 1856. He felt that his record 
as an active anti-expansionist would be adequate 
endorsement for his candidacy. When Fremont was given the 
nomination, Chase continued to support his party, but he 
kept his endorsement of its candidates rather general. As 
he concluded his address, Chase recommended Fremont to the 
crowd, claiming that Fremont was a man " . . .  who never 
says a thing he don't [sic] mean, and never promises a 
thing he don't [sic] perform." That was the sum of his 
political endorsement.
The final passage of the address was an appeal for 
anti-slavery votes in November. The close argumentation 
and personal testimony which characterized the body of the
speech gave way to generalizations and partisan 
assertions. Chase predicted that the eradication of 
slavery would produce the "blessed spectacle of a happy 
people, fearing God and loving the right." Prosperity 
would follow automatically once freedom was secured in all 
the territories, and the welfare of the nation would be 
insured, according to Chase. All of these good things 
would come to pass if his audience voted correctly. He 
could make such a promise believable for, on his own 
authority, he had established happiness, prosperity and 
freedom in Ohio as a Republican governor.
Cassius M. Clay: "Slavery or Freedom?" Speech of 24 
October 1856
Cassius M. Clay spoke before the Young Men's Fremont 
and Dayton Central Union on Friday, October 24, in New 
York City.60 His purpose was to generate new enthusiasm 
for the flagging Republican campaign. Clay's prior ethos 
as a masterful orator and a popular southern abolitionist 
was reinforced by his enthusiastic reception, as reported 
by the New York Daily Times.61 His address was 
interrupted repeatedly by laughter, cheers and applause 
during the course of the evening, indicating his 
popularity and acceptance as a party spokesman.62
Clay employed a variety of stylistic devices to enhance 
the emotional appeal of his address. Clay relied 
primarily upon satire to engage the sympathy of his 
audience. He enlarged upon the stereotypical impressions 
of the South and southerners held by his northern 
audience. For example, he referred to slave owners as 
"those who are in the habit of fainting away whenever the 
word liberty is mentioned . . . "
Clay divided his address into three major portions, 
each section relying for proof on his credibility as a 
southerner, a scholar, and an experienced politician^;------
First, he charged that southern slave-holding practices 
created an oligarchical form of government which prevented 
the universal exercise of personal liberty. He 
demonstrated that he was knowledgeable about the subject 
by referring to his experiences in Kentucky politics. He 
charged that the entire southern region was an oligarchy. 
The South was guilty of sectionalism, a real threat to 
freedom and liberty in the rest of the nation. " . . .  
the intention of the fathers of the Constitution was that 
Liberty should be national and Slavery sectional, . . . "  
for " . . .  the man who follows blindly the dictation of 
the South and would make a slave of a black man today 
would make a slave of a white man tomorrow.” Therefore, 
Clay demanded that every citizen should have the right to 
pursue liberty for his own protection.
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Further enhancing his ethos by demonstrating his
knowledge of the matter, Clay illustrated the difference
between the intent of the founding fathers who held slaves
but created the documents providing national liberty, and
the intentions of the men who desired to curtail all
personal liberties by opening the entire nation to
slavery. He proposed that, in spite of their ownership of
slaves, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George
Washington recognized the necessary personal liberties
that distinguished a democracy. Again arguing from his
authority as a native southerner. Clay insisted that there
were indeed men living in the South in 1856 who
appreciated the principles of liberty as outlined by the
authors of the Constitution.
. . . although the leading patriots and minds 
of the South recognize in common with those 
of the North, man's equality in law . . . 
yet, the great masses of the southern people 
did not recognize and appreciate this greatidea.®3
He claimed that the founding fathers could not be faulted 
for the oligarchy that arose in the slave states. Clay's 
detailed explanation regarding the intentions of the 
founding fathers was designed to answer Democratic 
arguments demonstrating the constitutionality of 
unrestrained slavery. Leading Democrats argued that the 
nation was founded by slave owners who never intended the 
slave to be free to enjoy the privileges of liberty.
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Measured by the neo-Aristotelian methodology developed 
in Speech Criticism, Clay's arguments appear to establish 
his integrity as a southerner who recognized and respected 
the concepts of liberty and equality. His ethos would be 
all the stronger by virtue of his role as "reluctant 
witness," that is, a southerner who supported the anti­
slavery cause. His image as a leading mind of the South 
was reinforced by his demonstrated knowledge of those 
concepts, and his good will toward his audience was 
emphasized by his allusions to their good fortune in being 
from the "enlightened" North.
Throughout his short address, Clay referred to the 
audience as "you men of the North" and "you, the Christian 
people of the nineteenth century." He emphasized his role 
as a southerner, referring to southern men collectively as 
"we" and "us." He reminded the audience of his prediction 
regarding the annexation of Texas as a slave state, 
further demonstrating his political foresight.
I warned you against the annexation of Texas 
as a slave state. Now after twelve years 
more, I stand before you again, and I tell 
you that this struggle must sometime be met, 
that one or the other of these principles 
must triumph in this country.64
The accuracy of his predictions reinforced his image as a
man of intelligence, further establishing his ethos.
The speaker reminded the audience that the spread of
slavery posed a national problem, which Clay had correctly
identified twelve years before the 1856 campaign.
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according to his own recorded testimony. He demanded that 
his northern audience support the cause of freedom since 
he claimed that slavery was an affront to both Christian 
and democratic ideals. Clay's reasoning flattered his 
regional audience. The North was consistent in its 
Christian principles and its pursuit of universal liberty, 
according to Clay's definitions. The South denied its 
Christian heritage by enslaving both blacks and whites in 
a society that concentrated its power in the hands of a 
few greedy individuals, again according to Clay's 
observations. Therefore, if Clay could "convert" to a 
Christian, northern, anti-slavery ideology, then other 
intelligent, thoughtful, Christian southerners could also 
"convert." Clay's ethos was his main contribution to the 
Republican cause.
William H. Seward: Address of 23 October 1856
William H. Seward entered the ranks of pro-Republican 
campaign speakers with reluctance. Stung by the party's 
refusal to select him as its first presidential candidate, 
Seward professed little interest in promoting the 
candidacy of Fremont. He agreed to speak in behalf of his 
party only as the campaign drew to a close in the fall of 
1856.
159
On October 23, he addressed a Republican meeting in
Auburn, New Y o r k . *>5 There were several thousand
townspeople in attendance, according to an estimate
appearing in the New York Daily Times. The crowd
enthusiastically greeted Seward upon his introduction,
cheering and whistling as he rose to speak.
Although Seward was speaking to a friendly, partisan,
home-town audience, his address was devoid of specific
campaign ideology or endorsement. The tenor of this
particular address was neither enthusiastic nor sincere.
Seward refused to discuss the candidates, claiming that
"It is not my habit to speak largely of candidates."
Rather than engaging the emotions of his audience in
support of Fremont and the Republican party, Seward
presented a solid, logical analysis of the political
dangers inherent in any three party contest.
Seward signalled his wish to renew his identification
with his audience in either a modest attempt to gain their
good will or as a means of asking their indulgence while
he ,engaged in a political ritual demanded by his party.
We are neighbors and friends. We know each 
other well. I know that you are sincere and 
you know, as I trust, that I am not a man of 
ungrateful disposition.®®
The introduction to his message may have been aimed at his
supporters who were not willing to trust the leaders or
the policies of the new party that had ungratefully cast
Seward aside in 1856.
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Having tried to establish a link with his audience in
the introduction, Seward proceeded to analyze the general
role of organized parties in national elections. He
warned his audience that his address would be rhetorically
unembellished by claiming that "you will not expect from
me either humorous, exaggerated, passionate, or
prejudicial speech.” Seward insisted that his lengthy
political career, and his professional interaction with
many of the candidates, precluded him from supporting one
man over another.
First, because, being necessarily brought 
into public combination or conflict with
public men, my judgement concerning them is
liable to the bias of partiality or jealousy.
Secondly, because it is not the habit of 
parties in our country to select unfit, 
unworthy, or unreliable men to be their 
repre sentative s.® ?
His support of the Republican party was tepid. His prior
ethos suggested that he would address the gathering with
the fervor he had displayed in his free soil arguments on
the floor of the Senate. Yet, the even, unemotional tenor
of his address suggests that he was unenthusiastic in his
support of the Republican candidate and the impression may
have affected his credibility with the audience.
The only aspect of the speech that might have increased
Seward's ethos was the character that he demonstrated as a
speaker. He exhibited good taste and moderation
throughout the address. His condemnation of the Know-
Nothing party was restrained, as he accused it of
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"distracting the public mind" and interposing "an unreal 
or false issue" on the minds of the voters. These traits 
presented him as a man of good character.
Restraint is evident throughout the address. He 
accused the Democratic administration in Washington of 
opening all states to slavery as it overruled individual 
state constitutions during the period of 1850-1856, and he 
concluded that " . . .  the whole of the Territories has 
been already lost to freedom by the legislation of the 
last seven years."
Seward provided a single, tepid endorsement of the 
Republican party to fulfill the ostensible purpose of his 
speech.
During the first six years of that period 
1849-1856, there were only two parties - the 
Democratic and the Whig parties - in Congress 
and in the country. During the last year, 
there were three, the Democrats, Know- 
Nothing, and Republican Parties. Everyone 
will at once acquit the Republican Party, and 
those who now constitute it, of all agency in 
the betrayal and surrender of Freedom which 
have been made.®®
Seward relied upon his personal experience as a Senator to
substantiate his allegations against the Whig, Democratic,
and Know-Nothing parties. However, his endorsement of the
Republicans was limited to his assertion that the party
could not be held responsible for any political activity
prior to its inception.
The conclusion of the address was equally ambivalent.
Seward claimed to have examined, without partiality, the
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political parties contending for the presidency in 1856.
He praised the audience as honest, well-meaning and 
patriotic, a technique by which speakers are often able to 
gain the good will of listeners. He attempted to assuage 
his injured dignity and reputation by observing that 
"While I have tried to pursue always one steady course 
which my conscience has approved, friends have often been 
alienated and adversaries have become friends." He sought 
to reinforce a favorable image by claiming that his 
judgment of those he alienated was charitable and he 
appealed for a charitable judgement from those who opposed 
him.
Seward spoke in his own defense on this occasion, not 
in defense of his party. He referred to his political 
record and his presidential qualifications. He did not 
present his political loyalty with any degree of 
sincerity. The tone of the entire address was one of 
wounded pride and reluctance to join in an enthusiastic 
effort to elect a national candidate in spite of personal 
differences. Seward appeared to be seeking personal 
support from a local, sympathetic audience rather than 
using his enormous influence to sway the audience in favor 
of Fremont's election and a Republican victory. Perhaps 
if he had exhibited a greater show of enthusiasm, Seward 
might have alienated the New York free soil contingent. 
Seward's purpose seems to have been immediate validation
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of his continued favor with the home-town crowd rather 
than to be recognized among the premier Republican 
speakers of the 1856 campaign.
Summary
The five speakers discussed in this chapter made 
effective use of their prior ethos in promoting the 
Republican platform in 1856. The vital, pugnacious 
personality of Cassius Clay infused his address with an 
urgency and importance unavailable to a more timid 
speaker. As a southerner, Clay could have possessed a 
particularly strong ethos, since he advocated positions a 
southerner would not be expected to support. His 
credibility would have been high, analogous to a 
"reluctant witness" in a courtroom. Clay's ethos probably 
grew as his reputation followed him from one speaking 
engagement to the next. He consistently demonstrated an 
understanding of Republican values in his pro-Union, anti­
slavery addresses. Although Clay demonstrated an 
occasional lack of moderation, tact, or good taste within 
his speeches, his bold and direct accusations of 
corruption within the ranks of the southern Democrats may 
well have formed the basis of effective ethical appeals.
Robinson, Reeder and Chase demonstrated character and 
intelligence in their addresses, according to the
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standards provided by the neo-Aristotelian model of 
analysis. Each man brought authority to the speech 
occasion based on personal experience. According to the 
inserted observations of the newspaper reporters, 
identification between speaker and audience was successful 
as measured by applause and vocal feed-back from the 
audience. On the whole, their ethos probably contributed 
to strengthening pre-existing positive attitudes toward 
the Republican party and its presidential candidate.
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Chapter 5 
Logical Appeals
According to the methodology presented in Speech 
Criticism, the logical appeals of a speech act can be 
examined for three elements: the validity of an idea as 
presented by the speaker; the application of argumentation 
theory to the development of proof in support of the 
speaker's idea; and the "measure of truth" demonstrated in 
the reasoning processes utilized by the speaker.1 
Although cautioning that these criteria alone are not a 
precise formula for speech criticism, the authors suggest 
the following three-part method for judging the logical 
development of a persuasive appeal: one, the "intellectual 
resources" of the speaker; two, the "severity and 
strictness" of the logical forms; and three, the basic 
"truth" of the speaker's ideas as they relate to existing 
conditions.
The "truths" from which the Republican speakers argued
l
were developed in the party ideology. "Freedom" was the 
basic theme of the party platform and free labor was the 
prevailing emphasis of each Republican campaign address.
As defined by Eric Foner, free labor encompassed not only 
the doctrine of freedom from bondage as a Constitutional
guarantee, but also the dignity of individual labor as the 
basis of a functioning capitalistic society.2 Individual 
labor was perceived as the foundation of a vital, 
expanding economy endowed with the morality of the 
eighteenth century Protestant work ethic. Free labor was 
a concept that included the opportunity for the laborer to 
rise from one economic level to the next as the just 
reward of his industriousness. Economic independence was 
the epitome of the working man's career.3
Although the free labor concept was appealing to the 
growing middle class in 1856, it was unpopular among 
northern industrialists. According to Foner's analysis, 
free labor threatened the capitalistic concept that 
employees should be grateful for their jobs regardless of 
working conditions or salary. However, most Republican 
speakers did not focus their rhetoric on the concerns of 
the big industrialists, since big business was well served 
by the political status quo. Instead, the orators were 
concerned with the votes of the middle class - a middle 
class, swelling with skilled immigrants and western 
businessmen, that was beginning to threaten the entrenched 
economic dominance of the eastern industrial 
establishment.
As a result of their free labor ideology, the 
Republicans perceived the stratified slave labor society 
of the South as an economic threat to the North.
Nathaniel Banks, whose Wall Street speech is examined in 
this chapter, addressed the negative economic 
ramifications of any future southern political dominion 
with a series of sectional arguments. To enhance the 
perception of the economic problems foreseen under another 
Democratic administration, the Republicans developed their 
own version of the southern conspiracy theory, linking 
national economic ruin with continued southern political 
domination in Congress.* The speakers predicted that the 
southern states would act together as a unified "slave 
power" to use the national government to promote the 
interests of the slave states over those of the progress- 
minded North.5 The erosion of free labor would accompany 
any consolidation of southern leadership in the federal 
government, resulting in a national slave society. 
Republicans claimed that any portion of a society that did 
not allow its workers to savor the rewards of their own 
labors could hardly be expected to promote the work ethic 
and economic growth of any other region in the country.
The logical arguments employed by Republican speakers 
were confined to the premise of free labor as a 
Constitutional right. In addition, many of the speakers 
built arguments against the extension of slavery by 
"proving" the existence of a pro-southern Democratic 
conspiracy to open the entire territorial United States to 
slavery. The arguments in favor of these concepts were
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constructed by men highly skilled in public speaking who 
addressed particularly receptive audiences.
This chapter examines the particular logical appeals 
employed by the following speakers: Nathaniel Banks,
speaker of the House, who provided the most dramatic 
example of logical proof in favor of free labor while 
addressing an outdoor assembly of New York merchants from 
the steps of the New York Merchant's Exchange; George 
Curtis, a newcomer to politics, who addressed a gathering 
of literary men in Middletown, Connecticut, on their duty 
as scholars to fight actively the "slave power" with their 
pens and their votes in order to protect the First 
Amendment guarantees of the Constitution; and William H. 
Seward, who provided the ideological premises of the 
Republican platform as a rational alternative to the 
breakdown of the political and economic systems that a 
Democratic administration would trigger.
Specific attention is paid to the use of economic and 
sectional appeals in place of the more inflammatory 
abolitionist and pro-Kansas rhetoric of the ethical and 
emotional appeals. Each speech is examined for two major 
premises as described in Speech Criticism: first, an 
analysis of the Republican economic policy embodied in the 
free labor concept in terms of credible evidence and valid 
reasoning processes; second, an analysis of the political
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threat envisioned by a "united" South for further credible 
evidence and valid reasoning.
According to the methodology presented in Thonssen, 
Baird and Braden, the invention of sound logical arguments 
lies in the speaker's ability to recognize pressing socio­
political problems? to think reflectively about those 
problems in order to define solutions; and to identify 
probable implications of those solutions.** The three 
speakers analyzed in this chapter effectively identified 
the containment of slavery and the growing threat of 
southern political control in the Congress as the pressing 
socio-political issues facing the campaign audience.
Their solutions lay with the election of a Republican 
administration. The logical appeals in these speeches 
dealt with the implications of electing a Republican 
administration and the implied problems in retaining a 
Democratic administration.
Nathaniel Banks: Address of September 26, 1856
Nathaniel Banks constructed his entire appeal on the 
premise that the South was to blame for all economic and 
political problems that plagued the nation in 1856. He 
relied upon two lines of reasoning to support his 
allegation. First, he argued that the superiority of 
northern industrialization demonstrated the inefficiency
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of southern slave labor policies, which contributed to a 
weakened economic situation in the nation as a whole. 
Second, he argued that the southern political stranglehold 
on national politics had occurred by northern default, not 
by any particular strength of southern political acumen.
Banks' strategy in constructing logical appeals was
clearly stated at the beginning of his address.
In that which I have to say to you I 
mean to rely upon great facts above 
all questions as to their truth, and 
facts which, if admitted, remove all 
question as to the policy by which we 
should be directed in this impending 
controversy
The crowd gathered to listen to Banks' "great facts" was 
estimated at well over 20,000 members by the New York 
Daily Times** and as great as 25,000 by the New York Daily 
Tribune.9 He spoke for over two hours to a crowd which 
packed the street for an entire city block in front of the 
Merchant's Exchange. To this mass of merchants, bankers, 
and speculators, Banks argued that all current national 
problems were the fault of the South, rooted in economic 
practices spawned by the reliance on bound labor and 
protected by "slave power" representatives ensconced in 
the United States Congress.
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Free Labor - Evidence
As his only evidence, Banks analyzed the economic 
productivity of the nation and the portions of that 
national product contributed by each region. He claimed 
that the North contributed three-quarters of the overall 
industrial/agricultural wealth of the nation. In 
contrast, he claimed that the South contributed 45% of the 
agricultural product, 20% of the industrial output, and 
less than 20% of the trade. According to him, these 
figures proved that " . . .  the reason of this is apparent 
and palpable . . .  In the South, there is one man down and 
another holding him there. There is one portion of the 
people doing nothing and another portion of the same 
people helping them do nothing."10 The solution could be 
found, he contended, by forcing the South to emulate 
northern industrial and economic practices.
Free Labor - Reasoning Processes
Banks argued that the northern industrial community 
would assist the South in a total revision of its economic 
structure. This revision would allow the South to 
contribute fairly to the national product. Indeed, he 
suggested that slavery would automatically wither in the
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face of the more efficient, northern agricultural methods
certain to be adopted by southern planters after the
northern enlightenment arrived in the slave states. The
speaker asserted that the southerners
will come North into the manufacturing 
and mechanical establishment, the 
agricultural fields and the country 
houses, and learning from us, they 
will accomplish great results in their 
own section.H
Banks' argument was logically sound and strategically
wise. He did not raise the possibility that the South
might resist change, but emphasized instead what his
audience presumed to be true: that businessmen and farmers
in the South aspired to the industrial and agricultural
achievements of the North.
Cast as a hypothetical syllogism, his argument can be 
examined for logical integrity. The major premise is: if 
southerners can be relieved of the responsibility for 
running the national government, then they will emulate 
northern concern with economic growth and improvement.
The minor premise is: a Republican administration can 
relieve the South of the responsibility for running the 
national government. The conclusion is that the South 
would turn to the North as a role model for economic 
improvement. Therefore, the minor premise affirms the 
antecedent and the syllogism is formally valid. The 
weakness of the argument is that Banks provided no 
motivation for southern agriculturalists to come North for
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instruction. However, since other Republican speakers 
argued from similar sectional premises, then Banks must 
have presumed the premises as truthful.
Southern Threat - Evidence
Banks claimed that a northern political victory would 
force the South to reevaluate its economic impact on the 
nation. He argued that once the South was no longer 
distracted by affairs of state, its citizens would 
automatically engage in commerce and industrialization. 
However, he also acknowledged that it was this southern 
preoccupation with national politics which had allowed 
northern industrialists the leisure to develop flourishing 
businesses. The inference seems to be that the time had 
come for the North to guide both the economy and the 
political direction of the nation, allowing the South to 
end slavery and pattern its economy on that of the North.
Banks argued that a northern political victory would
force the South to compare its achievements with those of
the North, causing its leaders to
recognize the truth of the statement 
that I have made to you - that they 
have no literature, no science, little 
or no commerce, little or no 
manufacturing and mechanical industry; 
and that even their agricultural 
industry is falling o f f . 12
As evidence, he cited statistics from the Bureau of 
Inventions, Washington, D.C., which supported his 
contention that few southerners were mechanically 
inventive. " [0] f two thousand patents issued . . . for the 
last year,” he noted, "less than one hundred and twenty- 
five were issued to men living in the fifteen southern 
states."13
The evidence used by Banks was loaded in favor of the 
small businessman and the middle-class manufacturing 
community. It was the northern industrialists and 
financial merchants he was addressing in both the 
immediate audience as well as the reading audience. He 
relied upon statistical evidence for all of his production 
arguments, inferring that greater production was the 
equivalent of greater success in both the economic and 
political spheres.
Southern Threat - Reasoning Processes
Banks' reasoning can be cast into the following 
syllogistic format: men who succeed in business can
succeed in politics; northern men are successful business 
men; therefore, northern men will make successful 
politicians.
The next assertion in his chain of reasoning was: men 
who succeed in politics should want to succeed in
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business; southern men were successful politicians; 
therefore, southern men should want to succeed at 
business. These categorical forms support a contention 
that arose repeatedly throughout his address. Banks 
formulated the hypothesis that northern control of 
politics would force the South to abandon slavery and 
engage in commerce patterned after northern practices.
Arguing that southern political maneuvering was the 
cause of the dangerous sectionalism that was a hallmark of 
the 1856 campaign, Banks used the Pierce administration to 
demonstrate how Democratic policy caused sectional 
division and civil unrest.14 He implied that the southern 
Democrats, responsible for the election of Pierce and his 
administration, were fully and solely responsible for the 
repeal of the Missouri Compromise. If it had not been 
repealed, the sectional and ideological strife in Kansas 
would have never occurred. Therefore, he contended, the 
Democrats, specifically the southern Democrats, were 
responsible for every drop of northern blood spilled in 
Kansas.
As a further indictment of the pro-southern, Democratic
administration, Banks claimed that the entire nation was
at peace in 1853. By comparison, Banks claimed that after
three years of Democratic leadership
We see today one entire section of the 
confederacy arrayed in policy and 
purpose, as represented by candidates, 
against another portion, and the
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fairest portion of the territorial 
possessions of the Government reddened 
with the blood of American citizens, 
stricken down by the hands of each 
other in a bloody civil strife.^5
The blood-soaked imagery employed by Banks focused the
blame for the Kansas riots on the Democratic
administration in Washington, D.C. It would have been
commonly accepted among the members of his audience that
Stephen Douglas, a Democrat, and his fellow members of the
Senate Committee on Territories were responsible for the
legislation that repealed the Missouri Compromise.
Banks and, by implication, the North were outraged 
further by an executive order sending federal troops to 
restore peace to the territory. This act was perceived as 
overt support of the pro-slavery territorial government —  
the government elected by armed insurgents from Missouri. 
Therefore, Banks placed the blame for the breakdown of law 
and order in the territories with the pro-southern Pierce 
administration. Casting the argument as a hypothetical 
syllogism, Banks contended that if the southern Democrats 
claimed to be representatives of a peaceful 
administration, then there should be no violence in the 
nation. There was violence in Kansas. Therefore, the 
representatives of the Democratic party did not represent 
peace. This syllogism tests successfully as a valid 
logical construction, since the minor premise denies the 
consequent.
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Banks furthered his sectional argument by claiming that
the Pierce administration actually condoned and promoted
the lawlessness that characterized the Democratically-
controlled policies.
The men of the North who have gone 
into that Territory are disfranchised, 
and the United States Government looks 
coldly upon all these transactions 
without an effort to restore peace, 
unwilling even to make any declaration 
of principles that shall tend to 
restore peace in that distracted 
Territory.^®
Banks contended that the Democrats were without an 
ideological basis as a party and could not claim logically 
to represent peace - or anything else - without a 
declaration of ideological commitment. His contention 
reinforced the popular notion that the North was more 
highly principled than the South. Based on the pro- 
Republican evidence provided by the political situation in 
Kansas, Pierce's southern-influenced administration 
represented only continued slavery and armed conflict.
Banks challenged the Democratic argument that the 
violence in Kansas stemmed from an excessive number of 
aggressive anti-slavery settlers. Claiming to have 
studied the emigration records of five western states. 
Banks concluded that emigration to Kansas was not a " . .
. new thing in the history of the American states as if it 
were of scandalous character, purpose and intent."1? By 
example, he demonstrated that no civil conflagration had
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accompanied any past northern migration westward. 
Therefore, the blame for the volatile situation in Kansas 
must be placed outside of the arrival of the northern 
anti-slavery settlers.
Perceived Truth of the Ideas:
According to Thonssen, Baird and Braden, the ” . . .
i
preparation and background that the speaker brings to the 
process of logical invention figures strongly in the 
determination of argumentative soundness and integrity."18 
Banks included statistics and examples to heighten his 
credibility as an analytical speaker. His conclusions 
were logically sound when tested against both the evidence 
he presented and the prevailing beliefs of his partisan 
audience. But, Banks did not merely list facts, figures, 
and analyses. His use of emotional proof, with evocative 
language being of primary importance, strengthened his 
logical appeals.
This use of emotional proof was a further measure of 
the intellectual stock of Banks as a speaker, since a 
successful orator must be able to adapt the evidence to 
meet the needs of his audience. The speakers " . . .  must 
prepare the minds of the audience for the ready acceptance 
of the evidence used to support the arguments."19 For 
example, in order to engage the sympathy of his audience
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for his purely sectional argument, Banks demanded that 
they remember the violence in the Senate. He was 
indirectly referring to Sumner's caning by the enraged 
Democrat, Preston Brooks, who became an effective symbol 
of southern emotionalism and violent potential, an idea 
popular among the northern speakers.
Banks reminded his audience of the incident in order to
expand inductively his argument about the dangers of
increased southern political control.
[I]f the act . . . [by] which the 
sovereignty of a State is despoiled of 
its Representative is looked upon with 
acclamation in some parts of the 
country and tolerated with 
indifference in other sections, every 
man must feel in his heart of hearts 
that there is no longer a hope for the 
institutions or liberties of the 
American people.20
Banks skillfully wove his emotional proofs into the 
claim of logical analyses that comprised the main portion 
of his address. He used emotional proofs to illustrate 
the "truth" of his logical conclusions - the test of 
probable "certainty" demanded by the methodology.21 He 
demonstrated the certainty of the economic threat posed by 
future southern political strength in a manner acceptable 
to his immediate audience. His conclusion that a 
Republican administration would bring "four years of peace 
. . . and we will open all these avenues of wealth"22 was 
one of the few unsubstantiated assertions of his entire 
speech.
Banks did not address the possibility that northern 
pre-occupation with politics, should the Republicans be 
victorious in 1856, might weaken the northern contribution 
to the national product. Neither did he entertain the 
possibility that the South might cling even more strongly 
to the institution of slavery if stripped of both economic 
and political options as a result of a Republican 
administration. Since Banks and his audience were 
convinced that the South desired to match northern 
industrial and agricultural output, he argued that the 
South would willingly relinquish its institutions in order 
to industrialize. Once the South was occupied by 
commercial interests, he insisted, southern political 
domination would melt away.
He asserted that the South had actually amassed its 
political power by default, a notion popular with his 
audience. Since the North had been absorbed by commerce 
during the developing years of the nation's history, the 
South "has turned its attention chiefly, so far as its 
leading men are concerned, to the government of the 
country," securing for themselves and their fellow 
southerners the necessary "methods of obtaining places of 
honor and trust in the Government."2^ Political power 
needed to be divided between the sections of the country, 
according to Banks, with the Republicans providing the 
means to bring about a political balance.
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George William Curtis: Address of August 7, 1856
On August 7, 1856, George William Curtis delivered an 
address entitled "The Duties of the American Scholar" to 
the members of the assembled literary societies of 
Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut.2^ The 
address was one of the most widely distributed, read, and 
quoted of the Republican campaign in spite of its 
suitability for a particular occasion and the narrow 
audience of intellectual and economic elite of the 
northeast.
In his speech, Curtis eloquently called for literary 
activists in the mold of the wounded Charles Sumner, who, 
"In a Republic of free men, . . . speaks for freedom and 
his blood stains the Senate floor."2  ̂ Curtis artfully 
built a substantial case to encourage scholars to employ 
their pens actively and their voices in support of the 
Republican campaign - a case so sound in its rational 
development that its proofs were borrowed wholesale by 
other Republicans during the remainder of the campaign.
George William Curtis spoke from experience, both as a 
scholar and as a politician. His introductory remarks 
were designed to establish his intellectual resources, 
since his audience was composed of academics. The 
relationship between the duties he assigned his audience
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and the political problems of the era was tenuous. Yet, 
by carefully constructing proofs that defined the 
scholar's responsibility to take an active part in the 
campaign and by offering himself as an inferential example 
of an activist-scholar, Curtis proved that he was a 
skillful strategist.
His own scholarly background was the most important 
facet in establishing his intellectual stock and his 
capacity for the formulation of i d e a s . 26 Curtis chose to 
demonstrate his intellectual abilities in a lengthy 
introduction that contained a wealth of literary and 
historical allusions. His audience may have been aware of 
his background as a protegee of Ralph Waldo Emerson and 
the Transcendentalists of Brooks Farm, where Curtis stayed 
for two years during his youth. He was well-traveled, 
documenting his travels in works of satire and descriptive 
analysis that were published and widely circulated in the 
North. "The Duties of the American Scholar" was the first 
in a series of literary orations that distinguished his
career.27
Once Curtis established his intellectual stock, he 
proceeded to establish a link between his audience and the 
political problems of the nation. Since few members of 
his audience were directly affected by the Kansas 
situation, Curtis had to establish a connection between 
the experiences shared by his immediate audience and the
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urgency of the issues facing the rest of the North. These 
students and academics, cloistered in a private, 
northeastern college, needed to be reassured of their 
importance in the Republican campaign. Curtis needed to 
establish a political scholarly ideal with which his 
immediate audience could successfully identify. Only then 
could he effectively argue for specific action.
Curtis began his address with a series of definitions 
in order to enhance the process of identification. 
Scholarship was defined as an active process of 
involvement in world affairs. Curtis claimed that the 
scholar of 1856 must not "abstract" himself from the 
practical world any more than the Greeks would have 
abstracted themselves from events at Thermopylae.
Claiming that the life of a scholar in ancient Greece did 
not preclude the scholar's responsibilities as a citizen, 
Curtis inferred that the precedent for action applied to 
the audience he addressed in Middletown. He demanded that 
the scholars seated before him, as citizens of a republic, 
fulfill their duty to protect their Constitutional 
freedoms, for without freedom, scholarship can neither 
flourish nor even exist. His premise was boldly stated, 
given the occasion, because he was addressing participants 
in a literary festival, not a political rally. Curtis 
acknowledged the seeming impropriety of his political 
oratory on an epideictic occasion, but he defended his
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argument by asserting his intent to stray beyond the
oratorical pale of the occasion.
I know well that a conventional 
prejudice consecrates this occasion to 
dull abstractions and timid if not 
treacherous generalities. It would 
allow me to speak of the scholar and 
the American scholar, in his relation 
to Greek roots and particles, but 
would forbid me to mention his duties 
to American topics and times.28
In this manner, he gave greater weight to the perceived
urgency of the issue under examination which is a logical
approach to a topic both unexpected and (perhaps)
unwelcome on this ceremonial occasion.
Free Labor - Evidence
Curtis included very little specific evidence in this 
speech. Instead, he relied on his ability to construct 
arguments from logical premises that were accepted as 
truthful by his audience. He argued, mainly, from 
examples.
Curtis employed a brief stock argument to establish the 
economic value of free labor. His evidence against the 
use of slave labor included a comparison of land values 
between the potentially fertile southern areas of the 
nation and the less fertile New England states. He 
asserted that the inexpensive southern farmland had been 
worked to exhaustion by the unenlightened system of
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intensive slave labor. The South's potential for a 
successful agricultural society had been destroyed by the 
greedy demands of the few and the labor of the oppressed 
majority. Curtis claimed that the relatively low land 
values in the potentially rich southern climates 
constituted the necessary evidence that slave labor was 
economically unsound.2 9
Free Labor - Reasoning Processes
Curtis built a case that favored scholarly involvement
in behalf of particular political activities. First, he
defined the general role of scholars in any national
enterprise, insisting that scholars held the collective
responsibility for the soul of their nation. Scholars
embodied the conscience of the state, carrying the
responsibility to re-awaken the populace to its
responsibilities in times of national prosperity and
prosperity's attendant immorality. He provided examples
from ancient history, again establishing precedents for
his audience to build upon.
Greece was not greatest when rumors of 
war had ceased. Rome was not most 
imperial in the voluptuous calm of 
Constantinopolitan decay. The 
magnificent monotony of Bourbon 
tyranny in France, and the reign of 
its shopkeeping King, were not the 
grand eras of French h i s t o r y . 30
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Curtis chose to emphasize the national prosperity and 
complacency as the greatest impediments to a Republican 
victory. Ironically, his audience was composed of the 
sons of satisfied, prosperous merchants and farmers.
Curtis condemned Greece, Rome, and France for failing 
to provide for the long-term collective welfare of their 
citizens. He characterized their activities as selfish - 
aimed at immediate gain. If they had only met the 
aesthetic needs of their citizenry, he claimed, then they 
would have prospered. Therefore, since the goal of the 
state is a prosperity which can be achieved by providing 
for the common aesthetic needs of the entire nation, then 
the " . . .  elevation and correction of public sentiment 
is the scholar's office in the state."31
Curtis provided a confusing set of propositions in 
proof of his hypothesis. First, he defined his terms. He 
claimed that national peace was the key to prosperity.
But peace depends upon the absence of moral idealism. He 
implied that moral idealism disappears with political 
compromise according to historical precedent. If peace can 
be negotiated easily when moral standards are in abeyance, 
then the success of private enterprise (which depends upon 
peace to succeed) becomes the measure of the moral 
standard of the nation. Therefore, if keeping peace within 
a nation is the most important task of the government, 
then the task of the scholar is to insure that the moral
standards and aesthetic needs of the citizens are not 
forgotten. As a specific indictment of the Democratic 
party, Curtis cited the political power of the wealthy, 
slave-owning southerners to illustrate his hypothesis.
The Compromise of 1850, which contained the immoral 
Fugitive Slave clause, was negotiated to maintain the 
peace between the two sections of the nation. Therefore, 
peace was secured by compromising the moral standards of 
the nation in order to preserve private enterprise. 
Deductively, then, Curtis indicted the wealthy, 
slaveowning southerners and their northern financial 
counterparts for following a line of political expediency 
that protected their financial interests.
The argument was applied to his particular audience 
when Curtis asserted that the duty of the scholar is to 
identify the immoral bases of such national policies and 
to use all literary means to uncover and broadcast those 
activities to the public. The nobility of citizenship, he 
claimed, is preserved through moral activity in this 
manner.
To the right discharge of this duty 
all his learning is merely subsidiary, 
and if he fails to devote it to this
end he is recreant to his duty. The
end of all scholarly attainment is to 
live nobly.32
As an example of an activist scholar whose life was
dedicated to the nobility of literary pursuits and their
political application, Curtis presented a lengthy
biography of John Milton. Milton would have been a 
familiar character to the Middletown audience as both the 
author of Paradise Lost and as a foe of "Cromwellian 
dictatorship."33 Curtis argued that scholars should apply 
their literary skills to the same political ends which 
occupied Milton - freedom of the press, enlightened 
education and the revelation of truth in a public 
atmosphere of dialectical freedom.
Having established the scholarly political ideal to 
which he wished his audience to aspire, Curtis proceeded 
to analyze the particular political role of the American 
scholar. Curtis claimed that the American scholar who 
neither voiced his opinion nor voted was a traitor.
Before casting the argument as a syllogism, it is 
necessary to analyze his terms. First, Curtis argued that 
a democratic republic determines policy by majority rule 
and that the majority is determined by the number of votes 
cast and available for tabulation. Each non-voter weakens 
his own cause numerically, allowing the minority to 
achieve a political ascendancy that undermines the 
democratic ideal of majority rule. Therefore, treason is 
the result of withholding one's vote. All non-voters are 
traitors in a participatory democracy. America is a 
participatory democracy. Therefore, non-voters in America 
are traitors. As a categorical syllogism, the argument is 
valid.
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In a second, specific argument against the use of slave 
labor, Curtis cited the "natural" decline of slavery in 
the North as a sign of inefficiency as an economic, and 
political, system. Economic, political, and artistic 
progress accompanied the rise of the North as an 
industrial and agricultural leader at the time slavery was 
abandoned. Since the North was providing the art, 
literature, educational institutions, and manufacturing 
processes that were the measures of progress, as 
interpreted by Curtis and the Republican sectionalists, 
and the North had cast off slavery prior to the rise of 
its progressive institutions, Curtis chose to acknowledge 
the decline of northern slavery as a sign of rising 
progressivism.
A third sign employed as an argument against 
governmental support of slavery was his use of "testimony" 
from the correspondence of the founding fathers, men who 
were perceived as enlightened protectors of both "Liberty" 
and liberty. Curtis dealt with the ideological aspects of 
"Liberty" in his definition of the governmental 
responsibility to protect society from "rapacious" 
individuals. Individual liberty, a concept that occupied 
the Republicans in 1856, had its roots in the 
Constitutional Convention, according to evidence supplied 
by Curtis. He claimed that George Washington desired the 
legal abolition of slavery in his correspondence dated
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1786; that Thomas Jefferson considered slavery a form of 
despotism; and that James Madison abhorred the concept of 
man as a piece of property.
Curtis inferred that this testimony, taken from a 
variety of personal correspondence between the men named 
above and their various political counterparts, was 
evidence that the republic was conceived in a spirit of 
universal individual liberty. The democratic nature of 
American political institutions was constrained by an 
acknowledgment of bondage.34 Therefore, democracy would 
not exist - and was not designed to exist - in the 
presence of slavery.
The premises of this argument would have been perceived 
as valid by the partisan voters in his audience. His 
reasoning was consistent with party assertions, slanted 
toward portraying the slave-owning founders as men whose 
intellects rebelled at the necessity for keeping slaves. 
Curtis did not choose to illustrate further the 
relationship between slavery and its practice by the men 
who were portrayed as the ideological founders of the 
anti-slavery Republican party. His audience had often 
heard the arguments designed to exonerate Jefferson, 
Madison and Washington. Curtis simply added more evidence 
with his list of correspondence.
In order to vote, however, one needed to make a 
decision as to which party "respected" the majority of
national concerns and the welfare of the state. Ideally, 
one supported the party that recognized the needs of the 
majority of the citizens. At this point in his address, 
Curtis began his partisan appeal.
Southern Threat - Evidence
Curtis argued that the existence of slavery denied the
basic premise of a democratic government. Progress could
not occur, he contended, under a system which denied
liberty to any member of that system. The evidence was
clear. Obviously, no progress had occurred in the South,
since a lack of literature or other civilized activities
could be documented.
Manners are fantastic and fierce; 
brute force supplants moral principle; 
freedom of speech is suppressed 
because the national speech of Man 
condemns slavery . . .  a slave society 
has the characteristics of wandering 
tribes who rob, and live, therefore, 
insecure in the shadow of impendingvengeance.^5
Curtis acknowledged the existence of individuals among the 
slave owners who were moral and undeserving of 
condemnation. He recognized that not all men could be 
responsible for a system which governed them. However, he 
did argue that "the mass of men are never better than 
their institution",36 which supported his initial 
proposition that the system of slavery was at fault.
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Curtis demanded a government that would serve the 
progressive needs of all members of the society.
Otherwise, the institution itself was not functional.
The events that encouraged the growth of the "slave 
power" were presented as specific evidence of a southern 
threat. Curtis reminded his audience that Mississippi was 
brought into the Union as a slave state over the protests 
of the abolitionists who demanded a free constitution; 
that the Missouri Compromise was enacted with the South as 
a document of trust; that Florida had entered the Union 
under Spanish rule, which had abolished slavery, then 
became a slave state when becoming part of a democratic 
nation; that the Pickney Resolutions violated the First 
Amendment; that the Compromise of 1850 was another 
document of trust that strengthened the fugitive slave 
laws; and that the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854 was the 
final bit of evidence that the united South was 
controlling the nation's government for the benefit of a 
minority of its citizens.37
The purpose of the lengthy chronology was to illustrate 
the concessions wrung from the United States government by 
the "Slave Power," a term Curtis employed repeatedly. By 
implying that slave holders were powerfully united in 
order to transform democratic institutions to their 
selfish needs, he was attempting to engage the sympathy of
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the audience while presenting documentary evidence to 
support his contentions. Curtis reminded his audience 
that the threat of disunion had accompanied every demand 
made by members of the "Slave Power," in spite of the 
numerical and economic inferiority to the North.
Southern Threat - Reasoning Processes
Curtis argued that it was not really the threat of
disunion that so powerfully insured the policies of the
"Slave Power," but rather the moral degeneration of the
North during its search for a prosperous peace. It was
compromise that gave the "Slave Power" its strength and
weakened the North. Curtis described the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise to illustrate his argument.
This [repeal] was an immense victory 
for the Slave Power, for it revealed 
to them a state of demoralization in 
the party of Freedom. It showed the 
Slave Power that it could accomplish 
its ends by depending upon the moral 
weakness of the enemy rather than upon 
its own numerical strength. The 
historian commemorates a national 
crime when he records that during all 
these debates the party of Freedom had 
a majority of votes in Congress.3®
At the conclusion of his speech, Curtis had argued a full
circle. He returned to the theme of collective
responsibility, which had characterized his opening
remarks to the assembled scholars.
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In order to prove that the Republicans represented the 
ideals of the democratic state whose liberties were being 
exploited by the opposing, minority party, Curtis argued 
that the function of a governmental institution was 
limited to its ability to protect human liberty. He 
defended his assertion with the following hypothetical 
reasoning: if human governments enact laws, then those 
laws must be designed to protect society from those 
members who would restrict individual freedoms by usurping 
power. Human governments enact laws. Therefore, the 
function of government is to protect society from 
individuals who would assume powers detrimental to society 
as a whole. The reasoning is valid because the minor 
premise affirms the antecedent clause of the major 
premise.
He clarified this circular definition by claiming that
society exists both to improve the individual's quality of
life as well as to promote the improvement of the "race".
Therefore, the government must protect society from
irresponsible people without limiting the ability of
society to improve itself and its individual members.
[C]onsequently that is the best 
government which gives to men the 
largest liberty and constantly 
modifies itself in the interest of 
Freedom.3^
By inference, Curtis indicted Douglas and his political 
cohorts for preparing the legislation that repealed the
Missouri Compromise. According to the Republicans, the 
repeal was perceived as detrimental to the health of the 
nation. The abrogation of civil law in the territories was 
evidence of the improper use of power that resulted in the 
restriction of personal liberty in the border regions. 
Curtis clearly intended to influence the audience in favor 
of the Republican platform, which he discussed in some 
detail as a means of establishing a more responsible form 
of government. He repeated the words "liberty" and 
"freedom" frequently throughout the second portion of his 
speech. This repetition served to remind his audience of 
the Republican slogan which included the phrases "free 
labor, free soil and free men." He obviously intended to 
enhance a sense of identity which, in turn, would increase 
the appeal of his logical arguments.
Perceived Truth of the Ideas
Curtis was able to supply evidence for his contentions 
even at the most emotional moments of his address. This 
technique heightened his authority as a speaker and 
reenforced his reputation as a scholar.40 For example, 
his reference to a "national crime" reminded the audience 
of his earlier examination of the treasonous activities 
of the Pierce administration. The themes of liberty, duty 
and morality appeared throughout the address, illustrated
and supported in a manner consistent with Curtis1 
reputation. These themes were also consistent with the 
moral temper of the region. Curtis gathered the three 
themes into a decisive call to action in the conclusion of 
his address.
He asserted that freedom of thought could only exist in 
an atmosphere of liberty, for without the freedom to 
express thought, the intellectual life of the individual 
and society would cease to exist. He compared the 
scholars seated before him in Middletown to the patriots 
of Lexington and Bunker Hill. He demanded that the 
scholars temporarily forsake their homes and their purely 
intellectual pursuits in order to protect their political 
liberty, just as the residents of revolutionary New 
England temporarily forsook their homes to secure a 
government free from outside influence. By inference, the 
"Slave Power" took on overtones of British despotism - 
taxation without representation - which was a powerful 
emotional appeal in New England.
Curtis the transcendentalist was evident throughout the
<
address. He reasoned by analogy, employing historical and 
literary examples familiar to his audience, searching for 
arguments relevant to the occasion and the local political 
temper. His ideas were internally consistent, as none of 
his evidence refuted any portion of his theses. Curtis 
addressed the particular needs of his party, his region
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and his audience throughout the speech, placing the 
particular issue - an appeal for votes - into a 
sociological construct with intellectual appeal for his 
audience.
Curtis engaged in a valid reflective process. He 
identified the political problem, the abrogation of 
majority rule; he analyzed the problem in the proper 
social setting, the lack of scholarship demonstrated by 
those men wielding the greatest political power; he 
suggested a solution, that those who favored majority rule 
for the protection of their liberty to pursue scholarly 
activities should vote against the currently prevailing 
minority; and he reasoned, by example and analogy, that 
the implications of both the present situation and the 
implications of his solution should provide the necessary 
evidence and motivation to involve his audience actively 
in supporting the Republican campaign.
William H. Seward: Address of 24 October, 1856
William H. Seward enjoyed a reputation as an 
impassioned defender of freedom. During the summer months 
of the 1856 campaign, he continued to argue from the 
Senate floor against the extension of slavery into the 
territories of the United States. He was in the midst of 
a long, distinguished career in the United States Senate
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as a representative from New York. He had served that 
state as its governor as well as its Congressional 
representative, being returned to the Senate as recently 
as 1855 by the vote of the state legislature. His re- 
election campaign in 1855 was the successful result of a 
state-wide oratorical contest between the pro-slavery and 
the free soil politicians. Seward was returned to the 
Senate for a second six year term as the representative of 
the anti-slavery politicans of New York. He did not 
campaign for his Senate seat, since Senators were still 
appointed in 1855, but he actively participated in the 
state elections that year by stumping for Republican 
candidates.4^
In 1855, Seward gave several speeches that were full of 
enthusiasm and ringing endorsements of the newly formed 
Republican Party as a result of his involvement in the New 
York campaign.43 Seward's "free Kansas" and anti­
slavery speeches were widely reprinted and referenced, 
with one reference even appearing (with attribution) in 
President Pierce's annual Message to Congress in December, 
1855.43
In Albany, New York, Seward condemned the Democratic 
Party and the entire national administration for bowing to 
the dictates of the privileged classes - the 
slaveholders.44 This speech, which was delivered on 
October 12, 1855 - one year prior to his campaign speech
205
favoring the candidacy of John Fremont, identified clearly
the particular problems facing the emerging Republican
party and the political future of the nation. Eloquently,
Seward described "the spirit of the revolutionary age"
that must infuse the anti-slavery voters. He argued that
slavery was "antagonistic to the fundamental principle of
the g o v e r n m e n t " ; 4 5  a n <j that the privileged classes
promoted legislation that "darkly shaded, [allows]
personal humiliations which daily come home to
yourselves."46
I do not dwell, as others so often and 
so justly do, upon the atrocious 
usurpation of the government of Kansas 
by the slaveholders of Missouri, nor 
even on the barbarous and tyrannical 
code which they have established to 
stifle freedom in that territory, nor 
even yet on the fraudulent and 
nefarious connivance of the presidentwith the usurpers.47
These were not the words of a man lacking imagination or 
courage, nor were they the words of a man of unpolished 
rhetorical skill or unawareness of his oratorical power. 
William Seward should have been a great asset to the 
Republican Party in 1856, given his reputation and the 
evidence of his moral convictions in 1855. However,
Seward gave a limited effort to the national campaign
designed by the party he had helped to create, mold, and
launch into the political arena.
Only two major addresses are included in his memoirs 
for the campaign period. Seward was, of course, detained
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in Washington for the extra session of Congress that was 
called in late August to deal with the budget issues of 
the Indian wars.*8 The extra session of Congress demanded 
a great deal of his time and energy. His passion was 
expended by the end of the session. He had not secured 
the Republican presidential nomination at the June 
convention; his oratory on the floor of the Senate had not 
produced any immediate results in Kansas; and he faced a 
national campaign for which he had no enthusiasm, either 
personally or professionally. Seward preferred to spend 
the fall in Europe, but he was dissuaded by political 
friends. They needed his voice, especially in New York, 
to legitimize the activities of the new party. Familiar 
names, like that of William H. Seward, provided the sole 
means of identification that the Republican Party could 
depend upon for bringing new voters to its organization.
In 1856, William Seward's campaign speeches were coldly 
analytical, almost devoid of passion. Stylistically, they 
contrast sharply with his speeches of 1855. The topics of 
both years were similar - campaign speeches in favor of 
Republican candidates and ideals - but the lack of 
metaphor, evocative language, and idealistic goals in the 
1856 addresses were uncharacteristic for both the speaker 
and the occasion. The ringing idealism and the sweeping 
oratory were noticeably lacking in these campaign efforts.
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Even his specific references to the Republican party were 
tepid and vague.
On October 2, 1856, Senator Seward made the first of 
the two campaign speeches that have been included in his 
memoirs. The Senator spoke in Detroit, Michigan, to a 
partisan crowd of Republican supporters. However if the 
audience had come to hear grand oratory and impassioned 
eloquence, they were bitterly disappointed. He proposed to 
prove that the slave-holding minority of the United States 
population had infiltrated every portion of the 
government. As proof, Seward provided lists. He listed 
the names of every appointed and elected member of 
Congress. He condemned the President, the vice-president, 
his secretaries, "printers, sergeants at arms, door­
keepers and pages," each of whom "is either an active or 
passive advocate of the policy of the slaveholding 
class."49 He listed committee members, by name, and their 
disposition to vote for slavery measures; Constitution 
committees, foreign relations committees, the committee on 
agriculture, and the committee on the Army and the Navy, 
services long thought to be particular southern 
strongholds.
In the speech, Seward surveyed the national government, 
department by department, taking his audience on a 
travelogue of the Washington Mall. The courts, the Post 
Office, and the Department of the Interior shared in the
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scorn heaped upon the internal operation of the Democratic 
administration by Senator Seward. But, he defended his 
speech to his Michigan audience, claiming that ” . . .  
there is no way of escaping imminent danger, without first 
calmly and steadily looking it fully in the face and 
ascertaining its real nature and magnitude."J50
On Thursday, October 23, in Auburn, New York, less than 
three weeks after his Michigan address, Seward spoke 
before a large, partisan crowd of Republican supporters. 
Rather than delivering an impassioned speech on the Kansas 
situation or the spread of slavery and its attendant 
political and moral evils, Seward provided a lecture on 
the American political two-party system. The Auburn 
speech was an oblique endorsement of the Republican party. 
It was designed to persuade by exposition, since Seward 
only faintly praised his alliance with the new Republican 
party while damning the Know-Nothing and Democratic 
organizations.
According to the five-step formula outlined by 
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden for the measurement of 
successful reflective experience, the logical development 
of Seward's major argument against the Know-Nothing 
(American) party was sound.51 First, he recognized the 
problem posed by the third party - a distraction of the 
public mind from the "real" issue facing the canvass. 
Second, he analyzed the bearing of the problem on the
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social setting of the day by arguing that Constitutional 
freedoms would be denied all men if slavery were permitted 
to expand into the territories. The capacity of his 
audience to engage in free trade would be limited as would 
their opportunity to enjoy a free labor market and the 
practice of free speech. Seward met the third measure of 
a successful reflective experience by arguing against 
support of the third party by the voter. Fourth, Seward's 
acuity of analysis was enhanced by his credibility as an 
experienced politician and the partisan nature of his 
home-town audience.
Upstate New York voters were historically disposed to 
distrust third parties. It was in their state that the 
Anti-Masonic party was founded after the murder of a Mason 
who published secret ritual information for public 
dissemination.S2 Seward's audience was composed of active 
abolitionists and angry anti-expansionists who were eager 
to hear about the urgency of settling the violence in 
Kansas and the role of the Know-Nothings and Democrats in 
fueling the frontier violence.
Seward did not discuss the free labor concepts that 
were of such importance in other Republican speeches. His 
address served two purposes, one overt and the other 
covert. His covert purpose was to remind the audience of 
his long service in their behalf - governor and Senator - 
and of his loyalty to the free-soil concepts that were the
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basis of the new party. However, his introduction clearly 
illustrated his outrage at being passed-over for the 
presidential nomination. He spoke of the "common memory" 
shared by his audience and himself of the "long and 
inclement political storms" which they had weathered over 
the years. He was gratified to see signs of "the triumph 
of the political principles which I have cherished through 
so many trials" but he was clearly disappointed by his 
role as a party spokesman, rather than that of premier 
candidate.53
William Seward delivered a dry, rational defense of the 
Republican platform by analyzing the shortcomings of the 
Democratic and Know-Nothing parties. He examined the 
political threat posed by the third party - the threat of 
a pro-slavery victory by default at the polls. He 
referred to the record of the Pierce administration as 
evidence of Democratic blundering - giving the voter 
little choice but to support the Republican party as the 
least of three evils.
Southern Threat - Evidence
Senator Seward provided evidence of the perfidy of the 
Democratic administration by listing examples of pro­
slavery legislation in his speech. He began with the 
Democratic obstruction of the admission of California
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under a "free" constitution in 1850; the Pierce 
administration's policy of popular sovereignty in the 
territories - the direct result of which was the frontier 
violence in progress during the campaign; and the refusal 
of the Democratic majority in Congress to admit Kansas as 
a free state in spite of impassioned petitions and the 
demands of her citizens.
Senator Seward produced a litany of events that he 
offered as proof that Democratic party rule had promoted 
the expansion of slavery and the negation of effective 
compromise. He resorted to lists in each speech - and the 
New York Senator was not afraid to name names. However, 
for the purposes of defining thematic emergence and 
political unity of thought, the Auburn speech will be 
examined in this chapter.
Seward produced evidence designed to prove that 
Democratic party rule was the moving force behind the 
territorial expansion of slavery. First, he reminded his 
audience that slavery was legally outlawed from every part 
of the nation at the time he first took national office in 
1849.^4 m  1856, he claimed, Congress had allowed the 
expansion of slavery into all regions, even into those 
states and territories that had voted to exclude the 
institution as constitutional measures. Therefore, Seward 
concluded that the campaign of 1856 was being waged on the 
issue of reclaiming territory for free labor, rather than
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preventing the enactment of legislation that would allow 
slavery to expand. He shifted ground from a defensive to 
an offensive argument.
Free Labor - Reasoning Processes
The solution to the expansion problem lay with the
Republican party, he assured his audience, but his proof
was curious. He suggested that the Republicans were
blameless as the agency of either the pro-expansion forces
or the prior means of checking the growing power of the
slavery forces, since the Republican party did not exist
until after the Missouri Compromise was repealed.
Everyone will at once acquit the 
Republican party and those who now 
constitute it, of all agency in the 
betrayal and surrender of Freedom 
[sic], which have thus been made.55
His argument was rational, but tepid. It also covered a
lot of ground. Seward not only attempted to exonerate the
Republicans with his reasoning that the party could not
act if it did not exist, but inferred that those Whigs who
were serving in Congress while the repeal was being
enacted were exonerated, as well.
Having built a case against the Democratic party based
upon its support of pro-slavery legislation, Seward
presumed that nothing better
[I]s to be hoped from the Democratic 
party in the future. It is a party
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essentially built on the interest of 
slaveholding classes. Deprived of 
that support, it would instantly cease 
to exist.5<>
Seward asserted that politics regulated the daily lives of
the American people and that the security of the
individual rested upon this regulation. However, without
wisdom and the "right conduct" in Congress, the national
good would cease to exist.
How much of individual, domestic and 
social happiness depends on the 
regulation and conduct of only one 
single human life? How vastly more of 
human happiness depends, then, on the 
regulation and conduct of the whole 
nation's thousand-fold longer life!5?
A functional, two-party system was the only hope for 
carrying on the proper regulation of those collective 
lives. And, even though the Democrats had supported pro­
slavery legislation, Seward conceded that they provided 
the proper two-party balance.
Southern Threat - Reasoning
To Seward, the Know-Nothings posed a double threat to 
the national safety. In addition to their un-American, 
unrepresentative "secret" stature, which was a strong 
secondary threat, the Know-Nothings as a third party would 
split the national vote and throw support to the 
Democrats. With Know-Nothing help, a Democratic 
administration might take power that would reflect a
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minority rule. Indirectly, then, the Know-Nothings became 
part of the southern threat by virtue of their ability to 
split tickets and provide for a pro-Democratic, pro­
slavery administration.
Seward argued that the real political power was being
contested by those two parties representing the opposing
slave-power and abolitionist interests. Relying upon his
experience as a politician and the reputation he had
earned as an anti-expansionist, the Senator claimed that
the Know-Nothing party was representative only of a
minority of voters who were clearly dangerous to the
Republican cause. For proof, he demonstrated how the
third party would numerically weaken the support of the
Republicans.
If the American people divide, and one 
portion, being a minority, declare for 
Freedom [sic] while another portion, 
being also a minority declare against 
foreigners and Catholics, and a third, 
larger than either, declare for 
slavery, nothing is obtained against 
foreigners and Catholics, nothing 
against slavery, and Kansas becomes a 
Slave State [sic].58
Seward argued that the Know-Nothing party represented an 
issue which was neither urgent nor relevant to the welfare 
of the nation. He claimed that the effect of the "false 
issue" raised by the American party, coupled with their 
neutrality on the slavery issue, distracted the public 
mind from the real issue.
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To demonstrate the American party's viability as part 
of the southern threat, Seward claimed that the third 
party would eventually align itself with the weaker of the 
two parties in every region of the country in order to 
gain political power. Republicans could watch with dismay 
as the Americans aligned themselves with Democrats in 
those northern and western states that were primarily 
Republican, serving their own limited, political ends. 
Republican strength was so limited in the South that 
Republican-American alliances throughout that region would 
serve to dilute Republican principles but would not 
provide a political threat to the entrenched Democratic 
majority. American-Whig alliances were a possibility in 
the South, but the Whig national organization had 
collapsed and neither party had a solid, national power 
base.
Seward warned that the American party was facing a
short, tempestuous political life.
By virtue of a law that is 
irresistible, it will sooner or later 
betray each party when its own 
peculiar ends require that course. The 
effort will cost its life. Crowded 
and jostled between the two 
combatants, it will and must 
dissolve . . .59
But, the Senator warned further that any such dissolution 
of the third party would occur too late to assist the 
cause of the free-soil party in the current controversy. 
Therefore, since that existence of a third party disrupted
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the political system that was designed to protect the 
security of the individual, Seward concluded that the 
Know-Nothing party could not hope to succeed except as a 
temporary impediment to freedom.
Having lectured on the third party as a disruptive
influence and the possible means of promoting minority
rule, Seward dismissed the Americans as a viable political
entity, altogether.
All masses which affect neutrality, as 
well as all masses which affect to 
stand independently on questions which 
have already passed . . . are crowded 
and crushed in the conflicts between 
the two which occupy, for the time 
being, the whole field of contest.
The Know-Nothings chose to ignore slavery and the 
territorial expansion of the practice in 1856. They 
concentrated on nativism, an issue that occupied 
(unsuccessfully) the Masonic party of the 1820s. Seward 
contended that the slavery issue could not be ignored, 
since it so fully occupied the public mind and the 
administration of the government, leaving the "nativists" 
to support a hollow issue. Further, by establishing an 
ideological link between the Know-Nothings and the Masons, 
Seward reenforced the similarities between the failed, 
discredited political activities of the latter and the 
political aims of the former.
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Perceived Truth of the Ideas
Seward demonstrated the inadequacy and dangerous 
ineptitude of Democratic leadership. He blamed the 
Democratic party for the breakdown of civil law and order 
in Kansas and accused the Democratic administration of 
ineptly protecting the Constitutional rights of the 
nation's inhabitants.
Having suggested that the Know-Nothings did not address 
the important issues, slavery and its impending expansion 
into the territories, Seward concluded that the third 
party was a clear danger to the American two-party system 
of majority rule and an indirect tool of the southern 
Democrats.
Seward concluded his short address by inferring that 
support for any party but the Republican party would 
result in the breakdown of majority rule and the 
constitutional guarantees of freedom. "If these arguments 
be sound, we are shut up to the necessity of giving our 
support to the Republican party as the only means of 
maintaining the cause of Freedom and Humanity.
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Summary
The final standard of measurement for determining the 
integrity of the ideas found in the speeches of the 
campaign of 1856 is the determination of the results of 
those ideas on society. "Was the speaker right, as 
determined by an appeal to historical reality?" is the 
measure described in Speech Criticism.**2
The abolition of slavery was accomplished during 
Lincoln's administration, ending the threat of the 
extension of slavery into the territories. However, the 
free labor concepts developed by northern speakers did not 
replace the slave labor system. The transformation of the 
South into a comprehensive industrial/agricultural 
economy, modeled on that of the North, was forestalled by 
Reconstruction. In addition to the harsh economic 
reprisals forced on the South, the social residue of class 
and economic distinctions unique to the South made the 
transition from a slave labor society to one of 
independent industry very difficult.
Southern businessmen were expected to flock north to 
learn the ways of Wall Street. Southern agriculturalists 
were supposed to journey north in large numbers to observe 
scientific farming techniques, according to Republican 
speakers during the 1856 campaign. Whereas some
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industrialization and agricultural diversification 
occurred after 1865, the economy of the South lagged 
behind that of the rest of the nation. Therefore, the 
economic predictions of the northern speakers were 
inaccurate.
Ultimately, the "southern threat" concept proved to be 
sound. The South did unite and the result was the Civil 
War. Northern Republicans did take control of the 
government in 1860 and remained in control through 1884. 
Since the neo-Aristotelian methodology suggests that 
" . . .  logical proof should ideally achieve Truth as the 
final d e s i d e r a t u m , "63 then the validity of the logical 
appeals used in the Republican campaign is open to a 
variety of interpretations. For example, the sectional 
arguments that painted the South as a threatening abode of 
ignorance and evil may have contributed to the rigors of 
northern reconstruction in the South after the Civil War. 
Whether or not the depth of ignorance in the South was 
truthfully reported in the northern campaign is of less 
importance to an analysis of the speeches than is the 
measure of perceived truth of the concept in the minds of 
the northern audience.
If it can be argued that the political enslavement of 
the South occurred in part through the persuasive appeals 
of the northern campaigners, then the ends of the 
Republican speakers were fulfilled by the eradication of
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the trade and ownership of men. The ends of the campaign 
were expedient, not truth-seeking. Since the proposed 
solution involved the election of a Republican 
administration as the means of ending slavery, then the 
ultimate goal of the campaign was achieved.
The arguments presented by the Republican speakers were 
perceived as the truth by their northern audiences. The 
speakers were coherent in their definition of the urgent 
nature of the political crisis and consistent in their 
call for a political solution. "Logical coherence" can 
function as a means of determining the truth of a 
situation, according to Thonssen, Baird and Braden, and 
the speakers examined in this chapter were profoundly 
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Chapter 6 
Emotional Appeals
According to neo-Aristotelian speech theory, an 
effective speaker must engage the emotions of his audience 
members in order to move them to action. Thonssen, Baird, 
and Braden define this rhetorical concept of emotional 
proof as that material which is "designed to put the 
listener in a frame of mind to react favorably and 
conformably to the speaker's purpose."1 Emotional proof 
requires the speaker to adapt his remarks to the needs of 
the particular audience and the issues of the moment. He 
strives to identify as an individual with his audience so 
that his concerns become their concerns and the audience 
is ready to act favorably on his suggestions.
The speaker, himself, is a major factor in any 
emotional appeal. He functions as the "interpreter" of 
the emotions he wishes the audience to reproduce.2 
However, he should not be an "emotional" person.
Irrational patterns of exposition are ineffective 
rhetorical tools. The experienced speaker should present 
an organized, intellectual and controlled address that 
eschews "extravagant imagery " and "exaggerated
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conclusions."3 The speaker's sincerity and rationality 
must be evident.
The most effective emotional tool at the speaker's 
disposal is evocative language. Speech Criticism 
postulates a dual role for language in any public address. 
First, language must appeal to the rationality of the 
listener so that the words have referential value.
Second, language must fulfill the emotional needs of the 
audience in order to complete the process of 
identification.^ There is no clear demarcation between 
the emotional and rational appeals of any persuasive 
address. The two areas overlap. The logical development 
of a particular idea is necessary for the establishment of 
cause/effect relationships, but the emotive language cues 
the audience on the proper reaction.
The Republican speeches were rich in imagery and 
evocative language. The speakers were essentially well 
trained, rational men who had a great deal of experience 
in public speaking. There were particular speakers who 
relied more heavily on emotional language and fear appeals 
than their colleagues. Primarily, these men were members 
of the more radical faction of the Republican party.
The emotional appeals of the 1856 Republican 
presidential canvass were encapsulated in the party 
slogan. "Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, and Fremont" 
was the chant at the vast torch-light rallies where whole
227
towns gathered to listen to partisan speakers. Each of 
the speakers defined his political terms within the 
framework of the party slogan, since "free soil" to a 
constitutionalist like Adams was a concept far different 
from the free soil concept of a moralist like Henry Ward 
Beecher.
Emotional appeals characterized the radical faction 
within the Republican party. The radical Republicans of 
1856 were characterized by their unwillingness to 
compromise on the expansion of slavery. According to Eric 
Foner, author of Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The 
Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War, the 
party radicals united only on the expansion issue.5 They 
had no cohesive economic policy and their foreign policy 
was limited to the exclusion of American slavery from 
Cuban soil.®
Foner identified rural New England as the most radical 
section of the North.? He cited the urban dependence on 
trade agreements with southern agriculturalists as the 
moderating influence on Republicans living in larger 
cities. The idealism of the radical faction within the 
Republican party was shaped by the high literary and 
religious standards on which the New Englanders prided 
themselves.®
The Republicans of the Western Reserve were heavily 
influenced by the religious abolitionism that swept the
north-east in the 1830s. Since the "northern tier" of the 
midwest had been settled almost exclusively by New 
Englanders moving due West for 20 years, radical, anti­
slavery Republicanism was embraced with ease by its 
inhabitants.9 Many of the Republicans of the Western 
Reserve were already sympathetic to the religious 
abolitionism of New England. However, the Reserve 
politicans were adamant that slavery be immediately 
abolished without any further compromise or delay. In 
this demand, they surpassed even their New England 
counterparts in radical tone and temper.10
Essentially, radical Republicans were idealistic free- 
soil activists. They provided the moral standard for the 
party and the campaign. Although the radicals were a 
strong political contingent within the free soil movement, 
many of them came to the Republican party from distinct 
abolitionist backgrounds.1! The abolitionists represented 
a tradition of moral activism rather than political 
activism. Therefore, the strategies they employed in 
their attempts to persuade voters to support the 
Republican platform were markedly different from those 
strategies employed by the political activists, since the 
convictions of each particular speaker assumed priority 
over purely party activities.
Ideals and morals are difficult to explain logically. 
They are most effectively presented in an emotional
appeal, designed to persuade an audience to action by 
arousing indignation, anger, outrage or some other 
emotion. The object of the speaker is to produce first 
conviction, then action. For this reason, the speeches of 
the more radical members of the Republican party leaned 
more heavily on emotional proof than did the speeches of 
the conservative speakers. The radicals strove to raise 
the anti-slavery issue to primary importance, while the 
conservatives attempted to placate the northern business 
community with a logical, protectionist approach.
According to Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, precise 
analyses of emotional appeals pose a problem for the 
critic because of the individual motivation behind each 
a p p e a l . 12 since antiquity, theorists have argued the 
moral aspects of emotional appeals as a mode of 
persuasion. Therefore, any definition of emotional 
appeals must assume some moral responsibility on the part 
of the speaker and the willingness of the audience to 
allow the speaker to make moral judgments.
This chapter examines two broad types of emotional 
appeals used in the 1856 Republican campaign: the 
religious speaking which most fully characterized the 
emotional arguments against slavery and the radical 
approach toward the political aspects of the moral issue 
imbedded in the anti-slavery movement. Each speech is
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examined for its primary thesis; then the particular 
elements of identification and language use is isolated.
Abolitionists
The most effective abolitionist speakers in 1856 were 
the pulpit orators. Speech Criticism lists the traits 
that a speaker must bring to an effective persuasive 
address.13 The first trait listed is the speaker's 
motives. Listeners probably attributed to Beecher, 
Cheever, and the other pulpit orators the altruistic 
motive of emancipating the slaves. These ministers were 
not associated with mob violence as were the secular 
abolitionists. Most of these ministers were respected 
opinion leaders with popular followings. Many of them 
spoke outside of their own churches and were widely quoted 
in the press. In particular, the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher 
and the Rev. George B. Cheever were outspoken ministers 
whose sermons hammered at their congregations to take an 
active part in emancipating the southern slaves. Both men 
had their sermons published in the daily newspapers and 
Beecher often wrote editorials. They endorsed the 
Republican platform and embellished the party appeals with 
forceful moral arguments.
Their moral arguments appear to be aimed at generating 
righteous indignation among the members of the audience.
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They apparently wanted to rouse their listeners to anger 
over the enforced bondage of the southern slave; to 
provoke the audience's guilt at shirking their collective 
responsibility toward their bound brothers in Christ; and 
to create a sense of shame that would move their audience 
to vote against the Democratic candidate in the coming 
election. Both men were masterful orators. Both Beecher 
and Cheever were well-practiced in the techniques of 
persuasion. Those particular techniques and arguments 
which they brought to bear in behalf of the Republican 
party are the focus of this chapter.
Henry Ward Beecher
The Reverend Henry Ward Beecher was a popular
abolitionist speaker. He took a leave of absence from his
New York pulpit in order to travel throughout New England
and speak on behalf of the Republican campaign. While
none of his campaign oratory has been included in those
works dealing with his life and public service, the
essence of Beecher's emotional appeal can be extrapolated
from an account of his preaching style.
His denunciations of oppression and 
oppressors do not proceed from a 
soured mind, but from a profound 
sympathy with the oppressed. . . .  He 
seems to be talking directly to each 
individual hearer. There is no 
escape; he bends over the pulpit and 
looks you in the face; he intends that
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you shall not go home without 
appropriating a portion of the 
discourse to yourself.!*
Unfortunately for the student of rhetoric, Beecher most
often spoke without notes.*5 However, his arguments
against slavery were recorded in The Independent, a
national weekly newspaper that carried Beecher's
editorials.^® His contributions to the newspaper were
indicated with a large star, but his name seldom appeared
in print.
Identification:
Identification is a technique usually studied when 
analyzing ethos. However, Thonssen, Baird, and Braden 
include identification as an important element in 
emotional proof because the concept of "acting together" 
or consubstantiality can be achieved only if the emotional 
needs of the audience are fully met by the speaker.!7 
Since the audience should perceive genuine emotion behind 
the appeals of the speech, the speaker needs to embody 
those emotions he wishes to arouse in his audience. 
Identification between speaker and audience, then, occurs 
when the speaker arouses the audience to the same 
emotional level that he, himself, enjoys.
Identification was accomplished by triggering two 
complex, emotional belief systems. First, Beecher spoke 
to audiences that presumed themselves to be practicing
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Christians. Beecher was an ordained minister. Therefore, 
the identification process had already begun before 
Beecher even rose to speak. As long as Beecher's message 
was perceived as a message of Christian righteousness, his 
audience would respond favorably.
Second, Beecher was addressing a secular audience, his 
fellow American citizens. Since the end of persuasion is 
to cause the audience to engage in action, Beecher was 
urging his listeners to use the polls to cause an end to a 
moral evil.3-8 His aim was to engage first their righteous 
anger on the broadest level - a gathering of Christians to 
listen to an indictment against unchristian behavior - 
which did not demand any particular action. Then, having 
established a common bond on that level, Beecher was able 
to use that anger as the basis for a call to action in the 
political arena for the purpose of bringing an end to 
slavery.
Beecher based his appeals on the premises that it was
the duty and necessity of every Christian to oppose
slaveryi Not only was it unchristian to support slavery,
but it was equally important to instruct others in their
duty to oppose slavery. Beecher constructed emotional
appeals that appear to be aimed at making the pacifists
feel guilty.
He draws a picture of the poor hunted 
fugitive; he leads you among the 
cotton fields of the fair, sunny 
south, where the breezes are scented
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with orange blossoms; and there he 
asks you to listen to the heart-broken 
sighs of some miserable slave mother, 
parted from her children. . . . But 
before he is done, he smites you; he 
charges those before him with 
indifference to this giant wrong; he 
tells them that the blood of the 
oppressed will be found on their 
skirts, for conniving at the servitude 
of three millions of their fellow- 
men.
Although slavery could not be abolished without the active 
support of the strict abolitionists, Beecher constructed 
his rhetorical strategies as if he believed that moral 
commitment was not enough. A plan of action must 
accompany his campaign of persuasion.
According to Beecher, the specific problem faced by the 
Republicans in 1856 was to identify a universal threat 
posed by the institution of slavery. In one address after 
another, throughout the state of New York, Beecher 
identified that threat. The inherent danger posed by 
slavery lay in the system's ability to function as an 
economic institution only if it could unendingly expand 
into new territories.21* Once the land wore out in the old 
sections farmed by intensive slave labor, the plantations 
were forced to move in search of new, fertile land. As 
long as land was available for the large-scale, single­
crop agriculture that characterized the South, slavery 
would continue to exist. Therefore, the Republicans were 
demonstrating political expediency by demanding that 
slavery not be allowed into the territories through
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legislative channels as well as moral expediency by 
opposing an institution that was immoral.
Slavery violated both the principles embodied in the 
Constitution of the United States and the concept of free 
labor as described by the Republicans. According to 
Beecher, then, there was a consistency between the 
political and the moral arguments against allowing slavery 
to expand. The task facing the new party was to move men 
to respond to the anti-expansionist arguments by voting 
for the Republican program.
Language;
Like many of the radical speakers, Beecher employed a 
great deal of imagery.21 in an article printed in the 
June 29, 1856, issue of The Independent, he metaphorically 
illustrated the issues of the campaign as explosives 
stored in a burning building. The prudent man, Beecher's 
metaphor for the Republicans, would rush to separate the 
explosives from the fire, while only a madman would stand 
aside to await the outcome. The madmen were those 
potential voters who preferred to wait out the 
inflammatory slavery situation, since any vote withheld 
for lack of conviction was a vote for the pro-slavery 
South.
Beecher also argued in his editorial that slavery 
demoralized both blacks and whites.22 political ideals,
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manners and personal habits were all endangered by the
institution.
Preaching must be guarded, political 
speeches must be guarded, newspapers 
must be circumspect. . . . Ignorance 
is right if slavery is right. Free 
speech is wrong if slavery is right. A 
system of force cannot deal with moralsuasion.23
Using the imagery of slavery, Beecher suggested that the 
minds as well as the bodies of all who lived in the South 
were fettered under the system of human bondage portrayed 
by Beecher.
He employed a variety of metaphorical constructions in
his observations. For example, the South was described as
a ship being wildly driven ahead of an "omnipotent
storm."24 Beecher continued with the sailing metaphor,
claiming that the "current" which guided southern policy
was not of its own immediate making but that it reflected
a "tendency" that had caused its policies to "drift far"
from the intent of the ship's master.
Every Northern man should thoroughly 
understand that the policy of the 
South is not one of vexatious 
haughtiness. It is a policy the 
necessity of which springs from the 
very organization of their society, 
from the irresistible nature of their 
industrial system. They cannot help 
themselves. If they would they 
cannot. They are on a current which 
sweeps them whether they will ornot.25
Henry Ward Beecher was a popular speaker. Although many 
of his anti-slavery arguments were familiar to audiences
237
throughout the North by virtue of The Independent and its 
wide circulation, it was his defense of his right to 
preach against the institution of slavery that formed the 
moral foundation of the radical Republicans.
The Journal of Commerce editorially attacked Beecher
for his sermons advocating abolition, according to
biographer David W. Bartlett. From his pulpit in New York
City, Beecher declaimed in his own defense:
Three million men, against natural 
law, against every fundamental 
principle of our state and national 
government are, by law, thrown over 
the pale of the race and denied to be 
men. This is not fit for the pulpit 
to mention; it is allowed, 
nevertheless, to preach about China 
and Indial Every year thousands of 
children are snatched from their 
parents' bosoms, and remorselessly 
sold every whither. . . . Every year 
husbands and wives are torn asunder,
Christian or no Christian; and the 
Journal of Commerce browbeats that 
pulpit that uttersa word about such 
politics . . . 2<>
These were the sentiments by which Beecher encouraged
other men of principle to join the Republican campaign,
even if they were not previously political activists. He
took the moral issue of slavery and turned it to political
advantage for those men who would join him in 1856. The
new moral definitions proposed by Beecher were the




Reverend G. B. Cheever of New York City portrayed the 
presidential canvass of 1856 as a moral crisis. He 
delivered a series of partisan sermons during the summer 
and fall of 1856 to illustrate the crisis to the people of 
New York.
Identification:
Since Beecher had pioneered the use of the pulpit for 
political purposes, Cheever did not have to establish his 
credentials as a political speaker. He was immediately 
accorded the status of a leading Republican spokesman by 
virtue of his pulpit and his politically-motivated 
abolitionist sentiments.
During October, the New York Daily Tribune and the New 
York Daily Times printed a series of abolitionist homilies 
delivered by Cheever. His theme was consistent from one 
sermon to the next. He claimed that slavery, itself, was 
a sinful activity - a well-worn abolitionist assertion. 
However, even greater moral damage resulted from the 
immoral practices that accompanied the institution of 
slavery, according to Cheever, and these were the damages 
that the Republicans could repair.
On October 20, Cheever discoursed on the moral problems 
that would accompany the expansion of slavery. The 
emotional impact of the setting probably predisposed his
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audience to listen to his discourse sympathetically. 
Cheever spoke from the pulpit of the Church of the 
Puritans on a chilly fall Sunday evening. Since his 
sermons had been widely publicized prior to the start of 
the series, the assembled audience can be presumed to have 
pro-Republican or abolitionist sentiments regardless of 
their active church membership.
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Language:
He established his intention immediately in the 
introduction by quoting from Jeremiah.27 cheever relied 
heavily upon the use of metaphor and evocative language 
throughout the sermon. Slavery was the "colossal guilt", 
a "shipwreck of conscience," a "national injustice," the 
"impious project," a "marked and mighty sin," and a 
"daring, culminating inequity".28 The men who engaged in 
the holding of slaves were members of the "oligarchy of 
masters" who promoted the "irresponsible despotism" 
produced by a slave-holding society.
God's retributipn against the slave owners would be
like a "sun shot into chaos" and his earthly agents
[Cheever's listeners and readers] were charged to get
[T]his orb of light in the firmament 
of God's word in the right line . . . 
and calculate our course of duty and 
safety . . .  We ourselves are at sea 
and surrounded by breakers and God 
only can rescue us . . .28
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Cheever employed the same type of navigational metaphor 
favored by Beecher. Both men reassured their partisan 
audiences that they were right to seek light and safe 
harbor in the face of the moral darkness that slavery 
represented. The stormy political seas were the fault of 
the slave owners who chose not to heed the biblical 
injunctions against human bondage.
Cheever shifted ground at the end of his emotion- 
charged exordium, moving from a demonstration of biblical 
precedents against slavery in general to a particular 
argument against the practice of slavery in the United 
States. He relied upon a parallel illustration to prove 
his allegations against the immorality of the institution 
in a nation's history. He compared the plight of the 
ancient Jews - and God's retribution against their captors 
- to the situation in the South. He warned that God would 
punish the pro-slavery southerners with the same dramatic 
intensity which He had visited upon the slave owners of 
Biblical times.
The punishments promised by Cheever were outlined in 
the Bible, his major source of authority. He tried to 
persuade his audience to action through the use of fear 
appeals, based upon situations chronicled in biblical 
times. He attempted to engage the emotions of his audience 
against the institution of slavery by promising dramatic 
fiery retribution against the unjust among them.
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[Tjhere burns the light, the fire, the 
wickedness, the warning, the 
thunderbolt; you can almost hear it 
hissing and detonating anew as you 
open these sacred pages. There stands 
the scorched, transfixed and blasted 
form of a nation once chosen and 
beloved of God, but now a monument to 
the universe of his inexorable 
justice.30
Cheever encouraged his congregation to deplore slavery 
before God's wrath was visited upon the United States just 
as it was described by Jeremiah in Cheever's opening 
remarks.
Since God's just and horrible punishment would extend
to those men in the North who refused to actively work for
abolition, Cheever proposed a course of action.
We are to choose for an empire between 
wrong and right courses, between 
injustice and justice, between 
oppression and benevolence, between 
slavery and freedom.3*
This course of moral and practical action was clothed in
impressive stylistic devices. Cheever used parallelism
and antithesis with impressive dramatic effect in this
passage as well as in others throughout the address. The
repetition of the moral dichotomy represented in this
particular passage was powerfully designed. Cheever
provided a clear definition of his concept of slavery as
wrong, unjust and oppressive.
According to Bembreck and Howell's text, Persuasion: A 
Means of Social Influence, the audience, or receiver of 
the message, must have the freedom to make choices if the
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process of persuasion is a valid process.32 cheever 
presented his audience with a choice of action, a 
necessary element of the persuasive process, while 
demonstrating that a single course of action was desirable 
among Christian men. He had predisposed his audience to 
identify the correct "choices" through their common 
identity as practicing Christians. Therefore, this 
"loaded" dichotomy suggested that Cheever's aim was to 
intensify attitudes already favorable to his cause by 
appearing to offer alternatives to the "correct" actions 
which would be totally unacceptable to both the speaker 
and his audience. This same dichotomy illustrates the 
uncompromising attitude of the radical Republicans toward 
slavery - there was no middle ground between slavery and 
its abolition. The voter supported either one or the 
other if he remained a radical.
Cheever outlined a course of action for his
congregation, based upon their collective duties as
Christians and citizens. He encouraged them to invest the
presidential canvass with the moral principles of
Christianity for
We do not preach to the people on a 
question of mere expediency, or 
diplomacy, or profit, or political 
economy, or statesmanship, or even of 
what is best, but of what is right; of 
what God a  H o w s .  3 3
True Christians, he asserted, cannot avoid speaking
against slavery and denouncing the "iniquity" of the
institution. He demanded that his congregation act 
against the extension of slavery with the enthusiasm of 
blacksmiths employing "burning thoughts and hard blows" 
rather than with kid gloves and "fastidious elegancies."34
Cheever's primary purpose was to activate his 
congregation by arousing them to anger and outrage. He 
played upon their feelings of guilt within the concept of 
collective responsibility, just as Beecher did with his 
audiences. Cheever praised his audience in advance of the 
their actions at the polls, encouraging them to bear 
testimony against the evils of slavery in a manner 
analogous to the bravery exhibited by Christ when 
testifying in front of Pilate. Cheever's imagery was 
exquisite. He was able to endow the Republican campaign 
with the weight of the entire Christian ethic by employing 
images such as Christ's bravery in front of Pilate. His 
congregation, both immediate and secondary, was "blessed” 
with a Christ-like mission to eradicate slavery. They 
would not have to engage in any activity more dangerous 
than casting their votes in favor of the Republican 
candidate, but Cheever ennobled the deed to heroic 
proportions.
The extent of slavery's unchristian character was 
illustrated with the image of Pilate. Pilate, who sought 
to place the blame for his actions elsewhere, was the 
prototype of the southern slave owner. Whereas Pilate
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placed the blame for Christ's execution on the heads of 
the assembled multitude, the southern slave owner placed 
the blame for the violence in Kansas on the heads of the 
northern radicals who refused to compromise.
Cheever described the southern moral and political
standards transported to the plains of Kansas as wicked,
treasonous, perverted, villainous, fraudulent, diabolical
and a "monstrous prostitution of law."35 The resulting
bloodshed, he claimed, could have been avoided by devising
national policy according to the dictates of the Bible.
This [border violence] could never be,
if we, as a people, had kept the word
of God in view . . . we must take our
stand on God's Word, and square our 
policy our platform, according to it 
• • »
Having demanded that his audience take action to stop the
spread of slavery as their moral duty, Cheever proposed a
series of six proofs designed to defend his contention 
that slavery was a sinful state, deserving of eradication 
on moral grounds, alone. With "proof," the audience would 
have good reasons to take action. These proofs occupied 
the second half of the body of his sermon and they were 
arranged in descending order of importance.
The arrangement of arguments within an address is a 
critical element in emotional proof.37 classical 
theorists argued that the most effective use of pathetic 
proof was at the beginning and at the end of the speech. 
Cheever adhered to this pattern of development. According
to the Ciceronian model examined by Thonssen, Baird, and 
Braden, Cheever opened his sermon with an exordium 
designed to prepare his audience to sympathize with his 
later premises. He first presented the grounds for 
speaker-audience identification by quoting from the 
scriptures to establish his source of inspiration. The 
narration was devoted to shifting audience indignation 
from slavery in broad, historical terms to the proposition 
facing the voters in 1856. He built parallels between the 
ancient Jews and the contemporary Africans that would 
allow his audience to make inferential judgments against 
the southern slaveholders who wished to extend slavery 
into the territories.
His logical proofs, all based upon moral indictments 
and philosophical "truths," were developed in the center 
of the address. The invention of these "truths" was 
consistent with the reasoning employed by other Republican 
speakers who were casting about for logical reasons to 
oppose slavery. An amorphous theme was beginning to 
emerge by this late point in the campaign. This theme 
would begin to replace the "fire and brimstone" thunder of 
the radicals as a more rational approach to the moral 
issues imbedded in the slavery controversy. Briefly, 
Cheever demonstrated the illegality of slavery within the 
Christian concept of democratic government. He claimed 
that laws against oppression, man-stealing, denial of
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brotherly love and the violation of the parent-child 
relation were designed to protect all residents of the 
United States. His proofs were couched in metaphor and an 
assumption of the common Christian experience of his 
audience rather than as demonstrable lines of evidential 
reasoning like the economic and political arguments of the 
Congressional speakers.
Cheever1s address was consistent with the classical
model of emotional proof as outlined in Thonssen, Baird,
and Braden, for he closed his sermon with a call to
specific action in a highly-charged peroration.
Every man who sanctions the iniquity 
of slavery, by a vote in favor of it 
is himself part and parcel of the sin.
But it is not a question of mere 
individual sin. It is what you will 
do with the power put into your hands
to make others sin . . .38
Cheever closed his appeal by charging his congregation to
become keepers of their southern brothers? to encourage
those northern voters not in attendance to vote against
slavery for the salvation of all souls, whether directly
or indirectly involved in the perpetuation of slavery.
One week after delivering the sermon based upon the 
words of Jeremiah, Cheever delivered a second sermon in 
favor of the Republicans entitled "God Against Slavery," 
based upon Ezekiel 22:29, 30,31.38 jn addition to 
expanding upon the six proofs against slavery that he had 
outlined the previous Sunday, Cheever developed the
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concept of "man-stealing" into a full-scale moral horror
as a means of inciting his congregation to vote against
the pro-slavery Democrats. His premise was based on the
reasoning that if another Democratic administration were
elected, then the horror would increase geometrically.
[F]or every two immortal beings forced 
into this chattelism, there would be 
five others forced, in like manner, by
the next.40
Cheever accused these later generations of "thieves" of a 
double crime. Their first crime was that of stealing men 
to make into slaves. Their second crime was that of 
stealing the slave-born children from their natural 
parents, disrupting the sacred and natural bond between 
parent and child.
These emotional proofs were effective from the pulpit, 
but used sparingly on the stump. The proofs were too 
reminiscent of the abolitionist rhetoric to be of much use 
to the moderate Republicans and the Democratic-Republicans 
in 1856. In fact, there were some Republicans who found 
the abolitionist sentiments of the pulpit orators to be 
contradictory to the party's success at the polls. It was 
too easy for the Democrats to condemn Republicans as 
rabble-rousing abolitionists. In fact, one of these Whig- 
turned-Democrat speakers was Rufus Choate. Throughout the 
northeast he began to question publically the right of 
activist preachers to represent a purely political 
endeavor that could only result in disunion.
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The "Radical" Speakers
Invention was a very important element in the 
construction of the free soil emotional proofs. Since 
even the radicals were shy about employing stock 
abolitionist arguments, the invention of new arguments was 
necessary. Normally, invention would not be analyzed as a 
portion of pathetic argument. However, Republican 
rhetorical tactics were founded on new varieties of 
political arguments in order to avoid comparison with 
abolitionist, Whig, and Democratic ideological arguments 
of past campaigns. Therefore, invention becomes an 
important tool in analyzing the structure of these 
Republican addresses. In order to provide a foundation 
for the recurring arguments in the later Republican 
campaign speeches, a brief thematic analysis of Senator 
Sumner's address from the spring of 1856, "The Crime 
Against Kansas," is necessary. Many of Sumner's 
definitions and rationalizations were quoted throughout 
the campaign without attribution to the Senator. Sumner's 
address, in essence, was the keynote of the 1856 
Republican campaign.
Charles Sumner compared slavery to a crime against the 
government, (treason), and a crime against social 
morality. His arguments in support of the immorality of
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slavery were passionate and highly metaphorical, much 
bolder than those accusations employed during the formal 
campaign. Slavery was a "harlot" and a "wicked" practice, 
a "perversion" against the Constitution. To extend 
slavery into the territories would result in the "rape of 
a virgin land," an interesting contrast to the 
metaphorical harlotry he called forth elsewhere in the 
same speech.
His logical proofs dealing with the constitutionality 
of slavery were often borrowed by Republican speakers. 
Sumner charged that since slavery was clearly 
unconstitutional, the extension of slavery into the 
territories was an act of treason. Freedom, he claimed, 
was the natural state of men under the Constitution and 
the Constitution protected men in all parts of the nation. 
Slavery was practiced sectionally and was a political 
concept limited to that section, claimed Sumner. However, 
freedom was a national concept. Therefore, the pro­
slavery men were the treasonous sectionalists who were in 
open defiance of the constitutional guarantees of personal 
freedom. Sumner reasoned that their mere participation in 
the slave society, whether they owned slaves or not, made 
them traitors.
Sumner listed the particular crimes of which he accused 
the South. Congress had been "swindled" with the repeal 
of the Compromise of 1850; popular sovereignty in the
250
South was abridged, since slavery was the only "choice" of 
those men unable to cast a vote for any elected official; 
property rights substituted for human rights, according to 
the fugitive slave legislation "forced" upon the North; 
and the entire democratic process was prostituted by the 
voting frauds perpetuated in the South and her "invaders" 
in Kansas.
The pro-slavery factions in Kansas and Washington 
"reeked" with conspiracy, claimed Sumner. Government 
appointees to Kansas were demonstrably pro-slavery, sent 
by the pro-slavery President Pierce and his administration 
to obtain control of the territories of the "Slave Power." 
Sumner charged Pierce and his administration with 
"murder," "illegal" militia raids, and the abrogation of 
law and order by their Missouri "invaders." A "tyranny" 
was in effect in Kansas and Pierce, the Democrats, and all 
of the pro-slavery South was to blame.
In addition to the emotive material supplied by Sumner, 
some of the emotional proofs employed by the less 
temperate radicals of 1856 were lifted directly from the 
abolitionist campaigns of previous years. These were the 
immoderate, accusatory proofs studiously avoided by the 
more moderate elements of the Republican party. Yet, it 
was the radical faction that provided the platform, the 
slogan and the ideology that united the party and gave it 
the strength to survive a single-issue campaign.
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Republican Appeals
The Whigs in the Republican party emphasized Union and 
compromise; the Democrats plotted to undermine the power 
of Calhoun and his Slave Power followers? and the 
abolitionists were determined to abolish slavery 
regardless of the political situation. However, one line 
of defense consistently appeared in most Republican 
addresses - the northern radicals defended the rights of 
free soil men to engage in free labor as guaranteed by the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the intentions of 
the founding triumvirate of George Washington, James 
Madison, and Thomas Jefferson.
Salmon Chase, Andrew Reeder, Charles Robinson and Henry 
Wilson were among the speakers who remained loyal to their 
anti-slavery roots while campaigning for the Republican 
party. While they employed emotional proofs more limited 
in scope than those all-encompassing arguments adopted by 
the pulpit orators, they were adept at illustrating the 
concepts of freedom and justice as promised by a 
Republican administration.
For example, Senator Henry Wilson addressed a huge 
crowd of laborers and workingmen at the New York City 
Tabernacle on Saturday, October 4, 1856.^1 His appearance
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on the speakers' platform was accompanied by the sounds of 
a brass band and a glee club, who were entertaining the 
crowd with "rousing" campaign songs. The platform of the 
Mechanics and Workingman's Central Republican Union was 
read aloud to the crowd, then Wilson was introduced. His 
audience was wildly partisan. According to the newspaper 
report, he was greeted with cheers, applause, shouts and 
the "waving of hats and handkerchiefs."
Since the audience and the speaker already shared 
identification as Republicans, and since their goals were 
similar as illustrated by the Union platform, mirrored the 
Republican national platform, Wilson's job was to 
intensify the commitment of the crowd to the national 
party. He defended the northern principle of free labor by 
characterizing southerners
as "degraded and dishonored" as a result of the slavery 
system. This form of sectional slander became pro forma 
in the Republican campaign. It needed no further 
amplification when addressed to a northern, anti-slavery 
audience.
Wilson charged the Democrats with criminal activity
against the very men standing before him in New York City,
[Hjaving taken nearly 500,000 square 
miles of the soil of this nation 
forever consecrated to freedom and 
opening it to the inroads of Human 
Slavery. It was a crime against the 
mechanics, against the laboring men 
and against the small farmers of the 
United States . . .42
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He continued with this quasi-religious metaphor by 
accusing the Democrats of obeying the demands of the Slave 
Power to claim Kansas for slavery, having stolen "the 
heritage of the freemen of the Republic North and South, 
and desecrated it, laid it as a votive offering at the 
foot of the Slave Power."43
Wilson was enlisting the support of his audience of 
laboring men in favor of a political party that revered 
free labor. While the purely political issue of the 
extension of slavery into the territories might not move 
his audience to vote for Republican candidates, Wilson was 
certain that an appeal against the restriction of free 
trade and an end to free labor would command their 
attention. The Republicans reasoned that territories built 
with slave labor wouldn't welcome free labor. Wilson 
developed that notion of restrictive emigration while 
painting the South as comparable to a rapist plundering 
the territories "to dishonor and disgrace and degrade."
Wilson referred to the Democrats as "Lords of the 
Lash," "traitors" and "Calhoun s e c t i o n a l i s t s . H e  
demanded the emancipation of the white men of the South 
from the restrictions slavery put upon free enterprise 
rather than demanding that slavery be eradicated for moral 
reasons. The enslavement by the white man by the system 
of slavery became a stock Republican argument.
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In contrast to Wilson's diatribe against the
enslavement of the working classes of the South, Salmon P.
Chase remained an abolitionist to the end of the campaign.
Chase demanded the emancipation of the Negro slaves
whether under the aegis of a particular party or by any
other possible means. He, too, referred to slavery as a
crime and the slave states as "oppressors." Democrats
were members of an "invading gang," ready to "scheme"
against the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution.^5 chase employed analogy in order to
compare the 1856 canvass to a battle between the forces of
freedom and bondage.
It is here in our midst the battle of
freedom is to be fought; we are to
determine whether . . . murder and 
rapine are to stalk abroad in the 
broad light of day, startling even the 
stoutest hearts by their atrocity.46
Chase gave voice to the radical concept that individual
liberty was more important as a goal than the preservation
of the Union. Even the prospect of compromise with those
men who represented the slave states was perceived by the
radicals as a traitorous act. The Union, claimed Chase,
could continue only if it were founded upon the exercise
of full freedom for all participants.47 in effect, the
Union, as represented by the Pierce administration, was
perceived as a tool of the "Slave Power." Therefore, it
was of no use to the radicals in its present form, for the
ideals of the Constitution had been prostituted by Douglas
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and the expansionists within the administration. Cassius
Clay expressed the radical contempt for compromise in his
New York address of October 25.
I say look back upon our past history 
to see if you have not done enough in 
the way of conciliation and compromise 
. . . the man who blindly follows the 
dictation of the South, and would make 
a slave of a black man today, would 
make a slave of a white man 
tomorrow.* 8
Clay offered no proof for his assertion, but this radical 
line of sectional reasoning was acceptable to partisan 
audiences by this late date in the campaign. The concept 
of white enslavement gradually replaced the more 
conservative free labor concept in the later campaign 
rhetoric. It was certainly more dramatic and it fostered 
more immediate identification between speaker and 
audience. Whereas none of the audience members might have 
occasion to visit the South and actually observe the 
slavery system in operation, most of the audience members 
could identify with the possibility of reduced emigration 
to the West and a tight labor market.
The frontier radicals, exemplified by Andrew Reeder and 
Charles Robinson, were more concerned with the 
Constitutional violations on territorial soil than with 
the larger issues of slavery. However, they brought forth 
the same arguments that Clay and Chase favored for the 
purposes of identification with the audience. Radical 
speakers warned their audiences that if Constitutional
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abuses could happen in the territories, then they had 
initiated a precedent that would allow abuses in any other 
portion of the Union. Further, the abuses currently under 
discussion were the fault of the Democratic 
administration, both current and immediately past.
The territorial spokesmen relied upon graphic
description and evocative, first-person language to
generate sympathy. Reeder skillfully used analogy as a
stylistic device to demonstrate the specific dangers of
the spread of slavery across the nation. Postulating that
the territories could not support both free and slave
labor, Reeder claimed that slave territories would dam the
westward expansion of the free labor advocates of the
northeast, clogging the cities and saturating the
marketplace.
These northern states may be likened 
to a tub under a fountain, all the 
time boiling over with a surplus 
population, and streaming over the 
vast West . . . [ifJ you shut off this 
entire stream of northern emigration 
you . . . turn back this human tide to 
throw itself upon the states of the 
North . . .4^
Reeder assumed that his audience accepted the proposition 
that slave and free labor could not co-exist based on 
inductive evidence provided by the violent situation in 
Kansas. By example, if the pro-slavery forces and the 
free state forces could not compromise in a single,
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uncommitted territory, then the possibility for national 
compromise was even more dismal.
Reeder employed praeteritio, a sophisticated stylistic 
device which allows for the inclusion of derogatory 
remarks while protecting the speaker from slander, to 
illustrate the horrors visited upon his fellow Kansans in 
the name of justice. For example, Reeder claimed that he 
would not undertake to describe the "robberies, the house 
burnings, the plunderings, the horse-stealings, the 
murders" in the time allotted to his speech while, of 
course, he proceeded to do so. He felt inadequate to the 
task of describing "the acts of our oppressors [which] 
were stained with blood and with every attribute which 
could disgrace humanity" although those acts were planned 
with "devilish ingenuity" toward "awful consequences."50
In contrast to the skillful use of devices in the 
address of Reeder, Charles Robinson limited his emotional 
appeals to specific eyewitness accounts designed to align 
his audience against the Democrats. He employed few 
analogies or other sophisticated devices to arouse the 
sympathy of his audience. His success as an emotional 
speaker lay with his ability to speak plainly of - and to 
• the average citi2en in straightforward terms. Robinson 
was able to identify with his audience and create common 
ground immediately. He claimed that "It makes me sick 
every time I think of a Northern man going for Southern
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aggression."51 He described the plight of Kansas in the
same plain, straight-forward terms that served to
underscore the nobility of the beleaguered free state men.
Captain Shores, who has spent most of 
his time in defending the homes of the 
people of Kansas . . .  is sick, his 
wife is sick, and he has no means of 
support. This is the condition of 
some of our captains and you may 
imagine what the rest must s u f f e r . 52
The success of his examples rested on the presumption that
every person in attendance at the speech had been sick at
one time; that each could identify with the care of a sick
spouse, so that identification with the sick, discouraged
Captain Shores should have been universal in the audience.
Without the use of sophisticated rhetorical devices,
Robinson created a spare, bold picture of suffering with
which his audience could easily sympathize.
Robinson illustrated his major premises with homey 
anecdotes, plainly expressed without ambiguity, for the 
maximum identification. He spoke of no threat larger than 
the situation in Kansas itself, leaving it to his audience 
to realize the national threat through inductive 
application.53 The result was an address of great 
trustworthiness from a man who humbly begged for political 
support from his listeners so that a sinple problem might 




Rufus Choate delivered a pro-Democratic address at 
Lowell, Massachusetts, on October 30. His speech employs 
many of the same references and emotional appeals used by 
the Republicans, providing an interesting rhetorical 
counterpoint to the free soil rhetoric. For the sake of 
comparison, a brief analysis of Choate's address is 
included. He was addressing the same geographic audience 
that gathered to hear Seward, Chase, Banks and the other 
leading northeastern speakers.
Throughout his introduction, Choate relied heavily upon 
the same iconographic representations of national ideals 
that were standard fare in the Republican speeches; 
representations of national values that were familiar to 
his northeastern audience and would enhance his chances to 
achieve consubstantiality. He was attempting to engage the 
sympathy of his audience for his message by arousing their 
sense of patriotism and linking their patriotic emotions 
to the imagery within his speech. For example, he 
commended his Massachusetts audience for attending his 
speech like "true patriots."54 He acknowledged their 
desire to elect a "successor to Washington" who would 
represent a "closer Union, and a truer and intenser [sic] 
American feeling and life" than that promised by the
current administration,55
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However, Choate presented a non-sectional argument in 
favor of the Democratic party that was strikingly 
different from the arguments of his Republican colleagues. 
Since his premises were certain to be unpopular with the 
anti-slavery audience in attendance, he employed a 
stylistic device that was meant to form an immediate bond 
of identification between himself and his listeners. He 
introduced the body of his speech with a series of 
rhetorical questions that were designed to be answered in 
the affirmative.
Rufus Choate wanted compromise. He felt that sectional 
and emotional arguments were falsely divisive since they 
ignored the political aspects of a presidential canvass.
No longer were the Democrats arrayed against the Whigs on 
the use of tariffs and the running of the government - 
realms in which men might exercise the use of political 
power wisely. Instead, Choate envisioned continued 
conflict.
Don't tell us how provoked you are, or 
how provoked Rev. Mr. This or Hon. Mr.
That has come to be against the South;
[or] how passionately one southern 
member spoke or another southern 
member acted; [or] how wicked it was 
in Washington to hold slaves . .
Choate complained that other speakers tried to "mystify or
trick us" with statistics designed to prove the
superiority of the North or the inferiority of the South.
The result of this trickery, he claimed, was not
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beneficial to the nation as a whole, since it provided no
solutions. Choate's observations were designed to focus
the ideals of his party on a workable solution to the
disunion that was threatened by the accusations being
tossed from pulpit to pulpit in the northeast.
Does this attempt to weave and plait 
the two north wings of the old 
national parties into a single 
Northern one, and cut the Southern 
wing off altogether, strike you to be 
quite as far-sighted and safe as it is 
new and bold? . . .  To combine States 
against States in such a system as 
ours - has it been generally held a 
very happy device towards forming a 
more perfect union and insuring 
domestic tranquillity? . . .  to put in 
requisition every species of rhetoric 
and sophistry to impress on the 
general mind that the end justifies 
the means; . . . does this strike you 
as altogether in the spirit of 
Washington and Franklin, and the 
preamble to the Constitution and the 
Farewell Address? Does it strike you 
that if carried out it will prove to 
be a mere Summer excursion to Moscow?
Will there be no bivouack [sic] in the 
snow: no avenging Winter hanging on 
retreat? No Leipaic; no Waterloo? 57
Choate was adept in the use of metaphor. He was able to
employ the same stylistic devices that Cheever and Beecher
relied upon for emotional proof in their sermons.
However, Choate demonstrated the truth of his arguments
through the imagery of the Constitution and the
presidential succession, rather than through biblical
example and individual moral exhortation. Rufus Choate
262
preferred collective action in favor of the political 
good, rather than.individual action for moral good.
Choate was violently opposed to a sectional party.
But, he was also a foe of slavery. He developed a thesis
which would allow for the containment of slavery and the
success of the new party. Choate simply proposed that the
Missouri Compromise and the Compromise of 1850 be honored.
[T]hat which gave peace to the country 
in 1820 and that which consummated the 
peace of the country in 1850 ought to 
be made good by the government of the 
United States and with the consent of 
the American people.58
Choate argued that freedom and Union were obtainable with
compromise. He continued to embellish his address with
rhetorical questions throughout, giving to the whole
speech a defensive posture. He did not make a conscious
attempt to engage in any further identification with his
audience after initially acknowledging those attending the
speech as his neighbors in Lowell. The speech appears to
be an ideological alignment of party and national policy.
Choate attempted to expose the sectionalism as the first
step in the destruction of the Union. He called
sectionalism an "artificial" issue and he indicted the
abolitionists as traitors to the Union. He called for
[T]he recognition of an equal title to 
love, regard, honor, equality, in each 
and every state and region; that 
studious and that admirable conclusion 
of all things sectional.59
Choate demanded that sectionalism give way before the 
heritage shared by the entire nation. He employed 
further, local iconography in his peroration by reminding 
his audience of Bunker Hill and Faneuil Hall as sites of 
national - not sectional - importance. He reminded his 
audience that the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution inspired the Democratic platform. Those 
documents were not the province of the North but of the 
whole nation. His final appeal was to the memory of 
George Washington, who warned against sectionalism in his 
Farewell Address, an address often quoted by Republican 
speakers seeking to exonerate the Founding Fathers as 
slave owners. Choate neatly deflected the Republican 
arguments with complimentary emotional proofs of his own.
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Summary
The emotional appeals employed by Republican speakers 
were as varied as the backgrounds of the individuals who 
wrote the speeches. Whigs emphasized Union and 
compromise; Democrats plotted to undermine the power of 
Calhoun and his "Slave Power" followers; and the 
abolitionists were determined to abolish slavery 
regardless of the political situation.
Many of the emotional appeals employed by the 
Republicans appear to be at odds with one another because 
of the diversity of political experience brought to the 
campaign by the various speakers. In 1856, the Republican 
party had not yet crystallized its ideology and was still 
dependent upon the prior reputation and particular 
speaking ability of each spokesman. Also, each speaker 
represented a particular personal facet of the political 
scene, so that the individual quite often spoke more 
loudly than did the party he represented.
Since the main thrust of the 1856 campaign was to stop 
the expansion of slavery into the territories, the rampant 
emotionalism of the abolitionists was de-emphasized by 
those speakers who represented the powerful inner circle 
of the organization. For Nathaniel Banks, William Seward 
and George Curtis, rational exposition was a more fitting
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form of persuasion than emotional arguments better suited 
to the pulpit. They strove to form the basis for a 
lasting political organization that would represent more 
than the abolitionist sentiment that originally brought 
them together in 1854. The solid reasoning that 
characterized the speeches of the party organizers was the 
vital thrust that carried the party into the campaign of 
I860, not the stale, emotional diatribes against the evils 
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The Republican campaign rhetoric of 1856 was shaped in 
part by the free soil concerns of northern politicians. 
The repeal of the Compromise of 1850 and the extension of 
slavery into the Kansas territory inflamed those 
Republicans who spoke during the presidential campaign of 
1856.
However, the persuasive arguments employed by 
Republican speakers were constrained by the same 
circumstances that spawned the organization. The 
Republican party was composed of many free soil factions 
rather than a single, cohesive group. The party had no 
history and could provide no sense of identity for its 
members. In addition to the lack of a group identity, 
Republican free soil sentiments ranged from those of the 
abolitionists to those who favored full compromise with 
the Democrats.
Therefore, the free soil conflict which confronted the 
new party was double-edged. Free soil provided the
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campaign platform, but divided the rhetors according to 
individual sentiments.
The arguments employed by Republican party spokesmen 
generally advocated free soil policies for political, 
moral, and economic reasons. The arguments were open to 
individual interpretation, allowing each speaker to meet 
the needs of his particular audience while pursuing his 
own variety of free soil advocacy.
First, the political arguments in favor of free soil 
were designed to attack the results of pro-slavery. 
Democratic policies in the territories and in the South. 
Anti-slavery arguments and anti-Democratic arguments were 
interchangeable, according to the surviving speech texts. 
Republican speakers linked the Democratic party and pro­
slavery activities, establishing an anti-Democratic 
identity for members of the new party.
In addition to the anti-Democratic unity advocated by 
Republican speakers, the free soil concept united the 
North against the Slave Power Conspiracy of the South. 
These sectional arguments, coupled with the anti- 
Democratic rhetoric of the Republican campaign, gave the 
members of the new party a sense of political identity.
Second, Republican speakers established an economic 
identity for their audiences. Republicans, they 
explained, were free-state residents who were convinced 
that slave labor, if unstopped, would increase white
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unemployment and close the western frontier to eastern 
emigrants. It was the duty of Republicans to vote the 
Democrats out of office so that slavery might be contained 
in the South for the economic good of the free white men 
of the North.
Third, slavery was morally reprehensible to the free 
men of the North, according to party spokesmen.
Republican speakers backed their moral arguments against 
slavery with evidence from the long history of 
abolitionism in New England. Slavery imprisoned both the 
black man and the white man, they argued.
The Republican platform of 1856 was a compromise 
measure, designed to satisfy the more militant free soil 
members of the party. Yet, Republicans argued in favor of 
non-expansion and free soil rather than for abolition and 
universal emancipation. Abolition implied militancy and 
lawlessness, whereas the new party demanded law and order 
on the territorial frontier.
Conclusions
Although the Republicans lost the presidential election 
of 1856, the party was successful in 1860. The rhetorical 
strategies used by party spokesmen in 1856 provided 
rhetorical strategies for successful Republican campaigns 
in 1858 and 1860.
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A primary element in the Republican success was the 
politically experienced men who joined the party as its 
spokesmen. They effectively created a political identity 
for the new party, avoiding any similarity to the old Whig 
and abolitionist organizations. Many campaign speakers 
did not identify themselves as "Republicans." They spoke 
of issues and national concerns that were part of the 
Republican platform rather than making promises in the 
name of the Republican party. Many of the speakers who 
chose to remain formally unaffiliated with the Republican 
party were known to be opposed to the Democratic 
administration. However, once the new party placed 
members into the Congress and produced great popular 
support at the polls in 1856, many previously unaffiliated 
opinion leaders openly joined the party and touted their 
"charter" membership to generate added ethos for 
themselves in the campaigns of 1858 and 1860.
In order to establish some form of identification with 
their audiences, Republican speakers addressed gatherings 
as fellow-citizens, fellow-merchants or fellow-scholars in 
1856. By 1858, they could address their audiences as 
fellow-Republicans, based on the demographic evidence of 
election returns. The radical Republicans usually 
resorted to slavery issues to cement identification with 
their audiences, while the moderates chose economic themes 
to dispose the audience in their favor. By 1858, both
contingents of the Republican party could point to 
Congressional and state voting records of party members as 
well as the destructive line of policy being followed by 
the Democrats in the face of an alternative Republican 
platform.
However, Republican speakers faced constraints imposed 
by the situation they strove to resolve. The political 
factions which composed the new party included many former 
Democrats. To verbally abuse a party to which they had so 
recently owed political loyalty was a difficult task. 
According to Lloyd Bitzer's rhetorical analysis of Abraham 
Lincoln's campaign speaking in 1860, Senator Stephen 
Douglas and his fellow Democrats continued to be blamed 
for perpetrating a pro-slavery conspiracy. Therefore, 
much of the anti-Democratic rhetoric was aimed at 
President Pierce, the Pierce Administration, and the Slave 
Power Democrats. The "evil" Democrats had allowed the 
repeal of the Missouri and Clay Compromises into which the 
non-slave states had entered in good faith. The negation 
of the compromises, in addition to destroying good faith, 
allowed the perpetuation of an institution which was 
morally reprehensible to the Republicans of the northeast. 
The Slave Power conspiracy theory proved popular in 1856 
as a unification theme in the northeast, so it was 
retained as one of the fantasy themes of the later 
Republican campaigns.
Speakers painted the expansion of slavery as an 
immediate threat to the security of the free state 
residents by portraying the violence in Kansas as the 
result of slavery expansion policies favored by the 
Democrats. The causal links used by the Republicans to 
blame the Democratic administration for the constitutional 
violations in Kansas were expanded (or chained) to 
illustrate a threat to the entire nation.
By placing the blame for the frontier atrocities on the 
Democrats, the Republicans continued to strengthen their 
party identity as the united opposition to the "evil" 
Democrats. This form of party identification was vital to 
the new party in 1856 and their united opposition to 
Democratic territorial legislation continued into the 
campaigns of 1858 and 1860. According to Bitzer's 
analysis, the Dred Scott decision increased the urgency of 
the debates concerning the legality of slavery as a local 
or a national institution.
Republican speakers continued to support the sectional 
nature of their party. Sectionalism was a frequent and 
violent theme in the Republican speeches during the 1858 
campaigns. However, the sectionalism fostered by the anti­
slavery platform of the party created another rhetorical 
problem. Since the majority of large business owners in 
the North had economic ties to the South, a means of 
providing a sense of economic security had to be
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discovered. This problem was not solved until after the 
campaign of 1856. Instead, the rampant sectional 
arguments of 1856 were designed to insult and isolate all 
southerners, as well as anyone with economic or emotional 
ties to the South, whether they were slaveholders or not. 
The vicious verbal attacks aimed at the educational, 
social and moral structures of the slave states alarmed 
those conservative northern businessmen whose economic 
success depended in some measure upon a stable southern 
trade. The radical anti-southern sentiments which proved 
so popular with mass audiences in the North widened the 
gap between the Republicans and the business community.
As a result, the Republicans never accumulated a 
comfortable treasury during the 1856 campaign.* Large 
donors were not attracted to the party, mainly because of 
its uncompromising sectionalism. Instead, the Know- 
Nothing party attracted many of the wealthy, north-eastern 
businessmen in 1856, a party that promised to shield their 
business ventures from immigrants and papists, as well as 
from radical Republicans.
However, the sectional argument remained one of the 
strongest stock arguments in the Republican repertoire.
The argument condemned Democrats, slavery, the South and 
Stephen Douglas in a variety of ingenious forms. These 
various forms of the sectional argument became the bases 
for the fantasy themes which chained through the
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Republican culture in the four years prior to the election 
of 1860. Lincoln’s enhanced conspiracy theory was simply 
a more sophisticated form of the sectional argument of 
1856.2
Judging the effectiveness of public speaking is a 
difficult task. Thonssen, Baird, and Braden suggest in 
Speech Criticism that audience response is one method of 
judging effectiveness. However, since a variety of 
speeches that were given over several months time were 
examined in this study, the only available form of 
response would be the popular vote recorded at the end of 
the campaign. Since voting abuses, errors in tabulation, 
and the lack of a uniform registration code existed in 
1856, the popular tally of recorded votes cannot be an 
accurate measure of audience response.
In fact, there were recorded votes for Republican 
candidates. John C. Fremont received one-third of the 
official popular presidential vote in 1856. Other 
Congressional and state offices were filled by Republican 
candidates in 1856 and the years which followed. Voters 
were being affected by the Republican appeals and electing 
party members to public office. According to Thonssen, 
Baird, and Braden, effective oratory can be measured by 
the actions taken by the audience as a result of hearing a 
speech.2 But, judging the effects of many speeches over a 
six month period may not be defensible.
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However, Speech Criticism also suggests that an 
effective speech should function as a means of positive 
social change. Rather than limiting judgement of public 
speaking to the immediate audience response, the critic 
may study the effect of rhetoric on groups of people which 
associate with one another in public life.4 Specifically, 
the methodology demands that effective rhetoric 
anticipates the needs of a future audience as well as the 
needs of an immediate audience. If the orator 
demonstrates foresight, wisdom, vision, and perspicacity, 
then his arguments may be judged sound.5
Therefore, the speeches of the Republican presidential 
campaign may be judged according to their political and 
social value in light of later Republican campaigns. The 
political arguments of 1856 grew from the political 
exigence provided by the territorial violence and the 
perceived Slave Power threat from the South. The social 
arguments reflected the larger value-laden issues 
identified by Republican speakers such as Nathaniel Banks 
and George Curtis.
The Republican speakers in 1856 demanded an end to the 
bloodshed in the territories, adequate representation for 
the anti-slavery residents of Kansas, and legislation to 
stop the spread of slavery into the territories. These 
demands met immediate political needs; these demands would 
cease to define the party when solutions were presented.
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However, the compelling political issues of the 1860 
presidential campaign were similar to those issues of 
1856. The slavery issue was still unresolved and 
territorial violence continued. The speakers who 
predicted that the violence would escalate were correct in 
their predictions. Speeches supporting territorial law 
and order were delivered by Republican rhetors during the 
four years between presidential elections.
Eyewitnesses like Robinson and Reeder continued to 
demand an end to the pro-slavery, Democratic support of 
the Lecompte faction in Kansas. Since James Buchanan, a 
Democrat, was serving as President, Republicans continued 
to argue that the Democrats were to blame for the bloody 
territorial violence.
The short-term demands of speakers like Clay, Robinson, 
Reeder, Beecher, and Cheever were validated during the 
period between presidential elections. Violence did 
escalate, as they predicted; the threat of slavery 
expansion strengthened with the reinstitution of the slave 
trade under a Democratic administration; and the spectre 
of a united Slave Power grew stronger as southern "fire- 
eaters" urged separation from the Union. These Republican 
speakers were accurate in their predictions of political 
events in their immediate future, but would their campaign 
rhetoric provide the basis for a lasting ideology?
Speakers such as Chase, Banks, Curtis, and Seward 
provided the Republicans with transcendent ideas which 
survived the political crises of the pre-Civil War era. 
Their arguments in favor of liberty, freedom, and the 
constitutionality of the legislation passing through 
Congress were not dependent upon the particular political 
situation. The values reflected in their appeals were 
open to compromise and wide interpretation.
The Republican argument protesting the constitutional 
legality for the adoption of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
provided an ideological basis for other legislative 
battles, rather than being limited to a single situation. 
The economic issues inherent in the Republican free labor 
concept provided the ideological framework for 
endorsements of future economic policies.
The Republican idealists proposed social concepts that 
sustained the party through the slavery crisis. The 
effectiveness of their appeals can be measured by the 
survival of the party. Slavery has been legislated out of 
existence and the Kansas territorial dispute has been 
settled. Yet, the ideals of the early Republicans 
continue to exist in the economic and legislative policies 
of the contemporary party.
According to Ernest Bormann, the fantasy themes which 
were most important during the late 1850s linked the free 
soil movement to the rhetorical visions of a free
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frontier.6 Abraham Lincoln, especially, was concerned 
about the dangers of slavery and the southern policy of 
expansionism. Bormann claims that "Lincoln's vision 
portrayed the issue as one of great historical importance, 
of the survival of the Union . . . In essence, Lincoln 
was caught up in a restoration drama that concerned his 
entire party - the restoration of the Union to the 
principles of full equality and "the great experiment in 
human self-government" that occupied the founding fathers.
On June 16 1858, Abraham Lincoln delivered his "House 
Divided" speech in Springfield, Illinois.® The occasion 
was his acceptance of the Republican nomination for a seat 
in the United States Senate. This speech was an example 
of the restoration theme in Republican rhetoric which was 
popularized in the speaking of the 1858 Illinois 
senatorial campaign.
Slavery was still the pivotal issue in national 
politics and the Republicans seemed no closer to 
legislating an end to slavery than they were in 1856. 
Lincoln was concerned about the divisiveness of the 
slavery issue and could not comprehend how the nation 
might survive as a single unit until its resolution. He 
did not predict the destruction of the Union in his 
address, but he did warn the South to prepare to abolish 
slavery according to the dictates of the free soil 
advocates.
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Lincoln concluded that the Union would endure 
regardless of the stress placed upon it by the divisive 
slavery issue because all internal conflict could be 
settled constitutionally.
Even the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was placed 
in historical perspective by Lincoln, proof that even such 
a grievous wrong could be rectified through the normal 
course of justice.9 Without public endorsement of the 
repeal, the law could not be made to work. If the 
"rightful basis" of the government were allowed to work in 
favor of the people it was designed to represent and 
protect, then the expansion of slavery would be a moot 
issue. However, the particular problem facing the 
Republicans remained the same in 1858 as it had in 1856 - 
how were they to ensure that the legal system of the 
United States government would be allowed to operate in 
all states and all territories?
With regard to the "gag rule" and the fugitive slave 
laws, Lincoln remarked that the "opposition" chose to 
constrain the entire concept of self-government within the 
following definition: " . . .  that if any one man choose 
to enslave another, no third man shall be allowed to 
object."10
In summary, Bormann's analysis of Lincoln's speaking in 
1858 finds that Abraham Lincoln was more concerned with 
the governmental imbalance that affected the ability to
compromise among the regions than with the issue of 
slavery. Lincoln assumed that the institution of slavery 
would expire without government intervention. He was much 
more concerned with the heated sectionalism and the lack 
of national unity that inspired men to reinterpret the 
Constitution to meet their immediate political needs. 
Lincoln was not confident that the Union could survive the 
sectional divisiveness that closed off avenues of 
discussion and debate, reducing the grounds for common 
identification and self-government among the states,H 
However, the sectional argument remained one of the 
strongest stock emotional arguments in the Republican 
repertoire. The argument was useful for the condemnation 
of Democrats, slavery, the South and Stephen Douglas in 
any variety of ingenious forms. Sectionalism and frontier 
violence provided the means of political identification in 
a decade when it was necessary to skirt the issue of 
outright abolition. Without these specific emotional 
appeals, the strength of the identification between the 
new party and the northern idealists would have faltered 
early in 1856. The Republicans were closely linked to 
their own arguments against the brutality of a social 
system that enslaved both black and white citizens. They 
couldn't simply drop sectionalism and anti-expansionism 
for a new vision in 1858 and 1860.
"Free labor" was a Republican concept that was the 
perfect counterpoint to their "free men" philosophy. One 
could not exist without the other. However, the concepts 
were so broad that any number of intellectual and 
political interpretations could be applied in the course 
of future campaigns.
Suggestions for Further Study
Eric Foner suggested that the campaign of 1856 has been 
too long ignored by historians and political scientists. 
The lack of secondary source material currently available 
about this presidential contest confirms Foner's 
observation. In order to make the best use of extant 
historical and political studies of the immediate pre- 
Civil War era, the rhetorical scholar will need to examine 
particular arguments for their historical development, 
that is, to search for the historical exigence from which 
the campaign arguments arose.
In particular, rhetoricians contemplating a study of 
the campaign rhetoric of the mid-nineteenth century will 
need to explore private collections for biographical and 
communication data of those speakers who have not been 
treated to exhaustive, published biographies. For 
example, many influential Republican speakers such as
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Robinson and Reeder are not profiled in volumes easily 
accessible to scholars outside of Kansas.
The formation of the Republican party is only briefly 
treated in this study. Most standard Republican histories 
state that a new party was formed on one of several 
disputed dates. Although theories of organizational 
structure apply to the formation of any political party, 
no study has been devoted to the formation of the 
Republican party in particular. A rhetorician with 
expertise in organizational communication should examine 
the dynamics of party formation in greater depth than this 
study provides.
The Democratic and Know-Nothing answers to the 
particular Republican free soil charges need to be 
studied. In some regions of the country, Republican 
speakers advocated compromise with one or the other of the 
opposing parties in an effort to split the vote. The 
rhetorical significance of the arguments in favor of 
campaign compromise needs further study.
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